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Politicians or Parties? Assessing the Effects of Intraparty Conflict in the United States
Oliver Ahlstrom McClellan
This dissertation presents the results of a series of large-N, demographically representative
survey experiments conducted at different stages of the 2020 presidential election cycle,
designed to test the effects of highlighting intraparty policy conflict on subjects’ political
beliefs. I find politicians of both major political parties are able to persuade followers to
take on counter-party policy positions with limited electoral risk, and that these persuasive
effects are enduring, still detectable nine months after treatment. While subjects updated
their own policy positions in response to treatment, they did not update the policy
positions they prefer when selecting among hypothetical candidates, in contrast to issue
voting theorists predictions. While politicians appear to be far more effective opinion
leaders than parties, therefore, their persuasive abilities may not significantly alter the
shape of the partisan electorate as faced by other candidates. These findings refine our
scholarly understanding of individual politicians as opinion leaders in the contemporary
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Introduction
In electoral systems, there is a fundamental tension between individual political candidates
and the political parties they represent. In the United States, individualistic politics and
separate elections for the legislative and executive branches create an unusual system that
empowers individual politicians. Foundational theories of the interactions between political
parties and individual candidates in the U.S., however, still put much stock in the power of
parties. In recent years partisanship has been identified as perhaps the single most powerful
driver of American political behavior. Studies of political participation and policy persuasion
support the idea that partisan voters support candidates and policies that receive their par-
ties’ endorsement, often uncritically and regardless of their own ideology. Yet the literature
on elite influence on public opinion theoretically and empirically identifies a central role for
popular politicians to shape their supporters’ political preferences.
Despite this wealth of research, the hierarchy between politicians and parties is still
unclear. The two are often conflated, particularly when used to cue policy positions, a trend
that has increased as political polarization between the two major parties and ideological
consistency within each of them have risen over the past decades. Most of what we can
surmise about this hierarchy and tension is indirect, based on circumstantial evidence that
partisan members of the electorate have a stronger attachment to either politicians or parties,
or by comparing treatment effect sizes created by different types of cues. The lack of firm
knowledge about the relationship between and hierarchy of politicians and party in the
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minds of the electorate limits our ability to forecast how partisans will react when prominent
politicians break from party orthodoxy.
What happens when politicians contradict their parties? Which of these figures do par-
tisans follow? Should a given party take a stand against heterodox politicians for the sake of
maintaining ideological consistency? Or do they stand to benefit more from staying in the
good graces of popular figures, even if it means reversing course on long-held party policy
doctrine? Do candidates who buck the party line fundamentally alter policy preferences of
the partisan electorate for future candidates, as issue voting theories would predict? These
questions are highly salient in contemporary politics, as political scientists, pundits, and
members of the public offer conflicting takes on the political tug-of-war unfolding in the
Republican Party between the party and its most prominent politician, President Donald
Trump, as well as in the Democratic Party between “party-line” candidates like President
Joe Biden and progressive figures like Senator Bernie Sanders.
This dissertation presents the results of a series of large-N, demographically representa-
tive survey experiments in three chapters. Each chapter estimates the effects of the same set
of treatments on a different set of outcomes. The experiments were conducted at different
stages of the 2020 presidential election cycle, beginning in the lead-up to the Democratic
Party’s presidential primary elections and continuing until just before the November general
election. Respondents were randomly shown a series of informational treatments consisting
of real news stories, candidate quotes or Twitter posts, and accurate factual statements that
highlighted intraparty policy conflict, identifying the cued politician and their party as op-
posing one another on specific policies. Broadly, the experiments find that politicians of both
major political parties are able to persuade followers to take on counter-party policy posi-
tions with limited electoral risk. This persuasion was both large in magnitude and enduring,
still detectable nine months after initial treatment. Despite the large effects treatment had
on respondents’ own policy preferences, however, treatment did not have any significant ef-
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fect on respondents’ selection of hypothetical candidates separated by their policy positions.
This finding calls into question the long-term effects individual politicians have on electorate
preferences and stands in contradiction to issue voting theories’ predictions.
The first chapter presents the effects of seeing politicians’ and parties’ conflicting pol-
icy positions on subjects’ own policy preferences. Subjects aligned their preferences with
those of their preferred politicians, against their parties, in nearly all cases. Even partisans
who professed an affinity to politicians new to the national stage such as then-Mayor Pete
Buttigieg were more likely to side with their new attachment (Buttigieg) than their long-
held one (the Democratic Party). This is true for all candidates on issues across the political
spectrum and for all types of informational treatment. This chapter explores a variety of
sources of treatment effect heterogeneity, including the method of informational treatment,
policy area, and subject characteristics such as support for the cued politician, strength of
partisan affiliation, and education. The opinion changes identified in this chapter, in addition
to being large in magnitude, exhibited remarkable endurance. A recontact survey conducted
nine months after the initial wave identified significant persuasive effects from the first wave
treatments. Broadly, the chapter argues that attachments to particular partisan candidates,
even those formed recently, generally outweigh subjects’ allegiance to their political parties
when it comes to policy preferences. It finds that follow-the-leader persuasion caused even
by light-touch treatments is both significant and durable.
The second chapter examines effects of treatment on subjects’ evaluations of the cued
objects—politicians and parties. Outside of a few exceptional candidate × policy combina-
tions, among their supporters politicians appear to suffer only minimal evaluation effects for
adopting unpopular or counter-party positions, even in the presence of explicit counter cues
from respondents’ political parties. This effect held among both Democratic and Republi-
can respondents, though evaluation effects were slightly stronger among Democrats. As the
number of counter-party issue positions shown to subjects increased, so did the magnitude
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of evaluation effects for both politician and party, though even at high dosage evaluation
magnitudes remain relatively small for both parties. Critically, however, treatment group
respondents lowered their evaluations of all politicians and parties, not just those whose
positions were shown by treatments. This suggests the political conflict inherent in each
treatment may be the primary driver of this chapter’s estimated evaluation effects, rather
than the specific policy positions conveyed by treatment. While politicians’ evaluation penal-
ties for opposing their political parties were small, even among co-partisan nonsupporters,
highlighting politicians’ policy disagreements with other co-partisan politicians elicited eval-
uation penalties of much greater magnitude. Even these more significant penalties were
entirely eliminated, however, when the salience of interparty competition was increased.
Taken together, these findings support recent arguments that many traditional theories of
democratic accountability have ceased to operate as theorized in contemporary interparty
competition, but may still function in primary elections.
The final chapter presents the results of a conjoint experiment in which respondents se-
lected among hypothetical candidates differentiated by their policy positions. This design
enabled the measurement of whether and to what extent popular politicians shape the elec-
torate other politicians face. In this way, it also directly tests issue voting theories. While
treatments caused random, durable, and significant changes in respondents’ policy positions,
they appear to have had no effect on the policy positions respondents preferred when choos-
ing which hypothetical candidates to support. This outcome casts doubt on the long-term
effect even highly effective opinion leaders like Donald Trump may have on the preferences
of the partisan electorate, and provides evidence contrary to issue voting model predictions.
Taken together, the results presented in these three chapters point to individual politi-
cians’ great persuasive powers among their supporters, and political parties’ inability to
effectively counter politicians who achieve a national following, but also suggest that this
persuasive power does not fundamentally reshape the partisan electorate. Outside of a few
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specific issues, politicians appear to suffer few penalties for adopting even highly unpopular
positions, even when their departure from partisan norms is made clear. Despite politicians’
significant powers as opinion leaders, however, their ultimate effect on electorate preferences
is less clear. Parties may not need to adjust their platform to match the policy positions of
their most popular politicians, and candidates new to the political scene may have difficulty
riding the coattails of heterodox politicians on the basis of policy positions.
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Chapter 1: Policy Persuasion
Abstract: The first chapter presents the effects of informational treatments showing the
conflicting policy stances of politicians and their parties on partisan subjects’ policy prefer-
ences. Subjects generally aligned their preferences with those of their preferred politicians,
against their parties. Even partisans who professed an affinity to politicians new to the
national stage, such as then-Mayor Pete Buttigieg, were more likely to side with their new
attachment (Buttigieg) than their long-held one (the Democratic Party). This result held
true for both Democrats and Republicans, for all tested candidates on issues across the polit-
ical spectrum. This persuasion exhibited surprising durability, still detectable in a followup
survey conducted more than nine months after initial treatment. The method of information
transmission, however, is important. When compared to treatments that relayed politician
and party cues through direct factual statements, personal communication, such as direct
quotes or Tweets, were more persuasive. Traditional news articles conveying the same in-
formation, in contrast, had weaker effects than factual statements. The chapter argues that
attachments to particular partisan candidates, even those formed recently, outweigh sub-
jects’ allegiance to their political parties when it comes to policy preferences, and that the




In the immediate aftermath of the 2018 mass shooting in Parkland, Florida, President Don-
ald Trump expressed support for increasing restrictions on firearm sales and ownership.
President Trump’s departure from Republican Party orthodoxy led to much consternation
among the Republican elite, both in government and in the electorate. Republican Party
leaders and GOP-supporting interest group strategists hurried to meet with Donald Trump
and convince him to reverse his support for increasing gun control, which he did. But were
GOP anxieties merited? What are the effects on partisan voters when prominent politicians
oppose party doctrine? Do partisans follow favored politicians or parties? This chapter mea-
sures the effects of informational cues highlighting conflicting policy positions for politicians
and parties on partisan respondents own policy preferences. I find partisan respondents side
with favored politicians, against their party, in nearly all cases, and do so strongly.
The scholarly literature examining political elites’ influence on American citizens’ policy
preferences is an extensive one. Both seminal theories of public opinion (Key, 1961; Page
and Shapiro, 1992; Zaller, 1992) and modern empirical studies (Broockman and Butler, 2017;
Lenz, 2012)1 identify the central role political leaders play in forming and changing the policy
preferences of average citizens, despite differently interpreting the nature of the influence and
the normative implications of this influence on democratic functioning.
Many scholars interpret the powerful influence elite cues exert on public opinion as nor-
matively problematic for the prospects of political accountability in a citizen-led democracy
(Bullock, 2011; Key, 1955; Lenz, 2012). However, even extreme deference toward political
elites’ policy positions by the public could alternatively be interpreted as evidence of effective
heuristic use: people trust their parties and prominent political figures to better understand
political issues and to protect their interests—in the absence of strongly held beliefs or deep
1Though see also Butler and Hassell (2018) for limits of these effects.
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knowledge on a particular topic, citizens defer to trusted, better-informed sources.
Despite the proliferation of empirical research on elite influence on public opinion in
recent years, several important gaps in this literature remain: most elite persuasion studies
focus on non-salient issues,2 focus on hypothetical candidates (Bullock, 2011; Boudreau
and MacKenzie, 2014; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus, 2013), or are only able to study
persuasive effects for one politician or one political party (Barber and Pope, 2019). Perhaps
most importantly, partisan and politician cues are typically conflated, either implicitly or
explicitly. Yet the two are different in important ways. Unlike parties, individual politicians
are not beholden to the public will beyond their own election cycles and terms of office
(Key, 1955; Aldrich, 1995). As Key puts it, the political party as an organization “wants
to upset no applecarts and conduct no crusades...Great popular leaders invariably want to
upset somebody’s applecart and to conduct some sort of crusade,”(Key, 1955, p.314). If
the power to shape electorate preferences resides in attachments to individuals rather than
parties or ideologies, the implications of elite influence on public opinion point towards a
potentially more volatile and reactive electorate.
What happens when the cues from prominent, favored politicians and political parties
push in opposite directions? When forced choose between the two, do people side with
their party doctrine, or with their politician’s ‘doctrine’? Does the direction or magnitude
of persuasive power vary by policy area, by party, or by candidate? Prior to 2016, as
parties appeared to be growing more ideologically homogeneous (Levendusky, 2009), one
might have thought scenarios where prominent politicians and their parties took opposing
policy positions were unlikely to arise and these questions therefore of little relevance to real
world politics. In contemporary politics, however, following the Republican base’s embrace
of Donald Trump’s unorthodox policy positions and the popularity of prominent Democratic
politicians who oppose the Democratic Party from the left, these questions have risen to the
2Ciuk and Yost (2016), for example, find that elite cues are primarily effective for low-salience issues.
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top of mind for political scientists, pundits, and the public alike.
This dissertation chapter presents the results of a study designed to answer these ques-
tions. In January 2020, partisan respondents were randomly shown a random number of
informational treatments that highlighted intraparty policy conflict between their party and
its presidential candidates. Following treatment, respondents were asked their own positions
on the same policies. In addition to testing these cues for both the Democratic Party and
the Republican Party, this experiment examined how persuasive effects varied across candi-
dates within one party. Specifically, fielding the experiment during the Democratic Party’s
presidential primary election allowed separate analyses of supporters of then-frontrunners
Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigeig across a variety of policy
areas.
When politicians take stances different from the long-held positions of the political par-
ties they represent, supporters tend to side with favored politicians rather than favored
parties. Unlike previous studies’ use of low-salience policies when measuring persuasiveness,
this study tests high-salience, contentious political issues and prominent national politi-
cians, shown by Barber and Pope (2019) and Nicholson (2012) to be particularly influential
on public opinion. Even while conveying the same policy information, the method of com-
munication appears to be important for politicians’ persuasive powers: adding symmetrical
personal quotes and Tweets from the politician and party to the baseline informational
statements increased the persuasive power of politician over party, while conveying the same
information through news articles reduced politicians’ power relative to their parties. Fi-
nally, there is evidence of significant heterogeneity in treatment effects among respondents.
Stronger ideological identification and partisan affiliation in particular each appear to in-
crease respondents’ tendencies to side with politician over party.
This paper proceeds in the following manner: the next section summarizes the theoretical
and empirical works that motivate this study. The following section defines the hypotheses
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to be tested. The section after describes the sample on which the experiment was conducted,
the issues tested, and the experimental design. The results section describes persuasive treat-
ment effects for each politician and policy, before turning to a pooled analysis to examine
treatment effect heterogeneity by treatment type and by respondent characteristics. The final
section concludes by summarizing the major finding of this study: when people are forced
to choose between politician and party, they side with the politician. Politicians’ greater
sway among the electorate seems to increase when their positions are relayed through per-
sonal communication and decrease when the same information is conveyed by conventional
news stories, suggesting the changing landscape of political communication is increasing the
power of individual politicians over the parties that they represent. Critically, these per-
suasive effects are surprisingly enduring, still detectable more than nine months after initial
treatment, unlike the persuasive effects estimated in many previous survey experiments.
Politicians’ and Parties’ Influence on Public Opinion
Understanding the role played by leaders in guiding the public opinion of democratic polities
has been a central focus of the American politics literature since its inception. Of particular
interest is political leaders’ ability to influence the public’s beliefs and preferences. V.O.
Key provides an early take on the dynamics between political leadership and public opinion:
“mass opinion finds expression principally through the mechanisms of political leadership.
Responses to survey questions delineate, not necessarily a ghostly entity whose likes and
dislikes are automatically transmuted into public policy, but a state of mind susceptible to
exploitation by political leadership” (Key, 1961, pp.151). Key acknowledges the influence
political parties and partisan identity have on their supporters’ attitudes (Key, 1961) but
distinguishes between the potential for influence held by the parties and by parties’ indi-
vidual leaders. While political parties’ bureaucratic roots lead them towards organizational
10
conservatism and therefore make them poor persuaders of the public, popular leaders are
often drawn from outside the party and are chosen3 for their dynamism and persuasive abil-
ities (Key, 1955). Key argues that the influence individual candidates can have on public
opinion is not only more powerful than parties’ influence, it has the potential to be more dan-
gerous, due to individual candidates’ shorter electoral time horizons, compared to parties’.
Parties “may hesitate to antagonize large groups by inflammatory appeals; the organization
wants to live and fight another day, whereas a candidate with only a personal following may
regard a campaign as only a matter of the moment” (Key, 1955, pp.315). More than a
half-century later, Lenz (2012) expresses a similar sentiment: “The finding that people took
cues from candidates as much, or more, than they did from parties may imply that they are
blindly following candidates who catch their fancy, rather than cuing off parties that repre-
sent their interests” (Lenz, 2012, pp.488-489). This dissertation takes seriously the critical
differences between parties and individual politicians, and seeks to test directly whether the
follow-the-leader persuasion Lenz identifies is more powerfully driven by personal or partisan
attachments.
Despite fundamental differences, both practical and normative, between opinion leader-
ship by individual candidates and opinion leadership by political parties, the two sources
of opinion leadership have typically been conflated in both empirical and theoretical works
since Key’s writing. One of the most influential models of elite influence on public opinion,
Zaller’s (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model, centers political leadership in its ac-
count of public opinion formation and change. However, it does not theoretically distinguish
between signals coming from candidates and those provided by parties, nor does it specify
how such a division might alter the model. Conflicting signals in the RAS model are split
3Key notes that these leaders are often not initially embraced by the party: “In times of stress these
leaders virtually force themselves on the party organization, which may have little choice in the matter if it
is to have a winning candidate. One can call the roll of great popular leaders, and nearly all of them have
had to overcome resistance of the organization of their party”(Key, 1955, pp.313-314).
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along ideological lines, not by source. In Zaller’s model, political messages are separated on
the basis of whether they appeal to liberal or conservative values, not whether they come
from a candidate or a party (Zaller, 1992, ch.9). Messaging coming from presidents is not
distinguished from messaging coming from presidents’ parties. Page and Shapiro (1992) also
describe an essential role for leaders in guiding public opinion by interpreting and explaining
complicated political circumstances to the public. While the authors distinguish the persua-
sive ability of presidents over other politicians, here, too, they do not distinguish between
messaging coming from presidents and parties.
Empirical studies on the persuasive effects of elite cues also do not directly contrast per-
son and party. Nicholson (2012) separately tests the effects of persuasive cues that feature
party leaders and cues that contain party labels, finding that party leader labels are more
persuasive. Similarly, Barber and Pope (2019) find stronger effects for leader cues than party
cues; treatments that cued “Trump” were effective, while treatments that cued “Republi-
cans in Congress” were not. However, neither of these studies directly test the persuasive
power of the personal versus the party. To all but the most uninformed respondents, cuing a
national partisan figure cues that figure’s party as well. Cuing “Trump” implicitly cues “Re-
publicans.” Treatments that contain explicit politician cues for prominent partisans contain
implicit party cues as well. Treatment subjects seeing a politician cue are therefore getting a
“double dose” of persuasive treatment; it is unsurprising that this treatment condition pro-
duces larger effects than treatments containing party alone. The only study that positions
American politicians and their parties on opposite sides of an issue does not reach a clear
conclusion as to which cue is stronger; Agadjanian (2020) finds Democrats sided with their
cued politician (Obama) while Republicans sided with their cued party, but the evidence is
not clear on this matter.
The study described here is designed to test the persuasive power of politicians against
the persuasive power of parties. Which of these signals people tend to follow is a question
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of significant practical and normative importance. Despite being identified as such over a
half-century ago, it is a question that has, until now, gone untested.
1 Hypotheses
This experiment is designed to test one central hypothesis:
H1: When cues from politicians and their party push in opposite directions, treatment
subjects will follow the politician, not the party, adopting policy preferences closer to
the position promoted by the politician and farther from that promoted by the party.
Heterogeneous treatment effects are also explored, as stipulated in the pre-analysis plan.
Of the pre-registered potential sources of heterogeneity, examined in this paper are het-
erogeneity in persuasive effects for different types of informational treatment, as well as
respondent characteristics including political knowledge, ideology, strength of partisan affil-
iation and support for the cued politician. In addition, a survey fielded nine months after
the initial survey recontacted respondents to measure the durability of the persuasive effects
estimated.
2 Research Design
The experiment examined in this chapter and the following chapters was pre-registered. The
preregistration plan can be found at https://osf.io/4u2g6.
2.1 Sample
The experiment described in this dissertation was conducted on a convenience sample of
nearly 12,000 respondents, recruited from the Lucid Fulcrum Exchange. For a discussion
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of the characteristics of this subject pool and the relevance of the experimental estimates
collected from this pool for drawing conclusions about the American public more broadly,
see Coppock and McClellan (2019). Appendix A contains a demographic summary of the
analyzed sample.
Prior to assignment, subjects were asked a variety of standard demographic and political
affiliation questions. Republican and Republican-leaning respondents were asked whether
they approved of the job Donald Trump was doing as president; those who approved of the
job Trump was doing as president were categorized as Trump supporters. Democrat and
Democrat-leaning respondents were asked which of the Democratic primary candidates (Joe
Biden, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg) they would vote for, were
the Democratic presidential primary held today, and were categorized as supporters of the
Democratic candidate they selected. All respondents were then asked questions to assess
the strength of their support for the indicated politician, as well as how likable and how
competent they found said politician.
2.2 Treatment Types
This experiment includes three different types of informational treatment: simple statements,
personal pleas, and news articles. Example text for each treatment type is included here,
with full treatment text included in Appendix H. These treatments were pre-registered and
are also available at https://osf.io/4u2g6.
The primary treatment type analyzed in this chapter were symmetrical, factual state-
ments which revealed the opposing positions of politician and party on the cued policy,
without any rhetoric or justification for the positions shown. The treatment text for Donald
Trump and the Republican Party cues for increasing gun control is included below as an
example.
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• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before decid-
ing your position on increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own
firearms.
The Republican Party opposes increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms.
However, Donald Trump supports increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on indi-
viduals’ rights to purchase and own firearms?
The personal plea treatments were similar to the simple statements, but add personal
language from both the politician and party. Tweets were taken from the candidates’ per-
sonal Twitter accounts and articulate the politician’s position on the specific issue without
excessive additional language that may have confounded treatment. Where suitable Tweets
were not available, direct quotes from the politicians were substituted, typically taken from
news stories or recordings of the politicians and were included in their entirety, other than
being edited for clarity. For each of the politician’s personal pleas, corresponding excerpts
were taken from the recent party platforms (2008, 2012, or 2016) that identify the party as
opposing the cued politician on the policy. These excerpts were also only edited for clarity,
with all substantive content left unaltered. These paired statements, one from the politician
and one from the party, show the politician’s position running counter to the party’s.
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your
position on increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own firearms.
The Republican Party opposes increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms, as stated in a recent official Republican Party Plat-
form:
“We uphold the right of individuals to keep and bear arms, a natural inalienable right
that predates the Constitution and is secured by the Second Amendment...We oppose
any effort to deprive individuals of their right to keep and bear arms.”
However, Donald Trump supports increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
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to purchase and own firearms, a stance he reiterated in a recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on indi-
viduals’ rights to purchase and own firearms?
The third treatment type tested, news article treatments, consisted of real news stories
about the intraparty disagreement on the policy. These news articles depicted the same
policy positions for politician and party as the previous treatment types, with varying degrees
of justification for the positions provided across issue. These articles were edited to remove
named references to politicians other than the one being tested, but were otherwise unaltered
from their published state. While the articles do contain variation in the relative amounts
of justification for both politician and party positions, articles were selected with the goal
of minimizing these differences in order to ensure sufficient comparability across candidates
and issues.
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before decid-
ing your position on increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own
firearms.
(Politico) – Donald Trump thrust himself to the fore of the gun debate on Wednesday,
announcing that he’ll meet with the National Rifle Association to discuss banning
people on the terror and no-fly watch lists from purchasing firearms.
His unprompted announcement pressures the gun lobby to help reach a compromise on
the contentious proposal in the wake of the worst mass shooting in American history.
Though Trump’s proactive stance on the terror watch list issue is new, he has previously
expressed his support of such a ban. Following November’s terrorist attacks in Paris
in which 130 people died, Trump backed a Democratic-pushed measure to bar people
on the watch list from purchasing guns.
Trump’s position appeared to signal a shift from the traditional Republican stance,
which had dismissed such bans just one day ago as ineffective or unconstitutional, if
not both.
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If Donald Trump decides today that he supports ‘No Fly, No Buy,’ it will be just the
latest disagreement that House Republicans say they have with him.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on indi-
viduals’ rights to purchase and own firearms?
2.3 Experimental Design
Following political and demographic covariate measurement, respondents were randomly
assigned to one of the three treatment types and received a random treatment dosage as-
signment, ranging from zero to five. The treatment dosage was then randomly distributed
across five policies. A respondent assigned to the “simple statement” treatment type and
assigned a treatment dosage of two, for example, would receive simple statement treatments
for two of the five issues and the control condition for the remaining three issues. A different
subject could receive the same assignment type and number but see the simple statement
treatments for two different issues. This randomization strategy enables the estimation of
treatment effects for each issue and treatment type combination, unlike most previously con-
ducted similar experiments, such as Barber and Pope (2019). For each issue, respondents
were asked whether they support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose each policy on a
seven-point scale, running from “Support strongly” to “Oppose strongly.”
The analyzed sample consists of Republican supporters of Donald Trump and Democratic
supporters of Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg who com-
pleted all relevant parts of the survey. The sample sizes for each politician in each treatment
condition are presented in Tables 1 through 5.4
4Also included in the pre-registered materials at https://osf.io/4u2g6 are a data simulation and power
analysis that guided the sample allocation decisions.
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Table 1: Donald Trump Sample Sizes by Treatment Type and Dosage
0 1 2 3 4 5
Simple statement treatment 0 169 165 136 149 321
Personal plea treatments 0 166 156 153 155 288
News article treatment 0 152 136 157 152 293
Control (no treatment) 685 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Joe Biden Sample Sizes by Treatment Type and Dosage
0 1 2 3 4 5
Personal plea treatments 0 55 64 75 78 147
Simple statement treatment 0 77 45 53 76 123
News article treatment 0 63 57 68 63 140
Control (no treatment) 299 0 0 0 0 0
2.4 Issues Tested
The primary constraint in selecting issues to use as the bases for treatments was the need
to not deceive respondents on either the political parties’ or politicians’ positions—to be
tested in this study, policies needed to be salient and the subject of real recent intraparty
disagreement between the cued politician and the cued politician’s political party in order
to generate enough material to create the three treatment types, and ideally were issues the
parties had maintained their relative positions on for a substantial length of time. The issues
had to be ones on which the cued politician had taken a direct stance on the record, either
by Tweeting their position or by being quoted as clearly on one side of the issue. In addition,
the issues needed to be ones on which the political party stance had been explicitly stated
in a recent official party platform. The issues also needed to have been discussed in the
mainstream media in order to identify a suitable news story for the news article treatment.
Finally, the five issues together needed to cover a broad range of policy areas.
The issues included are not necessarily representative of all policies. Politicians have a
strategic incentive to take distinctive policy stances on issues for which they believe they can
lead their supporters(Page, Shapiro and Dempsey, 1987)—no strategic politician would want
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Table 3: Bernie Sanders Sample Sizes by Treatment Type and Dosage
0 1 2 3 4 5
Simple statement treatment 0 90 88 102 100 163
Personal plea treatments 0 78 85 78 78 184
News article treatment 0 88 87 97 85 172
Control (no treatment) 387 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Elizabeth Warren Sample Sizes by Treatment Type and Dosage
0 1 2 3 4 5
Simple statement treatment 0 38 35 29 48 69
Personal plea treatments 0 23 36 28 28 86
News article treatment 0 33 34 45 31 76
Control (no treatment) 168 0 0 0 0 0
to stand apart from their parties on issues for which there is little hope of building support.
The timing of this study had benefits for each party in this regard. For the Republicans, as
discussed in Barber and Pope (2019), Donald Trump’s repeated endorsement of unorthodox
policy positions provides an excellent opportunity to separate individual policy positions
from ideological and partisan norms. For the Democrats, the presidential primary brought a
number of individual politicians to the national consciousness, and their direct competition
against one another cast their specific policy differences from one another and from the
partisan norms into sharp relief. The 2020 election cycle therefore represented a unique
opportunity to separate individual politicians’ stances from those of their political parties
for both major parties in the United States. I include a brief summary of each of the
issues tested below, with descriptions of the policy conflict between each candidate and their
political party.
For Donald Trump, the five issues identified were support for NATO, banning all Muslims
from entering the United States, political influence on the Federal Reserve, federal funding
for abortion providers, and increasing limitations on firearm sales. First, while support
for NATO has been a consistently held position in the Republican Party since NATO’s
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Table 5: Pete Buttigieg Sample Sizes by Treatment Type and Dosage
0 1 2 3 4 5
Simple statement treatment 0 25 28 26 18 42
Personal plea treatments 0 25 24 20 36 50
News article treatment 0 27 24 23 27 55
Control (no treatment) 113 0 0 0 0 0
creation, Trump has frequently criticized NATO and its most prominent member states and
has repeatedly stated that the U.S. should leave NATO. Second, Trump’s “Muslim ban”
policy was hotly debated in the mainstream media and within the Republican Party during
2017 and 2018. Donald Trump floated the idea of preventing people of Islamic faith from
entering the U.S. and then doubled down in later interviews, expressing support for banning
all Muslims from entering the United States on multiple occasions. The Republican Party
was opposed to this policy, and most prominent members of the Republican Party denounced
it firmly. Third, preserving independence for the central bank of the United States has long
been a consistent hallmark of conservative fiscal policy; the Republican Party has been
staunch in its support for insulating the Federal Reserve’s financial policies from partisan
politics. Donald Trump’s public statements pressuring the Federal Reserve to take actions
he prefers—usually to increase growth even if it means giving up the low inflation rates fiscal
conservatives favor—have been widely criticized by fiscal conservatives and by the Republican
Party. Fourth, opposition to federal funding for abortion has been a tenet of Republican
Party doctrine since the Reagan era. However, despite his vocal support for overturning
Roe vs. Wade, Trump has on several occasions expressed varying degrees of support for
access to abortion in general and for federal funding of abortion providers like Planned
Parenthood. Fifth, restricting firearm sales is another policy on which the Republican Party
has remained unwavering, even through the ongoing stream of mass shooting casualties across
the country. Following the 2018 shooting in Parkland, Florida, Trump Tweeted support for
various gun control measures, including ending the sale of bump stocks, and increasing the
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legal purchasing age for firearms to 21.
For Joe Biden, the five policy conflicts shown to subjects were on support for charter
schools, marijuana legalization, federal funding for abortions, expanding Social Security, and
building a border wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. First, charter schools have become a
partisan issue in recent years5—individual Democratic politicians are split on this issue,
with 2020 presidential primary candidates on both sides of the issue. Officially, however, at
the time of the experiment the Democratic Party supported charter schools and official 2016
Democratic Party Platform endorsed charter schools. Joe Biden, meanwhile, has consistently
opposed charter schools. Second, marijuana legalization is not a new issue, but has undergone
a sea change in recent years, partially as a result of changes in policy discussions surrounding
criminal justice reform. While the majority of Democrats favor marijuana legalization (67.5%
in the control group for this sample), Joe Biden has gone on the record several times in the
past few years opposing marijuana legalization. Third, one of Biden’s most contentious
policy positions during the Democratic Primary campaign was his support for the Hyde
Amendment, which blocks federal funding for abortions in all cases except to save the life of
the woman, or where the pregnancy arises from rape or incest. The Democratic Party has
staunchly opposed the Hyde Amendment since its creation, and articulates this opposition in
each recent party platform. Fourth, supporting and expanding the Social Security program
has also been a consistent pillar of the Democratic policy platform since the creation of the
Social Security program in 1935. However, while he was a U.S. Senator, Joe Biden opposed
expanding Social Security on several occasions and even supported making cuts to Social
Security benefits in the name of fiscal responsibility, a stance for which his challengers in
the 2020 Democratic presidential primary attacked him repeatedly. Fifth, the border wall
issue has not traditionally been a salient one in American politics; Biden’s vote in favor
of adding physical barriers along the border in 2006 attracted little attention at the time.
5(McClellan et al., 2018)
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The border wall issue came to the fore of policy debates, however, when Donald Trump
promised to “build a wall” between the U.S. and Mexico as part of his focus on decreasing
rates of undocumented immigration. Trump’s rhetoric around this issue immediately made
it a partisan one, with Republicans favoring building a physical barrier along the southern
border and the Democratic Party opposing any such construction.
The five tested issues for Bernie Sanders were trade tariffs, canceling all student debt,
Medicare-for-All, a national fracking ban, and decriminalizing the act of crossing the U.S.-
Mexico border without proper documentation. First, before 2016, supporting free trade and
creating tariff-free zones of international exchange had long been a point of policy agreement
between the Democratic and Republican Parties, with both endorsing free trade’s benefits
in increasing economic growth. Departing from this position, Bernie Sanders has consis-
tently opposed unlimited free trade, supporting tariffs to protect domestic industry and
workers as a part of his broader endorsement of economic populism. Second, Sanders’ advo-
cacy for canceling student debt is also aimed at helping young middle-class and low-income
Americans, who are disproportionately burdened by debt incurred in relation to attending
college(Looney, Wessel and Yilla, 2020). Sanders was a prominent early endorser of the
push to forgive all student loans, a proposal that received widespread coverage during the
Democratic Primary, but one that has yet to gain mainstream traction in the Democratic
Party. Third, Medicare-for-All is the name given to the proposal to create a single-payer
healthcare system in the U.S. Medicare-for-All would replace the network of private and
public insurance options with a single, unified system in which a centralized program would
insure and set healthcare prices for all Americans, as in many European health systems.
This possibility was discussed in the conversation surrounding the drafting of the Affordable
Care Act and has been endorsed by Sanders and many of the other most liberal Democratic
representatives since, but is not supported by more conservative Democratic Party mem-
bers on the basis of its potential taxpayer cost, and it is not officially supported by the
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Democratic Party. Fourth, “fracking” refers to hydraulic fracturing, a method of fossil fuel
extraction that renders viable certain fossil fuel deposits that are too depleted to be econom-
ically viable for development using conventional drilling methods. While an economic boon
to areas rich in oil and gas shale, notably electorally pivotal states like Pennsylvania and
Texas, the fracking process causes significant environmental damage and has been targeted
by environmental advocacy groups for stricter regulation or an outright ban. While Sanders
and other endorsers of the Green New Deal have expressed support for a ban on all domes-
tic fracking, the Democratic Party as a whole supports the extraction, with regulations, of
natural gas and oil through hydraulic fracturing. The fifth and final tested policy disagree-
ment between Sanders and the Democratic Party is decriminalizing the act of crossing the
U.S.-Mexico border without proper documentation. First passed in the early 20th century,
several national laws formally prohibit entering the United States without documented per-
mission. Donald Trump’s presidency saw a marked increase in the number of immigrants
prosecuted, incarcerated, and deported for unauthorized border crossing from Mexico. In
reaction to this increase in prosecution came calls from immigrant advocacy organizations
and left-leaning politicians, including Sanders, to officially decriminalize the act of crossing
the border. While the Democratic Party favors immigration reform and many methods of
easing the immigration process, the party has not officially endorsed the decriminalization
of undocumented border crossing.
Elizabeth Warren, much like Bernie Sanders, typically positions herself to the left of the
official Democratic Party platform. For Warren supporters, I tested a similar slate of issues:
trade tariffs, Medicare-for-All, a national fracking ban, decriminalizing undocumented border
crossing, and creating a national registry of all firearms and firearm owners. The first four
issues were the same as those discussed for Bernie Sanders above. The fifth issue tested for
Warren was the creation of a national gun registry. While the Democratic Party broadly
favors increasing gun control, the national gun registry is a polarizing gun control proposal,
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even within the Democratic Party. This proposal, which Warren supports, would create
a centralized registry of all firearm owners and owned firearms in the country, overriding
the state-by-state rules and systems of administration currently in place. The most recent
Democratic Party platforms when the experiment was conducted instead endorsed state-by-
state pushes for gun control legislation.
For Pete Buttigieg, the politician included in this study with the least previous national
exposure, finding five policies on which he took clear stances distinct from those held by
the Democratic Party proved more challenging. Perhaps due in part to the fact that he
was a relative newcomer to the national political scene, Buttigieg generally adhered to the
Democratic Party Platform positions in the lead-up to the presidential primary. However,
Buttigieg’s stances did have several points of departure from official Democratic Party posi-
tions: opposition to free trade, specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, a federal
firearm licensing requirement, maintaining the current level of federal defense spending,
rather than reducing it, immediate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and opposition
to the creation of publicly funded charter schools. Notably, Buttigieg’s opposition to free
trade, support for the creation of a federal gun licensing program, and opposition to charter
schools were all positions shared by or similar to those of other Democratic candidates dis-
cussed above. Where Buttigieg separated himself from both the party and other candidates
was in the military and foreign policy areas, presumably trusting his prior experience in
the military would allow him to lead supporters on these issues. With regard to defense
spending, Buttigieg stood apart from Democratic Party orthodoxy by opposing cuts to the
defense budget, favoring maintenance of previous spending levels instead. Similarly, immedi-
ate withdrawal from Afghanistan, a decision Buttigieg supported, was not the official stance
of the Democratic Party during the 2020 presidential primary. The party instead favored a
maintaining troop presence in Afghanistan to support nationbuilding efforts, and an eventual
gradual reduction of U.S. military personnel in the country.
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3 Results: Policy Persuasion
The policy preference outcomes analyzed in this chapter were originally recorded on a seven-
point outcome scale of policy support, with one indicating strong opposition to the policy
and seven indicating strong support. To make the persuasive effects estimated in this chap-
ter more readily interpretable, however, the analyses translate this scale into a percentage
support outcome measure. This measure is coded to represent the percentage of the sample
that share the politician’s policy position.6 Treatment effects are therefore relayed as per-
centage point changes, referring to the change in the percentage of the treatment group that
share the politician’s position on the issue. Though these estimates are subject to increased
uncertainty as a result of reducing variation in the outcome measure, this simplified outcome
reveals the substantive importance of the treatment effects, limiting changes in the outcome
measures to more meaningful thresholds that correspond to opinion change, rather than the
solidification or further entrenchment of existing policy support or opposition.
I present the percentages of the control and treatment groups’ support for their tested
politicians’ positions in Tables 6-10, with treatment effects estimated using regression with
covariate adjustment shown graphically in Figures 1 through 5.7 In these figures, positive
treatment effects indicate treatment groups were, on average, closer to the politicians’ stated
policy position than the control group. Negative treatment effects indicate the treatment
group was closer to the party position. All treatment effects include the pre-registered
regression specifications, including covariate adjustment for subjects’ level of knowledge of
their party’s political positions, political ideology, strength of partisan affiliation, strength of
support for their favored politician, a dummy variable for identifying as White, and subjects’
6Respondents who stated that they strongly support, support, or somewhat support the politician’s
position on the issue were coded as 1. Respondents who strongly oppose, oppose, or slightly oppose the
politician’s position were coded as 0. Respondents who neither support nor oppose the policy are coded as
a 0.5 on the 0-1 policy support scale.
7Tables with full regression results for all estimates are available at https://www.oliveramcclellan.com
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age.8 I examine the effects of the simple statements treatments for each politician on each
policy, before conducting pooled analyses, merging all policies using a standardized outcome
measure, to test for treatment effect heterogeneity across treatment type and by respondent
characteristics.
3.1 Policy Persuasion: Donald Trump Supporters
Table 6 shows the percentages in the control and treatment groups that shared Trump’s posi-
tions9 for each of the five policies tested: federal funding for abortions, support for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), increasing restrictions on firearm sales, banning Mus-
lims from entering the United States, and applying political pressure to the Federal Reserve.
The sample for this comparison consisted of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents
who approve of the job Trump is doing as president. Figure 1 displays treatment effects and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals estimated through OLS regression. All regressions
included the covariate adjustments described above to improve estimate precision.
For four of the five tested issues, Republican, Trump-supporting subjects shown a sim-
ple, symmetrical statements identifying Donald Trump and the Republican Party as having
conflicting positions on the issue moved toward Trump’s position, away from the Republican
Party position, relative to the no-statement control group. The magnitudes of these effects
are substantial: across the five policies the treatment effect averages 7.1 percentage points
in average policy agreement for Trump’s position. Below, I describe the policy by policy
results in more detail.
8Other specifications, such as including respondents’ likability and competence ratings of the cued politi-
cian, do slightly increase estimate precision, but do not alter any of the substantive findings discussed here,
and have therefore been omitted here.
9As described above, respondents who stated that they strongly support, support, or somewhat support
policies Trump was stated to support were coded as 1. Respondents who strongly oppose, oppose, or slightly
oppose such policies were coded as 0. Respondents who neither supported nor opposed the policy are coded
as a 0.5. For policies Trump was shown to oppose, respondents who strongly oppose, oppose, or slightly
oppose such policies were coded as 1, while respondents who strongly support, support, or somewhat support
the policy were coded as 0. Those who neither supported nor opposed the policy were again coded as 0.5.
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Support increasing gun control 46.7% 55.8%
First, if a participant is shown a simple informational treatment revealing Trump and the
Republican Party disagree about NATO, who will they find more persuasive? The leftmost
facet of Figure 1 displays the estimated treatment effect and 95% confidence interval around
this estimate on this issue. Shown opposing Trump and Republican Party statements on
this issue, Republican Trump-supporting respondents were significantly more likely to adopt
Trump’s position relative to the no-statement control group (Issue 1, Figure 1). Showing
respondents the conflicting positions of Donald Trump and the Republican Party towards
NATO led the treatment group to be 6.7 percentage points more likely to oppose NATO,
against more than 70 years of Republican Party doctrine.
The second effect estimate in Figure 1 shows the estimated treatment effect of seeing the
paired statements on policy support for banning Muslims from entering the United States.
Republican Trump supporters who saw paired statements on this issue were more likely
to support the ban, Trump’s position, than those in the control group, though a majority
(62.8%) of the control group supported banning Muslim immigrants from entering the U.S.
as well. Regression estimation of the treatment effect indicates treatment increased support
for banning all Muslims from entering the United States by 8.5 percentage points (Issue 2,
Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Donald Trump Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support
This figure displays treatment effects among Trump supporters of seeing simple state-
ment treatments on policy support, measured in percentage support.
The next two issues tested saw respondents side with Trump against longstanding Re-
publican Party policy positions. Only 33.9% of the control group favored federal funding
for abortion providers. After being shown the opposing positions of Trump and the Repub-
lican Party, however, 46.8% of respondents favored federal funding for abortion providers,
an increase of more than 13 percentage points (Issue 4, Figure 1). For this issue, one of
the most polarizing in the modern political landscape, Trump supporters moved from strong
opposition to federal abortion funding to a near-split when exposed to the simple statement
treatment.
Perhaps even more striking are the effects estimated for support for increasing restrictions
on firearm sales. While 47% of control group respondents supported increasing restrictions on
firearm sales, this proportion increased to 56% among the treatment group. Using regression
with covariates to increase estimate precision produces an estimated persuasive effect of
8.9 percentage points (SE = 2.1pp). Seeing Trump’s Tweet in support of increasing gun
28
control moved Trump-supporting Republicans from majority opposition to majority support
for increasing firearms sales restrictions, against explicitly stated opposition to such policies
from the GOP and in the context of decades of consistent GOP rhetoric against such policies.
Political influence on the Federal Reserve was the only issue for which Republican Trump
supporters did not side with Donald Trump, moving towards the Republican Party position,
away from Trump’s position, by about two percentage points. This small effect is not
statistically significant, and cannot be separated from expected sampling variability.
In this sample, Trump-supporting Republicans sided with Trump over the Republican
party on four of the five issues examined. They did so strongly, even on issues that have
long been core Republican Party policy positions. The estimated persuasive effects for all
issues other than political influence on the Federal Reserve are highly statistically significant,
falling well outside the range what might be expected as a result of typical sampling variation.
These estimated effects are of substantively significant magnitude as well, moving Trump-
supporting Republicans from opposition to Trump’s positions to near-parity (NATO, federal
funding for abortions), or from majority opposition to majority support (increasing gun
control). Furthermore, the confidence interval surrounding the estimated treatment effect
for political influence on the Federal Reserve does not overlap with the confidence intervals
around the treatment effect estimates on the from the other four issues, indicating that the
differences in effect magnitudes are not due to sampling error. Republican Trump supporters,
rather, appear to alter their stated policy preferences to match Trump’s, but not equally
across the tested issue areas.
3.2 Policy Persuasion: Joe Biden Supporters
Are these results specific to supporters of Donald Trump, as they are perhaps more malleable
than supporters of other politicians? It has frequently been suggested that the relationship
between Donald Trump and his supporters is an unusual one, stronger and more personally
29
















Oppose charter schools 39.8% 41.4%
loyal than that shared between most political figures and their supporters, making him
an unusually effective opinion leader(Goethals, 2017). For this reason, Barber and Pope
(2019) questions whether Trump’s persuasive ability is greater than most other politicians’,
and the extent to which evidence drawn from Trump and his supporters should inform
conclusions about politicians’ persuasive abilities more generally. In this section I present
estimated treatment effects among Joe Biden supporters, defined as Democratic respondents
who stated they would vote for Biden were the Democratic Presidential Primary Election
being held at the time of survey completion.
In January 2020, when these surveys were conducted, Joe Biden was the front-runner
for the Democratic presidential nomination. Most pundits agreed Biden’s popularity was
not due to his charisma or notable opinion leadership, unlike Trump, but rather to his
familiarity, stability and moderate policy views. This familiarity, a result of his 46-year
political career and prominent role as Barack Obama’s Vice President, also left Biden with a
long political track record of having endorsed policy positions that were out of sync with the
modern Democratic Party positions. These positions typically consisted of Biden having held
more conservative positions than those of the contemporary Democratic Party, and raised
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Figure 2: Joe Biden Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing simple state-
ment treatments on policy support, measured in percentage support.
questions about whether Biden would be able to win over the party’s more liberal wing
over the course of the primary election. This is reflected in the ideological identification
of Democratic Biden supporters in this sample, who averaged 4.1 on a seven-point ideology
scale from one (very liberal) to seven (very conservative), compared to the overall Democratic
sample average of 3.7.
Table 7 shows the percentages of the control and treatment groups sharing Biden’s po-
sitions on the four tested issues: increasing border fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border,
opposition to legalizing marijuana, opposition to federal funding for abortions, opposition to
expanding Social Security, and opposition to charter schools, coded using the same method
as described above for Trump supporters. Figure 2 displays corresponding ATEs and 95%
confidence intervals, measured with the same outcome measure, estimated through OLS
regression with covariate adjustment. For all five tested issues, Democratic Biden support-
ers moved toward Biden’s position, away from the Democratic Party position, even where
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Biden’s stances are at odds with long-held Democratic Party positions. The magnitude of
this persuasion is very similar to that observed among Trump supporters, averaging 7.6 per-
centage points of policy agreement with Biden across the five tested policies, and providing
evidence that Trump’s persuasive abilities estimated here and in previous studies is not the
result of a unique relationship between Trump and his supporters.
The first effect in Figure 2 is the estimated treatment effect for policy support for Biden’s
position on charter schools. Relative to no-treatment respondents, those told Biden opposes
charter schools while the Democratic Party supports them were slightly more likely to adopt
Biden’s position, though the magnitude of this effect is small and statistically insignificant
at 2.5 percentage points (SE = 2.9pp). However, this result falls well within the range of
what might be expected from sampling variation.
Corresponding effects for marijuana legalization can be seen in the second facet of Figure
2. When shown simple statements identifying support for (Democratic Party) and opposition
to (Joe Biden) marijuana legalization, treatment respondents moved toward Biden’s position.
These treatment effects are of greater substantive and statistical significance; respondents
were 5.9 percentage points (SE = 3.1pp) more likely to adopt Biden’s position. However,
Biden supporters remained, on average, strongly in favor of legalizing marijuana, even among
the treatment group (Table 7).
The treatment effects are smaller when looking at abortion funding, shown in the third
issue presented in Figure 2. When shown treatments that reveal Biden’s support for the
Hyde Amendment and the Democratic Party’s opposition to it, respondents were slightly
more likely to side with Biden than with the Democratic Party, though as is the case with
charter schools, this result is not statistically significant. Notably, the treatment effect
confidence intervals for abortion funding among Trump supporters and Biden supporters do
not overlap. While support for federal funding for abortion providers in general and the Hyde
Amendment are not identical issues, federal funding for abortion appears to be an issue on
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which Trump is a more effective opinion leader, or his supporters are more malleable, than
is the case for Joe Biden and his supporters.
The fourth issue analyzed for Biden supporters is opposition to expanding Social Secu-
rity benefits. When informed of Biden’s and the Democratic Party’s opposing positions on
expanding Social Security, respondents were much more likely to side with Biden, to the
tune of 10.0 percentage points. This is a substantial shift, and highly statistically signifi-
cant, however, even with treatment essentially doubling support for limiting Social Security
expansions, nearly 80% of Biden supporters favored expanding Social Security benefits.
The final issue in Figure 2 is building a physical barrier along the southern border of
the United States. When informed that Biden has previously supported building a border
barrier while the Democratic Party opposes such a barrier, Democratic Biden supporters
were much more likely to support building a barrier. This effect is of great magnitude at
18.2 percentage points (SE = 3.1pp). In other words, when told Biden supported it, Biden
supporters were willing to adopt one of Donald Trump’s signature policy positions—even
knowing the Democratic Party opposes it.
Across all five issues examined, Biden supporters were more likely to adopt Biden’s
position than the Democratic Party position when informed where each stands on the issue,
though for two of these issues the treatment effects were close to zero and fall well short
of statistical significance. Despite significant treatment effect differences across issues, on
average the direction and magnitude of persuasive effects estimated among Democratic Biden
supporters are very similar to those estimated among Republican Trump supporters.
3.3 Policy Persuasion: Bernie Sanders Supporters
At the time of the experiment, Bernie Sanders was seen as Joe Biden’s strongest challenger
for the Democratic nomination. Sanders built his brand by endorsing much more liberal
policy positions than mainstream Democratic positions, and rose to national prominence
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during the 2016 primary election cycle. Sanders’ liberal positions on social and economic
issues generally find him opposing the party from the left, and each of the five tested issues
in this experiment position him as more left-leaning than the Democratic Party. This stance
is also reflected in the average ideological identification of his supporters, 3.4 on the 1-7
liberal-conservative scale, relative to the 3.7 average among all Democratic respondents and
4.1 average among Biden supporters. The percentage of Sanders supporters that shared
Sanders’ positions on the tested issues was markedly higher than was the case for Trump or
Biden supporters—a majority of control group Sanders supporters shared Sanders’ position
for each of the five tested issues (Table 8). This was particularly notable for the student
debt and Medicare-for-All policies, for which nearly 90% of respondents who were not shown
Sanders’ positions shared those positions.
Despite the higher levels of control group alignment with Sanders’ policy positions, treat-
ment induced even higher levels of policy agreement among Democratic Sanders supporters.
The average persuasive effect estimated among Sanders supporters was 8.9 percentage points
towards Sanders’ position, a similar result to that observed among Trump and Biden support-
ers. As shown in the leftmost facet of Figure 3, informing Democratic, Sanders-supporting
respondents that Sanders supports trade tariffs while the Democratic Party opposes them in-
creased support for tariffs by nearly 17 percentage points, shifting his supporters from being
34
Figure 3: Bernie Sanders Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing simple state-
ment treatments on policy support, measured in percentage support.
essentially split on the issue (50.3% support for tariffs among the control group) to strongly
in support (67.5%) of tariffs. While the estimated persuasive effects for canceling student
debt and support for Medicare-for-All are near zero and not separable from the expected
sampling variation, the null effect estimated for this issue is likely due to a ceiling effect:
with almost 90% of the control group already sharing Sanders’ positions, there simply was
not much room for treatment to induce detectably higher levels of policy agreement in the
treatment group. When informed of the policy conflict between Sanders and the Democratic
Party on a national fracking ban, Sanders supporters sided with Sanders in support of a ban
by over 17 percentage points, a similar magnitude as that estimated for trade tariffs among
this sample. While a majority of control Sanders respondents shared Sanders’ support for
banning fracking, treatment led an overwhelming majority (81.4%) to share this position.
Decriminalizing undocumented border crossing was also an issue on which Sanders was able
to lead opinion among his supporters, though at 7.2 percentage points this effect is of smaller
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magnitude than that estimated for tariffs or fracking. The confidence interval surrounding
the treatment effect for decriminalizing the border does not quite overlap with the estimated
treatment effect intervals for tariffs or a fracking ban, indicating that the relatively smaller
magnitude of the decriminalizing undocumented border crossing is truly a smaller effect,
rather than being attributable to random sampling variance. Similar to Trump and Biden
supporters, Sanders supporters generally side with Sanders over the Democratic Party, but
with treatment effects that vary across policy area.
3.4 Policy Persuasion: Elizabeth Warren Supporters
At the time of the experiment, Elizabeth Warren was the third most popular Democratic
candidate, trailing Biden and Sanders. Warren adopted many of the same policy positions
as Bernie Sanders, generally aligning to the left of the Democratic Party during the 2020
Democratic primary, and Warren supporters share a similar supporter profile with Sanders
supporters, on average. In the sample analyzed here, her supporters had an average ideology
rating of 3.5, more liberal than Biden’s supporters and very similar to the 3.4 average among
Sanders supporters. The similarities between Warren’s and Sanders’ policy positions and
supporters are reflected in the rates of policy agreement with Warren’s positions for the four
issues commonly tested between both Warren and Sanders supporters: tariffs, Medicare-for-
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Figure 4: Elizabeth Warren Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support
This figure displays treatment effects among Warren supporters of seeing simple state-
ment treatments on policy support, measured in percentage support.
All, fracking, and decriminalizing undocumented border crossing. For these four issues, on
all of which Warren had the same position as Sanders, her supporters have a near-identical
level of support to Sanders’ supporters, as shown in Table 9. The new issue shown to
Warren supporters, support for creating a national gun registry, was very popular among
her supporters, with 90.7% of Democratic, Warren-supporting control group respondents
agreeing with Warren’s support for creating a gun registry. Despite these similarities, it
appears Warren was less effective at persuading her supporters to adopt her positions, against
those of the Democratic Party, with treatments across all issues producing an increase in
policy agreement of 5.3 percentage points, slightly lower than that estimated for Sanders
treatments among his supporters.
Warren was effective at convincing her supporters to support tariffs and a ban on fracking,
against Democratic Party opposition, as was the case for Sanders among his supporters.
There is some evidence that treatment persuaded Warren supporters to adopt her position on
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decriminalizing undocumented border crossing as well, with policy agreement with Warren’s
position 6.3 percentage points higher among those shown treatments for this issue. As
the rightmost facet in Figure 4 shows, however, the confidence interval for this estimated
treatment effect includes zero, so it is not possible to separate this perceived effect from
sampling noise at conventional levels of statistical significance.
The estimated treatment effect coefficients for the national gun registry and Medicare-
for-All among Warren supporters are slightly negative, indicating Warren supporters were
more likely to move toward the Democratic Party positions for these issues than toward
Warren’s position. However, these point estimates are near zero and fall well within the
range expected through normal sampling error. Given the enormous popularity of Warren’s
position for each of these issues among her supporters in the control group, it seems likely
that the lack of significant persuasive effects for these issues are primarily caused by ceiling
effect limits.
While immigration was the policy area where Joe Biden had the largest effect on his
supporters, for Sanders and Warren immigration was an issue for which treatment effects
were the smallest in magnitude, among issues that do not appear to be constrained by ceiling
effects. It is possible that immigration is an issue for which conservative persuasion is easier
to achieve than persuasion in a liberal direction, even among groups that typically favor
liberal immigration policy, or these patterns could be driven by specific interactions between
candidate and supporters. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the causes
for this heterogeneity, the results highlight the existence of differences across not just policy
area, but specific policies within a given policy area.
3.5 Policy Persuasion: Pete Buttigieg Supporters
Pete Buttigieg, the fourth most popular Democratic candidate at the time the experiment
was conducted, was the newest to the national stage among those tested in this experiment.
38
















Oppose charter schools 55.5% 51.4%
He also proved least effective, on average, at persuading his supporters to adopt his policy
positions against those of the Democratic Party, with his supporters siding with him against
the party in only two of the five tested policies, and only one of the five to an extent that is
separable from sampling variation. Results among Buttigieg supporters are shown in Table
10 and Figure 5. Averaging across policies, seeing the simple statement treatments produced
an increase in policy agreement with Buttigieg’s positions of 1.7 percentage points. As was
the case for Sanders and Warren, Buttigieg supporters moved towards his position of oppos-
ing free trade agreements by a substantial amount, in this case by 11.5 percentage points
(SE = 4.3pp). Buttigeig supporters also sided with him against the party in supporting an
immediate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, though this result falls short of statisti-
cal significance. Treatment did not move Buttigieg supporters to be more likely to either
support or oppose federal firearm licensing requirement, with an estimated effect of almost
exactly zero for this policy. As was the case among Elizabeth Warren supporters, however,
Buttigieg’s pro-gun control position was shared by nearly 90% of the control group, so ceiling
effects may have prevented the detection of persuasive effects on this policy. Similar to the
previously examined results for Biden and his supporters, Buttigieg supporters sided against
him, with the Democratic Party, in support of charter schools, though also to a degree that
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Figure 5: Pete Buttigieg Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support
This figure displays treatment effects among Buttigieg supporters of seeing simple
statement treatments on policy support, measured in percentage support.
falls short of statistical significance. Maintaining the current level of federal defense spending
was also a position for which Buttigieg was unable to increase support among his supporters.
When told that he opposes cutting the national defense budget and the Democratic Party
supports defense spending cuts, his supporters were 2.2 percentage points more likely to
support defense cuts. The large standard error around this estimate (SE = 5.5pp), however,
indicates this result is within the range of what might be expected through chance, even in
the absence of a true effect.
Taken together, these results support this chapter’s primary hypothesis. In 19 out of 25
total candidate × policy combinations, subjects sided with the politician, against their party,
in some cases against decades of consistent party doctrine. There are two aspects of these
results that are particularly notable: the similarity between Democratic and Republican
supporters and the greater persuasive power of Democratic nominee finalists Joe Biden and
Bernie Sanders compared to Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg among their respective
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supporters.
It has been suggested that the relationship between Trump and his supporters is a unique
one—Trump is an unusually adept persuader of his fans, and he enjoys a stronger, more de-
voted following than do most other politicians. The results presented here suggest otherwise:
Joe Biden, a politician not known for cultivating a fervent following, was almost identically
persuasive on the issues tested here among his supporters. Bernie Sanders was even slightly
more persuasive among his own supporters, despite two of the five issues tested among his
supporters, Medicare-for-All and canceling student debt, having essentially no room for fur-
ther persuasion. The willingness of partisan members of the electorate to follow candidate
cues, even against explicit counter-cues from their party, does not appear to be exclusive
to Trump and the Republican Party. Instead, it appears to be an aspect of commonality
between Democratic and Republican partisans, and of commonality between followers of
different politicians within the Democratic Party.
In retrospect, the greater degrees of persuasive success enjoyed by Biden and Sanders
over Warren and Buttigieg among each of their respective supporters are an intuitive result,
given Biden’s and Sanders’ greater degrees of electoral success during the primary. However,
this experiment was conducted before a single primary ballot had been counted, when all
of the candidates were considered firmly in the running. Furthermore, feeling thermometer,
likability, and competence ratings all suggest Buttigieg and Warren supporters felt no less
warmly toward their candidate, nor did they find their candidate less likable or competent,
than did Trump, Biden, or Sanders supporters. Which specific attributes, of either politi-
cians, their supporters, or the nature of the ties between politician and supporter, drive this
persuasive power or whether these differences are driven by particularities of the specific
policies tested, is a topic for future research to investigate.
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4 Personal Plea and News Treatments
The results presented above provide firm evidence in support of the primary hypothesis
tested. However, the simple statement treatments, while having the benefit of being per-
fectly symmetrical tests of candidates versus their parties, do not closely resemble the types
of political information members of the electorate encounter in the real world. How much
of the previously presented results are specific to the specific method of information trans-
mission? Do we see similar results if more realistic types of political information are used as
treatments? In this section, I present treatment effects for the personal pleas and news treat-
ments. The personal pleas were similar in structure to the simple statements treatments,
but contained an additional direct quote or Tweet from the politician and a corresponding
excerpt from the official party platforms that support or justify the Democratic Party posi-
tions highlighted. This additional content comes directly from the cued object without any
sort of intermediary, resembling the way many Americans get their political information in
the contemporary information environment, such as through Twitter or Facebook(Tandoc Jr
and Johnson, 2016).
The news article treatments consist of real news stories that cover each policy conflict
and relay the same policy positions for the politician and party as do the other treatment
types. The only modifications to these news articles from their original published form was
the removal of the names of politicians that were not the subject of the experiment, to avoid
confounding the intended treatments. This information type is designed to closely resemble
a more traditional informational environment, in which the policy positions are conveyed
along with more contextual information.
Policy-by-policy estimated treatment effects, split by treatment type, are shown in Fig-
ures 1-5 of Appendix B. Treatment effects for personal plea and news treatment types were
generally the in the same direction as and with comparable magnitudes to, and are often not
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statistically separable from, those estimated for the simple statement above for each candi-
date × policy combination. By pooling responses across the five policies each respondent
saw, however, it is possible to differentiate the magnitudes of persuasive effect for each treat-
ment type. This pooled analysis, presented in Figure 6, standardizes the original seven-point
outcome variable to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across the analyzed
sample. All analyses include the same covariates as the analyses presented above.10
Figure 6: Pooled Results, Persuasive Treatment Effects, Standardized
Policy Support Outcome
This figure displays treatment effects pooled at the respondent level of seeing each type
of treatment on policy support, measured in seven-point policy support, transformed
to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Among supporters of all five politicians, the personal plea treatment led subjects to
side with the politician, against the party, more strongly than did the simple statement
treatment. When the politician’s and party’s policy positions are accompanied by personal
content, the persuasive power of politicians over parties is increased. The news treatment
10The pooled dataset that produces these figures gives one observation to each policy the respondent saw;
each respondent appears five times in the stacked dataset. Confidence intervals for Figure 6 are estimated
with HC2 standard errors, clustered at the respondent level.
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instead appears to decrease politicians’ persuasive power over the party. The magnitude
of persuasive effects for the news treatment were smaller for all five politicians than for
the personal plea statement treatment and only about one-half as large as the effects for
the simple statements treatment.11 Though coefficients were positive for four of the five
candidates, indicating that partisan supporters still sided with politicians over parties, on
average, the effects for Warren and Buttigieg were near zero and not statistically significant.
This indicates that their supporters were split when deciding whom to follow after reading
the news articles when averaging across all five tested issues. For these candidates, the
personal plea and simple statements treatments produce a significant, positive coefficient.
Direct communication may therefore be even more important for less persuasive politicians.
Taken together, the persuasive effects for the three types of informational treatment high-
light the importance of the method of communication when studying how people determine
which cues to follow. On average, people side with the politician, not the party, for most
issues, though not for all issues. Trump supporters did not adopt his position on influencing
the Federal Reserve, while Biden supporters did not move closer to Biden’s position in op-
posing charter schools. Buttigieg supporters did not clearly move closer to his position on
defense spending, withdrawal from Afghanistan or charter schools. It appears that partisan
supporters do distinguish between different policies, rather than being similarly persuaded
across issues.
When informed of intraparty policy conflict in news article format rather than through
impartial statements, the persuasive powers of individual politicians over parties were greatly
reduced. When shown the information via the personal pleas treatment, as one would
encounter on Twitter or politicians’ personal websites, the persuasive powers of individual
politicians were greatly increased, and their supporters sided with them, against the party,
11The more detailed justifications in the news treatments could be partially driving the lower-magnitude
persuasive effects for the news treatments, as there is more potentially confounding language in these treat-
ments than either the simple statement or personal plea treatments.
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in nearly all cases. This pattern suggests the decline of traditional media sources and rise of
information sources like Twitter does indeed greatly increase the power individual politicians
have to lead their supporters, as suggested by Kernell (1993), while decreasing political
parties’ ability to counter popular politicians’ opinion leadership.
5 Not My Candidate! Persuasive Effects among Non-
Supporters
Figure 7: Pooled Results, Persuasive Treatment Effects Among
Non-Supporters, Standardized Policy Support Outcome
This figure displays treatment effects pooled at the respondent level of seeing each type
of treatment on policy support, measured in seven-point policy support, transformed
to have mean zero and standard deviation one, among non-supporters of the cued
candidates.
In April of 2020, when the Democratic primary field had narrowed to Biden and Sanders,
I fielded a similar experiment to that described above. However, instead of matching Demo-
cratic respondents to their preferred candidate to determine the politician cue, subjects were
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randomly matched to either Sanders or Biden. This created a randomly determined sub-
ject pool of Sanders supporters receiving the Biden vs. the Democratic Party cues and of
Biden supporters receiving Sanders vs. the Democratic Party cues, enabling estimation of
treatment effects among non-supporters12. For the Republicans and Donald Trump, I in-
clude an analysis of treatment effects among Republicans who did not approve of the job
Donald Trump was doing as president.13 Figure 7 displays pooled analysis results among
these non-supporter subject pools for each of the three cued politicians.14 Figures displaying
policy-specific estimated treatment effects among non-supporters can be found in Appendix
D.
Politicians have much less success convincing non-supporters to adopt their policy posi-
tions, when compared to their persuasive success among supporters. The positive coefficients
in the leftmost facet of Figure 7 suggest Sanders supporters sided with Biden against the
Democratic Party in the simple statements and personal plea treatment conditions, while the
corresponding negative coefficients in the middle facet indicate Biden supporters sided with
the Democratic Party over Bernie Sanders in these treatment conditions, averaging across
all policies. None of these effects, however, are distinguishable from zero, and this pattern
could therefore have come about as the result of sampling variation.
These inconclusive results are surprising given the opinions Sanders supporters had to-
ward Biden and the opinions Biden supporters had towards Sanders, relative to how each of
these groups felt towards the Democratic Party. Using feeling thermometer warmth ratings,
it is possible to compare the relative warmth subjects felt towards their favored candidate,
12This also created a second wave set of supporter respondents, defined similarly to the samples analyzed
above. The persuasive results among supporters in the second wave mirror the results estimated among the
first wave, and are included in Appendix C.
13While not an apples-to-apples comparison, there is no comparable figure in the Republican Party to
provide a comparable analysis to the Biden-Sanders competition within the Democratic Party. This analysis
shows effects among Wave 1 Trump non-supporters, due to the increased precision of estimates drawn from
the larger Wave 1 sample.
14These analyses use the same set of covariates as the previous analyses, with the omission of politician
support strength, which was not asked of non-supporters.
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their party, and other candidates. Among second wave respondents, Sanders supporters who
did not see any informational treatments felt an average warmth of 89.0 points (out of a
maximum of 100) toward Sanders, 73.2 points toward the Democratic Party, and 53.8 points
toward Biden. Biden supporters not seeing any treatments felt an average warmth rating of
86.4 points towards Biden, 81.0 points towards the Democratic Party, and 65.2 points to-
ward Sanders. Given the significant differences among these ratings, politicians’ persuasive
powers among their supporters over their party makes sense—supporters feel more warmly
toward their politicians than their parties, and follow their lead on policy. The lack of clear
persuasive power for parties over politicians among non-supporters, however, is less readily
explainable. Though both Sanders and Biden supporters felt far more warmly toward the
Democratic Party than they did toward their favored candidate’s challenger, they did not
side with the party against the challenger on policy issues. This result suggests partisan
members of the electorate are reluctant to side with their political party against individual
politicians on policy, even individual politicians toward whom they feel only tepid affinity.
This pattern holds for Republicans who do not approve of Trump as well. Despite control
group Republicans who do not approve of Trump feeling, on average, far more warmly
toward the Republican Party (58.5 points) than toward Trump (29.5 points), Republicans
that disapprove of Trump are torn between siding with their political party and a politician
they explicitly disapprove of when determining their policy positions on issues for which the
two disagree. The lack of clear negative estimated effects in this analysis underlines the
persuasive powers of individual politicians over political parties, beyond what may be the
result of affinity. Partisan respondents did not side with their party over cued politicians,
even in cases where they felt much more warmly toward the party than toward the politician.
Finally, in October 2020, just weeks before the presidential election, respondents from the
January survey were recontacted for a followup survey. In this followup survey, I surveyed
only Democratic respondents who had indicated support for Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth
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Figure 8: Pooled Results, Persuasive Treatment Effects of Biden Versus
Original Candidate, Standardized Policy Support Outcome
This figure displays treatment effects pooled at the respondent level of seeing each type
of treatment on policy support, measured in seven-point policy support, transformed
to have mean zero and standard deviation one, of Biden vs. original candidate among
Democrats who originally supported Sanders or Warren.
Warren in the January survey. Instead of cuing Biden vs. the Democratic Party, I randomly
cued Biden vs. the respondent’s original preferred candidate, either Sanders or Warren,15 for
five policies the respondents had not seen in Wave 1. For Sanders supporters, these policies
were support for the Brady Bill (Sanders initially opposed, Biden supported), construction
of a border wall (Sanders opposed, Biden supported), electoral college reform (Sanders sup-
ported, Biden opposed), federal abortion funding (Sanders supported, Biden opposed), and
Social Security expansion (Sanders supported, Biden opposed). For Warren supporters, the
five issues were canceling student debt (Warren supported, Biden opposed), creation of a
wealth tax (Warren supported, Biden opposed), electoral college reform (Warren supported,
Biden opposed), federal abortion funding (Warren supported, Biden opposed), and Social
15Respondents’ initial politician selections were imported based on a unique respondent identifier as the
respondents entered the survey.
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Security expansion (Warren supported, Biden opposed). The results of these treatments,
pooled across the five tested policies, are shown in Figure 8. Policy-specific results are in-
cluded in Appendix D. While the smaller sample size in the recontact survey prevents these
results from achieving conventional levels of statistical significance, all three treatment types
produced a negative treatment effect, meaning subjects sided with their original politicians,
against Biden, when shown the politicians’ divergent policy positions for each treatment
type. Shown Sanders’ and Biden’ positions on election reform, for example, recontacted
respondents sided with Sanders, against Biden, in favor of abolishing the electoral college.
While political parties appear to be largely ineffective at countering individual politicians
when it comes to influencing partisans’ policy preferences, other individual politicians ap-
pear to be more capable of doing so, even when they have been eliminated from electoral
contention.16
6 Enduring Effects
The October recontact survey also allows estimation of the durability of persuasive effects
from the initial January survey. Prior to any treatment administration, respondents were
asked their positions on the same policies they had seen in Wave 1 (trade tariffs, Medicare-for-
All, a fracking ban, decriminalizing undocumented border crossing, and creating a national
gun registry for those who originally supported Warren, trade tariffs, Medicare-for-All, a
fracking ban, decriminalizing undocumented border crossing, and canceling student debt
for those originally supporting Sanders). By matching respondents’ Wave 2 responses with
their Wave 1 treatment conditions, I estimate the endurance of persuasive effects for Wave
1 treatments. I present the results of this analysis, using the same standardized outcome
16The lack of statistical significance for these estimated treatment effect, even when pooling across issues,
however, prevents these results from being conclusive in their support for the power of respondents’ original
candidates.
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Table 11: Enduring Persuasive Treatment Effects
Policy Persuasion After Nine Months
Downstream Persuasion (Standardized Outcome)





















∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses. Demographic control variables included are a dummy variable for Whiteness and respondents’ age. Issue and Politician intercepts are dummy variables for each tested issue and each tested politician.
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measure and pooling approach used in the previous section, in Table 11. As indicated by
the significant, positive coefficients for the personal plea and news treatment variables, these
treatment types exhibited surprising durability, still detectable nine months after initial
treatment. These effect magnitudes are substantively significant as well, each translating
to about six percentage points in policy support for the politician positions. This is an
unusual finding for a “soft-touch” persuasion experiment, as many persuasive effects from
informational cues or vignettes dissipate quickly(Cook and Flay, 1978). The enduring nature
of the persuasive effects for the personal plea and news treatments suggest a degree of opinion
updating that goes beyond an ephemeral priming effect.
Interestingly, there is no downstream effect for the simple statement treatment, despite
this treatment type being more persuasive than the news treatment when outcomes were
measured immediately following treatment, as shown in Figure 6 above. This makes some
intuitive sense, as the simple treatment may be easy to interpret, but not very memorable.
The news treatment, meanwhile, may have a relatively smaller effect in the moment, as
it requires more effort and attention to interpret, but is more memorable and therefore
more lasting among those who are persuaded by it than is the simple statement. While
the personal plea treatment was roughly twice as powerful as the news treatment when
outcomes were measured immediately, in this downstream analysis the two treatment types
had similar effects on political opinions. It is possible that the increased persuasion of
personal communication found in the primary analysis is a largely temporary difference,
with durable persuasive power more similar between traditional and more contemporary
information sources.
The endurance of these persuasive effects was an unexpected result, as can be seen in
the pre-analysis plan for the recontact survey. It is an important one, however, providing
evidence of real, lasting opinion change in response to simple treatments. This result further
illustrates the persuasive power individual politicians have on the policy positions of their
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supporters. This added layer of robustness for the persuasive effects estimated in this chapter
adds more significance to the results and null findings presented in the second and third
chapters of this dissertation.
7 Heterogeneity by Respondent Characteristics
Tables 12 and 13 present estimates of pre-registered sources of interaction effects between re-
spondent characteristics and informational treatments among Republican Trump supporters
(Table 12) and Democrats (Table 13), with the Democratic analysis pooling across tested
candidates. Among both types of partisan, higher levels of political knowledge, measured
by respondents’ accuracy in identifying their party’s positions prior to treatment for cued is-
sues, increased treatment effects, though these results were not statistically significant among
Democratic respondents. This is a counterintuitive result, given many previous studies’ find-
ings that increased political knowledge tends to reduce, rather than increase, the magnitude
of persuasive effects (Barber and Pope, 2019). One possible explanation for this experiment’s
positive interaction effect is the nature of these questions’ formats and online survey exper-
imentation—respondents’ knowledge of their political parties’ policy positions was collected
in matrix format, asking the respondent to indicate policy positions for multiple policies
and multiple figures on each survey page, a format that is relatively demanding in terms
of the attention it requires of the respondent. Higher knowledge scores could be correlated
with “survey diligence,” with more attentive survey-takers taking care to accurately com-
plete the knowledge matrix, and then later reading and reacting to informational cues more
strongly than less diligent survey respondents. When interacting treatment with education,
rather than the political knowledge variable, the interaction effects among Republicans are
negative, mirroring the pattern most previous studies have estimated.
The positive coefficients on the treatment × ideology interactions in the second column of
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Table 12: Interaction Models, Trump Supporters
Policy Persuasion (Standardized Outcome)
Simple statement treatment × 0.038∗∗
knowledge (0.018)
News treatment × 0.076∗∗∗
knowledge (0.018)
Personal plea treatment × 0.088∗∗∗
knowledge (0.018)
Simple statement treatment × 0.007
ideology (0.017)
News treatment × 0.035∗∗
ideology (0.016)
Personal plea treatment × 0.010
ideology (0.016)
Simple statement treatment × 0.023
party strength (0.027)
News treatment × 0.057∗∗
party strength (0.027)
Personal plea treatment × 0.035
party strength (0.027)
Simple statement treatment × 0.122∗∗∗
politician support (0.035)
News treatment × politician support 0.035
politician support (0.036)
Personal plea treatment × −0.006
politician support (0.035)
Simple statement treatment 0.126∗∗∗ 0.152 0.044 −0.128
(0.037) (0.094) (0.175) (0.093)
News treatment 0.067∗ 0.006 −0.169 0.108
(0.035) (0.087) (0.171) (0.096)
Personal plea treatment 0.113∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.041 0.278∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.090) (0.173) (0.092)
Political covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.595 −0.613 −0.531 −0.591
(0.072) (0.079) (0.097) (0.079)
N 16,948 16,948 16,948 16,948
R2 0.140 0.138 0.138 0.139
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses. Included political covariates are political knowledge, ideology, strength of partisan affiliation, and strength of support for the tested politician. Demographic control variables included are a dummy variable for Whiteness and respondents’ age. Issue intercepts are dummy variables for each tested issue.
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Table 13: Interaction Models, All Democratic Supporters
Policy Persuasion (Standardized Outcome)
Simple statement treatment × 0.004
knowledge (0.016)
News treatment × 0.021
knowledge (0.015)
Personal plea treatment × 0.021
knowledge (0.015)
Simple statement treatment × −0.025∗∗
ideology (0.011)
News treatment × −0.014
ideology (0.011)
Personal plea treatment × −0.028∗∗
ideology (0.011)
Simple statement treatment × 0.016
party strength (0.024)
News treatment × 0.019
party strength (0.024)
Personal plea treatment × −0.060∗∗
party strength (0.025)
Simple statement treatment × 0.104∗∗∗
politician support (0.031)
News treatment × 0.029
politician support (0.031)
Personal plea treatment × 0.134∗∗∗
politician support (0.031)
Simple statement treatment 0.144∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ −0.110
(0.027) (0.043) (0.044) (0.078)
News treatment 0.030 0.115∗∗∗ 0.032 −0.011
(0.026) (0.044) (0.044) (0.076)
Personal plea treatment 0.179∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ −0.125
(0.028) (0.043) (0.044) (0.079)
Political covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.062 0.003 0.044 0.165
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.055)
N 21,392 21,392 21,392 21,392
R2 0.122 0.123 0.122 0.123
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses. Included political covariates are political knowledge, ideology, strength of partisan affiliation, and strength of support for the tested politician. Demographic control variables included are a dummy variable for Whiteness and respondents’ age. Issue intercepts are dummy variables for each tested issue.
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Table 12 indicate that for Republicans, identifying more strongly as conservative increases
the likelihood of siding with Trump against the Republican Party. For Democrats, the
negative coefficients in the second column of Table 13 indicate identifying more strongly
as liberal increases the likelihood of siding with their chosen Democratic candidate against
the Democratic party. This finding is similar to that found by Barber and Pope (2019)
where more conservative respondents reacted more strongly to liberal Trump cues. Trump’s
persuasive power appears to be stronger among his more conservative supporters, a dynamic
that holds, though without reaching statistical significance, if the analysis is restricted to
only issues for which Trump adopted liberal positions, gun control and abortion funding.
Notably, the informational treatments analyzed here included an explicit counter to Trump’s
position from the Republican Party, reducing the possibility of respondents interpreting
Trump’s position as the conservative position, further strengthening the argument that self-
placed ideology is more of a social identification category than an informative description
of one’s policy preferences (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016). This result suggests that this
identification category may be more accurately described as loyalty to Trump than loyalty
to the Republican Party among Republican Trump supporters.
I find a mirrored result for liberal identification among Democrats, something not previ-
ously tested, as indicated by the negative coefficients on the treatment × ideology rows of
Table 13.17 These significant negative coefficients indicate that stronger liberals were more
likely to side with their favored candidates over the Democratic Party. Notably, this finding
holds, though again the estimated interaction effects fall just shy of statistical significance,
when restricting the analysis to just Democratic Biden supporters—notable for the fact that
Biden took exclusively conservative positions in the tested treatments. Among Democratic
Biden supporters, those identifying more strongly as liberals were more likely to move toward
17Ideology is coded 1-7 from strong liberal to strong conservative. Therefore lower scores indicate stronger
liberal identification.
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Biden’s conservative positions, even in the presence of countering cues from the Democratic
Party. This pattern suggests that both self-reported conservatism and self-reported liberal-
ism may be more accurately thought of as social categorizations than meaningful expressions
of issue positions for many members of the electorate.
The results in Column 3 of Tables 12 and 13 are even more surprising. The positive
interaction coefficients for treatment × party strength in Table 12 indicate that as strength
of partisan identification increases, likelihood of siding with the Republican Party decreases.
These positive effect interactions when specifically pitting Trump against the Republican
Party suggest that partisan identification, among this sample at least, has more to do with
personal support for Trump than with support for the Republican Party. This result is
mirrored in the Democratic Party, but only for the personal plea treatment condition, as
shown by the significant negative coefficient on the personal plea treatment × party strength
indicator in Table 13. 18 Respondents identifying more strongly as Democrats were more
likely to side with their favored candidates, against the Democratic Party, when exposed
to the personal plea treatments. Loyalty to individual politicians over the party does not
appear to be an exclusively Republican phenomenon, and it appears the increase in direct
communication between politicians and their supporters may be an important component of
this dynamic.
8 Conclusion
The results presented support the primary hypotheses of this experiment. When presented
with treatments that show politician and party to be on opposite sides of an issue, both Re-
publican and Democratic respondents are more likely to move toward the politician position
than toward the party position, and to do so strongly. While this result accurately describes
18Party strength is coded 1-7 from strong Democrat to strong Republican. Therefore higher scores indicate
higher party strength for Republicans, and lower numbers indicate higher party strength for Democrats.
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the findings for most candidate × issue combinations, it does not describe the findings for all
such combinations. Respondents did not side with their favored candidates on certain issues,
such as Trump supporters on political influence on the Federal Reserve, or Biden supporters
on the Hyde Amendment’s abortion restrictions. 19 This finding underlines the power of elite
cues specifically from identifiable individuals—supporters of each tested politician generally
moved against party doctrine on highly salient issues, toward the politicians’ positions. This
chapter highlights the difficulties parties face in reigning in popular politicians, even when
those politicians are relative political newcomers to national politics.
Politicians’ persuasive power is notable even among non-supporters. Sanders supporters
did not side with the Democratic Party against Biden, nor did Biden supporters side with
the Democratic Party against Sanders. Even Republicans who do not approve of Trump did
not side with the Republican Party against him—despite each of these three groups feeling
more warmly toward their party than they did toward the tested politician. While political
parties do not appear capable of effectively countering individual politicians’ influence on
partisan policy positions, other individual politicians appear more capable of doing so. This
finding provides an incentive for parties to cultivate multiple popular politicians if they hope
to prevent hegemony of any one individual over the hearts and minds of their followers.
The medium of information transmission appears to significantly moderate the effective-
ness of politicians’ persuasion. Personal pleas, in the form of direct quotes or politician
Tweets, were identifiably more persuasive than simple factual statements for all candidates.
News articles, a more traditional method of political communication, were less effective in
convincing partisans to adopt politicians’ heterodox views. While the United States electoral
arena has always been a political system with notably weak parties and strong individual
19It is important to reiterate that the issues tested here were not selected randomly from all hypothetical
possibilities. Politicians have a strategic incentive to find policies on which they can lead; it is possible that
politicians chose to oppose their party on the issues selected here because they had reason to believe their
supporters had malleable preferences on these issues. The widespread effectiveness of the tested treatments,
however suggest politicians’ persuasive power is robust.
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politicians relative to parliamentary systems, the rise of new, more personal information
sources like Twitter may be increasing the persuasive power of individual politicians at the
expense of parties’ influence.
There are several important secondary findings presented in this paper. The surprising
durability of persuasive effects for the personal plea and news treatments underlines the real
and lasting power politicians have over the policy preferences of their followers, even nine
months after treatment. This effect endurance, rare for online persuasion studies, suggests
respondents’ desire to match the policy positions of favored politicians is not a result of mere
wording variations or temporary priming effects, but is real and lasting opinion change.
Finally, the significant treatment interaction effects for party strength and ideology, and
especially their symmetry within the Republican and Democratic parties, are an important
finding. Identifying more strongly as a conservative made respondents more likely to follow
Trump, even when he took a liberal policy position. Identifying more strongly as a liberal
similarly made respondents more likely to follow their preferred candidate, even when they
took a conservative policy position. More surprisingly still, identifying more strongly as
a Republican made respondents more likely to side against the Republican Party, while
identifying more strongly as a Democrat made respondents more likely to side against the
Democratic Party, when exposed to personal plea treatments. These significant interactions,
even in the presence of a direct counter from respondents’ political parties, should inform
both our understanding of contemporary political identities and future research designs.
What scholars of political science think of as ideology or partisanship may have less to do
with policy preferences or even with support for the political parties themselves, and perhaps
more to do with societal groupings and categorizations, an idea returned to in Chapter 3.
Furthermore, these societal categorizations, if that is what they truly are, appear driven by
allegiance to individuals, not organizations. This is not a Republican-specific phenomenon,
as it is sometimes portrayed. Rather, it applies similarly to both conservatives and liberals,
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as well as both Republicans and Democrats.
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Chapter 2: Evaluation Changes
Abstract: The second chapter estimates effects of the same informational treatments ana-
lyzed in Chapter 1 on a new set of outcomes: subjects’ evaluations of politicians and parties.
In most cases, subjects did not significantly lower their evaluations of cued politicians in
response to treatment, though for some issues, subjects who were shown the conflicting po-
sitions of their favored politician and their party did feel less warmly towards, and reported
being were less likely to vote for, the cued politician, relative to subjects who received no such
treatment. This finding holds among both Democratic and Republican respondents, though
evaluation effects were stronger among Democrats. Parties appear more vulnerable than
individual politicians to changes in partisan subjects’ evaluations when they are shown to
hold unpopular positions, further emphasizing the difficulties, identified in Chapter 1, that
parties face in attempting to constrain their popular candidates. As the number of issue
position treatments shown to subjects increased, so did the magnitude of evaluation effects
for both politician and party. Critically, treatment dosage lowered feelings of warmth for all
politicians and all parties, not just those whose issue positions were shown in treatments.
This finding suggests that the political conflict conveyed by the treatments, not the specific
policy issues, may be driving evaluation changes among respondents. While politicians’ eval-
uation penalties for opposing their political parties were very small, even among co-partisan
nonsupporters, highlighting politicians’ policy disagreements with other co-partisan politi-
cians elicited evaluation penalties of much greater magnitude. Taken together, these findings
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support recent arguments that many traditional theories of democratic accountability have
ceased to operate as theorized in contemporary interparty competition, but also point to
their effectiveness in primary elections, in the absence of interparty competition and where
parties may have multiple popular candidates.
1 Introduction
In addition to the public opinion leadership examined in the previous chapter, there is
a second crucial component to the relationship between the electorate and their political
representatives in foundational models of democratic accountability: the willingness of the
public to update their evaluations of politicians based on their words and actions. In order
for the electoral connection to incentivize good representation by elected representatives, the
electorate should remove electoral support from politicians who take unpopular actions and
increase electoral support for those who take popular actions (Mayhew, 1974). In recent
years, empirical studies such as Lenz (2012) and Broockman and Butler (2017) have instead
found evidence of the public revising their policy positions without altering their evalua-
tions of politicians when those politicians adopt unpopular policy positions, casting doubt
onto whether this accountability mechanism operates effectively in contemporary American
politics. However, nearly all such studies test only one or two issues, or issues that are not
salient, leaving open the possibility that attempts to identify negative evaluation effects may
rely on treatment strengths or dosages that are too low. Another important feature of most
studies that find respondents unwilling to update their opinions of favored politicians is the
role of partisanship—partisan affinity, or perhaps biased processing (Lodge and Taber, 2013)
causes partisans to resist updating their opinions of co-partisan legislators, to the detriment
of democratic functioning Achen et al. (2017). This chapter capitalizes on the structure of
the treatments examined in the previous chapter, each of which contain an explicit counter
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from the politician’s party, to examine the extent to which politicians are vulnerable to
electorate backlash when political parties directly contradict politicians’ positions.
Along with elite persuasion and accountability literature, this chapter contributes to
the literature on the ideological component of party labels. Stokes (1963) distinguishes
between ideological and valence components of party brands as constituents determine how
to vote. Voters need to have a degree of information in order to cast non-random votes
(Druckman, 2001; Arceneaux, 2008), and rely on party brands as informational heuristics for
determining candidates’ ideological positions (Snyder and Ting, 2002). Theoretical models
of voter choice also emphasize the importance for parties of maintaining an ideologically
consistent brand (Wittman, 1989; Jones and Hudson, 1998). Relatedly, conflicting pressures
have been shown to decrease political enthusiasm more broadly, independent from ideological
positioning information (Campbell et al., 1960; Mutz, 2002).
To what extent do partisan respondents update their evaluations of politician and party
in response to information about each of their policy positions when the two contradict one
another? How does party disunity have on partisans’ evaluations of politician and party?
When Donald Trump supports policy positions different from the Republican Party plat-
form, does reduced ideological consistency of the party brand cause Republicans to alter
their evaluation of Trump? Or their evaluation of the Republican Party? How does the
salience of interparty competition alter these effects? To address these questions, this chap-
ter examines the effects of the experiment described in Chapter 1 on a different outcome
measure: politician and party evaluations, as measured in feeling thermometer ratings and
vote likelihood.
This experiment identifies significant negative evaluation effects among subjects receiving
informational treatments for certain candidate × policy combinations; however, these effects
prove to be minimal for the majority of issues tested. Evaluation penalties increase with
treatment dosage, though even at high dosage levels the evaluation penalties for politicians
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who oppose their party remain fairly low. Unlike previous studies’ use of low-salience policies
when measuring persuasiveness, this study tests high-salience, contentious political issues
and prominent national politicians, shown by Carmines and Stimson (1980) and Nicholson
(2012), among others, to be particularly influential on public opinion. Instead of a single cue
with only the politician’s position, the cues tested here include both the politician position
and the contradicting position of the politician’s political party. This makes it clear that
the politician’s position is at odds with their party and theoretically limiting the protection
partisan affinity can provide to politicians and adding significance to the evidence presented
here of politicians’ relatively impervious standing among their supporters.
In addition, respondents in this study received as many as five treatments in a row before
evaluating the politician, whereas most previous studies test only one or two treatments. This
dosage variation is important, as the small negative reputation effects for seeing informational
treatments increase detectably with dosage for most politicians. However, these evaluation
penalties were common to all politicians and parties, not just those whose policy positions
were shown to respondents. This suggests the political conflict contained in the treatments,
not the specific policy positions, are the true drivers of the evaluation effects caused by high-
dosage treatments. Treatment appears to have reduced respondents’ political enthusiasm
more generally, rather than their evaluations of particular politicians or parties.
On the whole, evaluation penalties were very small when treatment positioned politicians
against their political parties. When politicians were matched against conflicting policy
cues coming from co-partisan politicians, however, the evaluation penalties were an order
of magnitude larger. This suggests that while parties may be ill-equipped to check their
popular candidates, other politicians can do so more effectively. However, this may only be
the case during primary elections: when experimentally increasing the salience of interparty
competition, even these larger evaluation penalties are eliminated.
This paper proceeds in the following manner: the next section summarizes the theoretical
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and empirical works that motivate this study. The following section defines the hypotheses
to be tested. The experimental sample and design is the same as that presented in Chapter 1,
and is summarized again here. The results section describes evaluation treatment effects for
all five tested politicians and their parties as well as vote likelihood changes for tested politi-
cians. The following section presents secondary analyses examining evaluation effects among
politicians’ non-supporters and the effects of politicians being opposed by other politicians,
rather than by political parties. I find evidence of evaluation penalties for certain specific
positions for both politicians and parties, though these effects are small, and only observed
for certain positions on certain issues. These penalties increase with treatment dosage; how-
ever, dosage appears to lower evaluations for all politicians and all parties, rather than doing
so only for those whose policy positions are conveyed by treatments. When politicians are
opposed by other popular politicians rather than by their parties, the estimated evaluation
penalties increase substantially for both warmth and vote likelihood outcomes. However,
even these substantial penalties are completely eliminated when interparty competition is
highlighted. Taken together, these results suggest that many of the classic models of elec-
toral accountability through issue voting do not operate as theorized in interparty contexts,
but may still be operating in primary elections.
1.1 Elite Persuasion or Position Adoption?
As summarized by Broockman and Butler (2017), most classic theoretical accounts of the
link between politicians’ and constituents’ policy positions describe the connection as one
of elite persuasion. Political elites can highlight their policy positions and convince the
public to adopt their positions, provided they present compelling justifications for those
positions (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Jacoby, 2000; Zaller, 1992). Mayhew’s (1974) elec-
toral connection remains intact: rather than risk electoral backlash for adopting unpopular
policy positions, politicians only adopt positions they can persuade their constituents to
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adopt as well. Most normative models of democratic functioning fall into this category.
The delegate model of representation (Rehfeld, 2009) in the United States, for instance, has
representatives follow the political will of their constituents even in situations where those
preferences are known to be detrimental to the constituents’ well-being. Even the trustee
model, which has representatives following their own political preferences where they diverge
from constituents’, assumes that representatives take their constituents’ preferences into ac-
count; formal models of the trustee system of representation weigh politicians’ ability to act
independently against constituents’ willingness to electorally sanction them (Stokes, 2001).
However, in recent years the opposing theory of position adoption has been widely dis-
cussed and tested. In this theory, constituents defer to trusted political leaders and adopt
their positions without demanding justification and without altering their evaluation of the
politician (Achen and Bartels, 2006; Broockman and Butler, 2017; Lenz, 2009, 2012). A crit-
ical difference in the predictions between the two models is whether politicians risk losing
electoral support for their advocated policy positions. While the elite persuasion literature
argues that they do run this risk, especially when not providing sufficient justification for
their positions, the position adoption theory suggests that they will not suffer decreased
electoral support. Analyzing the effects of the Carter-Ford debates, Abramowitz (1978)
finds evidence for persuasive effects but not for evaluation effects. This pattern, consistent
with the position adoption model, is also found by Lenz (2009, 2012), who relies primarily
on panel survey data to identify persuasion without noticeable evaluation effects. However,
as noted by Broockman and Butler (2017), these studies do not identify whether the jus-
tifications provided by leaders are essential in driving this pattern of effects. By randomly
varying the message content of elite communication to the public, Broockman and Butler
(2017) determine that justification is not necessary to alter the public’s policy positions, and
such preference changes seem to be unaccompanied by changes in the public’s evaluation of
the politician. However, in that study, as in nearly all elite cue persuasion studies, subjects
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are only asked about one of their legislator’s issue positions. Studies originating with Camp-
bell et al. (1960) and its rebuttal, Key (1966), as well as later works such as Carmines and
Stimson (1980), find that all issues are not equal in terms of their bearing on individuals’
evaluations of politicians and party. By testing only one issue, researchers run the risk of
picking an issue with low relevance to politician evaluation and incorrectly determining that
policy positions writ large, rather than the specific policy tested, have no effect on politician
evaluations.
Furthermore, the most prominent explanation for this lack of evaluation effects is the
influence of partisanship, either through its effect on information processing (Rahn, 1993;
Lodge and Taber, 2013), or by crowding out other sources of information, including pol-
icy positions, when partisans form their evaluations (Kirkland and Coppock, 2018). The
treatments analyzed here have the benefit of including explicit party counters for politicians’
positions, theoretically reducing the role partisanship may play in shielding politicians from
negative evaluation.
1.2 Ideological Consistency in Party Labels
Stokes (1963) identifies positional and valence aspects of political parties’ reputations, each
of which influences the way voters perceive the parties and party candidates when determin-
ing their vote. The valence aspect refers to voters’ evaluations of how well a party performs
in government: timely legislation, avoiding scandals, and other non-ideological performance
aspects. The positional aspect captures information about the ideologies of the parties’ mem-
bers, conveying information about what sort of policies the party and its candidates favor.
The treatments analyzed in this chapter, by explicitly conveying contradictory policy cues,
manipulate the ideological consistency of party brands, providing insight into the relative
influence of these positional and valence issues.
According to both theoretical (Snyder and Ting, 2002; Grynaviski, 2010) and empirical
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(Woon and Pope, 2008; Pope and Woon, 2009; Tomz and Sniderman, 2005) accounts, party
labels convey information about candidate ideologies, and partisan voters tend to prefer in-
formative party labels to uninformative party labels. As shown in Snyder and Ting (2002),
higher levels of ideological consistency result in more informative party labels; Wittman
(1989) and Jones and Hudson (1998) concur that vote-maximizing parties should strive for
informative, ideologically consistent party brands. In light of this literature, consternation
among the Republican elite in cases when Donald Trump departs from party orthodoxy
would seem to be justified. The most prominent politician in the Republican Party express-
ing support for increased gun control would seem to decrease the ideological consistency
of the “Republican” label, potentially lowering support for the party among Republicans.
However, given the previously discussed literature questioning the importance of policy po-
sitions in candidate evaluations, it stands to reason that this connection may no longer hold
for parties either. If the importance of policy positions in determining candidate support
has been overstated, perhaps the importance of ideological consistency party brands has
been overstated as well. This experiment takes advantage of experimentally manipulated
ideological consistency of party labels to test this proposition, both in partisan competition
contexts, among Republican supporters of Donald Trump, and non-partisan competition
contexts, among Democratic supporters of Joe Biden during the Democratic Party Primary
elections.
To summarize, for both parties and candidates, spatial voting theories (Downs, 1957)
suggest issue positions which are less popular should reduce partisan supporters’ evaluations
more than those that are popular.1 Treatment highlighting Trump’s stance on abortion
should therefore lower his supporters’ evaluations of him more than treatment showing his
position on applying political pressure to the Federal Reserve. Similarly, treatment revealing
1As noted above, however, not all issues are equally influential, as shown in Key (1961) and Carmines
and Stimson (1980)
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the Republican Party’s opposition to applying political pressure to the Federal Reserve should
lower respondents’ evaluations of the GOP more than treatment showing the Republican
Party stance on abortion. The extent to which this finding holds true for each of these
political figures helps inform our understanding of the role valence dimensions play for both
politicians and parties, relative to their ideological positioning.
I find some evidence of issue-based evaluation for both parties and politicians, but on the
whole subjects did not seem to consistently update their evaluations of either type of figure
in response to treatment. This pattern suggests valence dimensions outweigh ideological po-
sitioning factors on most issues for both politicians and parties. The results do not, however,
suggest that issues simply do not matter in partisan evaluations of politicians. Certain can-
didate × policy combinations, such as Biden’s support for abortion restrictions and Trump’s
support for increasing gun control, did produce significant evaluation effects. While specific
policy positions may generally have little effect on partisan supporters’ evaluations of favored
politicians, certain issues do move the evaluation needle, a finding compatible with previous
works such as Key (1961) and Carmines and Stimson (1980).
2 Hypotheses
This experiment is designed to test two main pre-registered hypotheses:
H1: Subjects who are exposed to treatment will feel less warmly toward favored politi-
cians than control subjects, as measured by feeling thermometer ratings. In addition,
treatment subjects will report being less likely to vote for the cued politician.
H2: Subjects who are exposed to treatment will feel less warmly toward their political party
than control subjects, as measured by feeling thermometer ratings.
In addition to these primary hypotheses, several secondary investigations, are explored.
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These secondary analyses include evaluation effects among non-supporters and whether eval-
uation penalties increase with treatment dosage, preregistered at https://osf.io/4u2g6.
An included secondary analysis that was not preregistered is the effect treatment had on
respondents’ evaluations of politicians and parties not mentioned in the treatments subjects
were shown. I offer a potential explanation for the significant evaluation penalties among




This chapter examines the same experiment as that described in the previous chapter, con-
ducted in January 2020, but measures treatment effects on a different set of outcomes:
respondents’ evaluations of politicians and parties. The sample is the same as that described
previously, consisting of a convenience sample of nearly 12,000 respondents, recruited from
the Lucid Fulcrum Exchange. This analysis splits the sample by partisan affiliation, and
by politician support within parties. Trump supporters were defined as Republican respon-
dents, including those who reported leaning Republican, who approve of the job Trump is
doing as president. Democratic respondents, including those who lean Democratic, were de-
fined as supporters of the candidate they reported they would vote for, were the Democratic
presidential primary election being held at the time the survey was taken.
3.2 Treatment Types
This experiment includes three different types of informational treatment: simple statements,
personal pleas, and news articles. All treatment texts were pre-registered and are included
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in Appendix H. I briefly summarize the treatment types here.
The first treatment type, simple statements, are symmetrical, factual statements which
reveal the opposing positions of politician and party on the cued policy, without any rhetoric
or justification for the policy positions shown. The personal plea treatments are structured
similarly, but add personalized content from both political party and politician in the form
of Tweets or direct quotes, paired with contradicting excerpts from recent official party
platforms. Quotes and platform excerpts articulated the positions held by the politician or
party, removing additional content that may have confounded treatment. I excluded Tweets
that had such potentially confounding information from consideration, including only Tweets
that covered exclusively the tested issue, in their original form. The third treatment type,
news articles, consisted of real news stories covering the intraparty disagreement on the
policy being tested. These news articles contained the same policy position information as
each of the two treatment types described above, with varying degrees of justification for
the cued positions across issues. These articles were edited only to remove the names of
politicians other than the one being tested and were otherwise unaltered from their original
publication format.
3.3 Experimental Design
Prior to assignment, subjects were asked a variety of standard demographic and political
affiliation questions. As stated above, Republicans were asked whether they approved of
the job Donald Trump was doing as president; Republicans who approved of the job Trump
was doing as president were categorized as Trump supporters. Democrats were asked which
of the most popular Democratic primary candidates (Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth
Warren, and Pete Buttigieg) they would vote for were the Democratic presidential primary
held today, and were categorized as supporters of the Democratic candidate they selected.
All respondents were asked questions to assess the strength of their support for their chosen
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politician, and to score how likable and how competent they found said candidate.
Following covariate measurement, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three
treatment types and received a random treatment dosage assignment, ranging from zero to
five. The treatment dosage was then randomly distributed across the five policies. For each
issue, respondents were asked whether they support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose
each policy on a seven-point scale, running from “Support strongly” to “Oppose strongly.”
Following the collection of subjects’ stated policy preferences, the subject of Chapter 1, all
subjects were asked whether they planned to vote in an upcoming election—the presidential
primary for Democrats and the 2020 presidential election for Republicans—as well as how
likely they were to vote for the tested politician in that election. Respondents were then
asked to evaluate each of the politicians and parties included in the this study on a 0-
100 feeling thermometer scale. Because respondents’ policy preferences were collected after
treatment was administered, it is not possible to condition evaluation outcomes on policy
preferences. Conditioning on these post-treatment variables would bias the estimation of
treatment effects, as shown in Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres (2018). This has the effect
of preventing certain analyses from being conducted, making it impossible to assess directly
which specific respondents are updating their evaluations of the cued politicians. In other
words, it is not clear from this experiment whether respondents are simultaneously updating
their policy preferences and their evaluations in response to treatment, or whether evaluation
effects are being driven by respondents who “stick to their guns” on policy positions.
The analyzed samples for each politician are the same as those analyzed in the previ-
ous chapter, consisting of Republican and Republican-leaning supporters of Donald Trump
(those who approve of the job he is doing as president) and Democratic and Democratic-
leaning supporters of Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg who
completed all relevant parts of the survey.
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4 Results: Politician Evaluations
For each tested politician and party, it is possible to estimate the effect of each policy ×
treatment type combination on respondents’ evaluations. These full results are presented
in Appendix E. For clarity of interpretation and to reduce the sampling variation for each
analyzed treatment effect, in the main text I have instead included summary figures that
show the average evaluation effect of seeing any treatment type for each policy, for each
tested politician and party. This estimation procedure essentially pools across treatment
types to compare treated to no-information respondents within each politician’s supporters.
This analytic strategy also has the benefit of minimizing the effects of specific wordings in
particular personal plea and news treatments that may confound the policy position signal
this chapter seeks to identify.
All treatment effects include the same pre-registered covariate adjustments as used in the
Chapter 1 analyses: subjects’ level of knowledge of their party’s political positions, political
ideology, strength of partisan affiliation, strength of support for their favored politician,
a dummy variable for identifying as White, and subjects’ age. There are three outcomes
analyzed for each politician: warmth toward the tested politician, likelihood of voting for
the tested politician, and warmth toward the tested political party. Warmth ratings are
measured using a feeling thermometer, running from 0 (coldest) to 100 (warmest) for both
politician and party. Vote likelihood was initially measured using a 1-5 scale of likelihood,
running from 1 (very unlikely to vote for the cued politician) to 5 (very likely to vote for
the cued politician), before being compressed to a more substantively meaningful likely vote
percentage outcome. Similar to the method used to compress policy support in Chapter 1,
respondents who stated that they were very likely or likely to vote for the tested politician
were coded as 1. Respondents who were unlikely or very unlikely to vote for the politician
were coded as 0. Respondents who reported being neither likely nor unlikely to vote for the
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politician were coded as a 0.5.
4.1 Evaluation Changes: Donald Trump and the Republican Party
Figure 1: Donald Trump Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Republican supporters of Donald Trump
of seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards Trump, measured in feeling ther-
mometer rating.
Figure 1 presents estimated treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals among Trump
supporters for seeing any of the three treatment types for each of the five tested issues
on feeling thermometer ratings toward Trump. Positive coefficients indicate that seeing
an informational treatment on the issue caused respondents to feel more warmly toward
Trump. Negative coefficients indicate that seeing an informational treatment on the issue
caused respondents to feel less warmly toward Trump.
None of the cued issues seems to have a particularly notable effect on Republican, Trump-
supporting respondents’ warmth toward Trump. There is, however, some evidence that the
issues had different effects on warmth ratings from one another: the coefficient for gun
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control, for example, shown in the rightmost facet in Figure 1, is negative and statistically
significant. This issue was the only one which produced a detectable change in respondents’
warmth toward Trump. The coefficient for federal funding for abortions, another unpopular
position Trump was shown to endorse, is positive and statistically insignificant. However,
even these two effects, the farthest from one another in terms of total distance between
coefficients, are not statistically distinguishable. It is not possible to separate the differences
in these effects from the variation that would be expected through sampling variation. The
lack of differences across the policies in the effect they have on warmth towards Trump is
notable given the differences in the base rates of support for Trump’s positions across policies:
as shown in Table 6 of Chapter 1, even among treatment groups a majority of respondents
opposed Trump’s positions on abortion funding and NATO, while a strong majority shared
his position on political influence on the Federal Reserve and banning Muslim immigration to
the United States. It would be reasonable to interpret these results as supporting Carmines
and Stimson’s (1980) argument that certain issues influence evaluations and others do not.
After all, Trump’s position on abortion changed respondents’ opinions while his positions
on the other four issues did not. However, none of these effects is differentiable from one
another, and the overall story is one of minimal effects and evaluation stability.
The pattern of effects is largely similar for vote likelihood, the outcome assessed in Fig-
ure 2. Again pooling across treatment types, seeing Trump’s and the Republican Party’s
conflicting policy stances does not seem to notably reduce Republican, Trump-supporting re-
spondents’ likelihood of voting for Trump in the upcoming election. The estimated treatment
effect for each issue is negative, suggesting treatment reduced respondents’ stated likelihood
of voting for Trump in the next election, but none is statistically significant. Of greater
theoretical relevance than any particular issue’s effect is the similarity across issues: as is
the case for thermometer ratings, none of the effects for any specific issue can be separated
conclusively from the effects for any other issue, despite Trump’s positions on these issues
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Figure 2: Donald Trump Evaluation Effects: Vote Likelihood
This figure displays treatment effects among Republican supporters of Donald Trump
of seeing each type of treatment on likelihood of voting for Trump in the next election.
having markedly different levels of baseline support in the analyzed sample.
What about the other figure cued in each informational treatment, the Republican Party?
Figure 3 shows estimated feeling thermometer effects for seeing informational treatments on
respondents’ warmth toward the Republican Party. Here we see some evidence of respondents
reacting differently to each issue: the least popular cued GOP position among the five tested
was GOP opposition to applying political pressure to the Federal Reserve; this issue is the
only one for which treatment seems to have had a significant effect on thermometer ratings,
with the evaluation penalty for this issue, -1.9 points (SE = 0.74), being twice as large as
any paid by Trump. The Republican Party position on abortion funding was a more popular
one, and being shown this position seems to have improved respondents’ evaluations of the
Republican Party, though not by a significant amount. However, once again it is not possible
to differentiate the effect treatments had for each issue from one another, and on the whole
treatment effects among Trump supporters show little effect of treatment on evaluations
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Figure 3: Republican Party Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Republican supporters of Donald Trump
of seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards the Republican Party, measured
in feeling thermometer rating.
toward either Trump or the Republican Party.
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4.2 Evaluation Changes: Joe Biden and the Democratic Party
Figure 4: Joe Biden Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Joe Biden of see-
ing each type of treatment on warmth towards Biden, measured in feeling thermometer
rating.
Figure 4 presents estimated treatment effects, pooling across treatment types, for seeing an
informational treatment for each of the five tested issues for Joe Biden supporters’ warmth
toward Biden. We see more variation in evaluation effects across issues for Biden supporters
than among Trump supporters. It is possible to separate the negative effect estimated
for seeing Biden’s support for the Hyde Amendment’s abortion funding restrictions (the
middle facet of Figure 4) from the positive effect estimated for seeing Biden’s support for
increasing border fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border on Democratic, Biden-supporting
respondents’ warmth toward Biden. The treatment effects for these issues correspond to the
persuasive effects described in Chapter 1: increased border fencing was the issue on which
Biden was most persuasive; federal abortion funding was the issue for which Biden was the
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least persuasive (Chapter 1, Figure 2). More here than among Trump supporters, Biden
supporters do appear to react differently to the different tested policy issues, updating their
evaluations when shown Biden’s support for abortion funding more strongly than for other
issues.
Figure 5: Joe Biden Evaluation Effects: Vote Likelihood
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Joe Biden of
seeing each type of treatment on likelihood of voting for Biden in the next election.
Estimated treatment effects fall into a similar pattern for Biden supporters’ likelihood
of voting for Biden in the next election (Figure 5). Decreased estimate precision for this
outcome, however, prevents the differences in effect magnitude between issues from achieving
statistical significance. When estimating treatments’ effects on respondents’ stated likelihood
of voting for Biden in the next election, seeing treatments for increasing border fencing had
the smallest impact on voting likelihood, near zero, while seeing Biden’s support for the
Hyde Amendment and the Democratic Party’s opposition to the Hyde Amendment had the
largest estimated effect, decreasing respondents’ likelihood of voting for Biden by about 3.4
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percentage points (SE = 1.3pp). This is a meaningful effect: during the 2020 Democratic
Presidential Primary election five states were decided by fewer than five percentage points;
a loss in likely voters of this magnitude could be the difference between a successful and
unsuccessful nomination campaign.
Figure 6: Democratic Party Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Joe Biden of
seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards the Democratic Party, measured in
feeling thermometer rating.
Unlike the treatment effects estimated among Republican Trump supporters, there is lit-
tle evidence of decreased feelings of warmth toward the Democratic Party among Democratic
Biden supporters (Figure 6). The treatment effect coefficients are positive for the issues on
which the Democratic Party position was most popular among this sample (abortion funding
and expanding Social Security) and the coefficients are negative for the Democratic Party’s
least popular positions (opposition to border fencing, support for charter schools). These
effects, however, are near zero and fall far short of the magnitude required to reach statistical
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significance.
Taken together, the evidence here suggests Biden supporters reacted more negatively
to his stance on abortion than to the other issues, but on the whole, estimated treatment
effects on evaluation of both Biden and of the Democratic Party are small and relatively
homogeneous across issue area.
4.3 Evaluation Changes: Bernie Sanders and the Democratic Party
Figure 7: Bernie Sanders Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Bernie Sanders
of seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards Sanders, measured in feeling
thermometer rating.
Figure 7 shows issue-by-issue estimated treatment effects for seeing informational treatments
of any kind on feelings of warmth toward Bernie Sanders among his supporters. Warmth
effects are near zero for all issues, with pooled treatment effects for all issues indistinguishable
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from zero and indistinguishable from one another. Given the popularity of Sanders’ shown
policy positions for each of the five issues tested this not a surprising result, but the across-
the-board low magnitude treatment effects, homogeneous across issue area, again suggest
highlighting Sanders’ policy stance divergence from the mainstream Democratic Party did
little to lower his supporters’ evaluations of him.
Figure 8: Bernie Sanders Evaluation Effects: Vote Likelihood
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Bernie Sanders
of seeing each type of treatment on likelihood of voting for Sanders in the next election.
Figure 8 summarizes estimated treatment effects for informational treatments on Sanders
supporters’ likelihood of voting for Sanders in the next election. These results are more
suggestive of differences across policy area, though this is not conclusive support, and the
estimates do not point to a clear evaluation penalty for Sanders’ heterodoxy. Sanders’ least
popular policy position, support for tariffs, does yield a negative effect estimate of -1.4
percentage points in the percentage of his supporters likely to vote for him, falling just
short of conventional levels of statistical significance. In contrast, his very popular positions
on student debt and Medicare-for-All had positive (but still insignificant) effects on the
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percentage of his supporters likely to support him, as would be expected if his voters were
leveraging the policy position information and using issue positions to update their politician
evaluations. However, the lack of any clear effects for this outcome render this support at
most suggestive, rather than conclusive.
Figure 9: Democratic Party Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Bernie Sanders
of seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards the Democratic Party, measured
in feeling thermometer rating.
Sanders supporters’ warmth toward the Democratic Party shows more clear evidence
of evaluation changes as a result of treatment, and of differentiation across issues (Figure
9). Seeing the Democratic Party’s opposition to tariffs increased warmth toward the party
among Democratic Sanders supporters by a significant amount (2.8 points, SE = 1.3 points),
while seeing the party’s less popular position of opposing decriminalization of undocumented
border crossing significantly lowered Sanders supporters’ warmth toward the party (-3.4
points, SE = 1.3 points). While Sanders supporters appear to have been relatively resistant
to changing their warmth toward Sanders as a result of treatment, they were more willing
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to adjust their evaluations of the Democratic Party. This is the opposite pattern from
that observed among Biden supporters, who were more willing to change their evaluation of
their candidate than their party. The effect pattern across the two subject pools suggests
respondents are, to some extent, updating their evaluations of politician and party based
on ideological distance, given that Bernie Sanders’ cued policy positions were much more
popular among his supporters (and the Democratic Party positions therefore much less
popular) than were Biden’s. Similar to the results presented above, however, on the whole
these findings point to relatively small evaluation penalties for both politicians and parties.
4.4 Evaluation Changes: Elizabeth Warren and the Democratic
Party
Figure 10: Elizabeth Warren Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Elizabeth War-
ren of seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards Warren, measured in feeling
thermometer rating.
83
The results for Elizabeth Warren and her supporters (Figure 10) are less intuitive than the
results among Sanders and his supporters—seeing Warren’s support for creating a national
gun registry and Medicare-for-All appear to have reduced her supporters’ warmth towards
her, despite being policy views shared by about 90% of Democratic Warren supporters.
Shown Warren’s support for a fracking ban and decriminalizing undocumented border cross-
ing, much less popular positions among her supporters, supporters appear to have increased
their warmth toward Warren. This counterintuitive pattern of estimated effects and the rel-
ative lack of precision in estimations for each issue underline the importance of not reading
too much into effects that fall within the range of what is possible due to random sampling
variation: none of these evaluation effects are significant, nor are they distinguishable from
one another. Figure 11, showing treatment effect estimates and 95% confidence intervals for
treatment effects on the percentage of Warren supporters who stated they were likely to vote
for Warren in the next election, also shows no significant effect for treatment on any issue in
terms of altering Democratic Warren supporters’ likelihood of voting for Warren in the next
election.
Treatment effects for Warren supporters’ feeling thermometer ratings toward the Demo-
cratic Party (Figure 12) closely align with the results estimated among Sanders supporters.
The Democratic Party’s opposition to tariffs, the most popular position shown to Warren
supporters, increased warmth toward the Democratic Party, while the party’s opposition to
decriminalizing border crossing and Medicare-for-All, far less popular positions, decreased
warmth toward the party. Again, though, these effect magnitudes fall shy of the level re-
quired for statistical significance. As was the case among Sanders supporters, there is some
evidence that Democratic respondents are more willing to update their evaluations of their
party than their favored candidate in the manner predicted by spatial utility models, but
the evidence is not conclusive.
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Figure 11: Elizabeth Warren Evaluation Effects: Vote Likelihood
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Elizabeth War-
ren of seeing each type of treatment on likelihood of voting for Warren in the next
election.
4.5 Evaluation Changes: Pete Buttigieg and the Democratic Party
Estimated thermometer rating effects for Pete Buttigieg among his supporters are shown in
Figure 13. Informational treatments are generally not estimated to have had a detectable
effect on Buttigieg’s supporters’ warmth toward him, withe the exception of treatments
showing Buttigieg’s support for immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan, which lowered
warmth by about 2.96 points (SE = 1.5). This was a policy position shared by the majority
of Buttigieg supporters (65% of those not seeing treatments for this policy) and was one
for which Buttigieg was able to lead his supporters’ opinions, again suggesting ideological
proximity may not be the driver of evaluation effects for politicians among their supporters.
Estimating treatment effects for vote likelihood, shown in Figure 14, finds one issue that
produced a significant effect on the percentage of Buttigieg supporters who stated they were
likely to vote for Mayor Pete: opposition to free trade. Showing informational treatments of
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Figure 12: Democratic Party Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Elizabeth War-
ren of seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards the Democratic Party, mea-
sured in feeling thermometer ratings.
any kind that relayed Buttigieg’s opposition to free trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific
Partnership as well as the Democratic Party’s support for such agreements reduced the
percentage of Buttigieg’s supporters that stated they were likely to vote for Buttigieg by 5.9
percentage points (SE = 2.2). This was the policy for which Buttigieg’s position was by far
least popular among his supporters, with only 18% of Buttigieg supporters in the control
group for this issue sharing Buttigieg’s opposition to free trade agreements. The negative
evaluation effect for this issue was also found for Sanders and Warren supporters, though to
a lesser degree and falling short of statistical significance among both Warren and Sanders
supporters.
Figure 15 shows estimated treatment effects for informational treatments among Buttigieg
supporters on feelings of warmth toward the Democratic Party. Most of these effect coeffi-
cients are relatively close to zero and not significant at conventional levels, with the exception
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Figure 13: Pete Buttigieg Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Pete Buttigieg
of seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards Buttigieg, measured in feeling
thermometer rating.
of the national gun licensing requirement. Seeing that the Democratic Party officially op-
poses such a licensing requirement lowered warmth toward the Democratic Party. This was
a position shared by only 10.2% of Buttigieg respondents who were not shown treatment for
this issue, making it by far the Democratic Party’s least popular position shown to Buttigieg
supporters. As was the case with each of the previous subject pools, Buttigieg respon-
dents updated their evaluations of their political party only in reaction to certain unpopular
positions.
Considering these findings collectively, in most cases subjects did not alter their evalu-
ations of either politicians or parties to a degree separable from sampling variation. Issue
positions both popular and unpopular by and large seem to have little impact on subjects’
opinions of their party or favored politician. The lack of evaluation effects, particularly in
light of the fact that the treatments tested here had explicit partisan counters for politicians’
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Figure 14: Pete Buttigieg Evaluation Effects: Vote Likelihood
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Pete Buttigieg of
seeing each type of treatment on likelihood of voting for Buttigieg in the next election.
positions, casts doubt on whether issue voting models sufficiently account for the effects va-
lence considerations have on politician and party evaluations, such as those argued for in
work such as Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001), and Snyder and Ting
(2002).
There are, however, exceptions to this general lack of detectable effects. Certain issue
positions did change subjects’ opinions, such as Biden’s support for abortion restrictions,
Trump’s support for increasing gun control, and the Democratic Party’s opposition to de-
criminalizing undocumented border crossings. These issues did alter respondents’ evaluations
of both politician and party, in ways most other issues did not. This heterogeneity across
issue positions is reconcilable with issue voting models that identify certain issues as the
primary drivers of opinion changes, such as Carmines and Stimson’s (1980) “easy issues” or
Bernhard and Freeder’s (2020) “deal-breaker” issues. 2
2The experimental results presented in Chapter 3 cast doubt on whether respondents truly issue vote on
these issues either, however.
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Figure 15: Democratic Party Evaluation Effects: Feeling Thermometer
Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Democratic supporters of Pete Buttigieg
of seeing each type of treatment on warmth towards the Democratic Party, measured
in feeling thermometer rating.
4.6 Evaluation Effects by Dosage
While evaluation penalties for both politicians and parties for each individual policy are
relatively small, for many issue × politician combinations the estimated treatment effects
are negative, but not individually significant. Do these effects stack with one another to
the extent that their effects collectively can be separated from sampling variation? Column
1 in Table 1 finds a significant, linear relationship between the number of treatments seen
and negative evaluation effects for respondents’ feelings of warmth toward their favored
politician, pooling across issues, treatment types and politicians. Treatment dosage had a
similar effect on warmth ratings towards respondents’ parties, shown in Column 2 of Table
1. Disaggregated results for each politician and party are presented in Appendix F.3
3For the pooled analyses presented in Table 1 and Table 2, Democratic respondents’ party strength and
ideology scores have been realigned to correspond with Republican scores; higher values indicate stronger
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Table 1: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Cued Politician and Party
Cued Politician Cued Party






Politician support 1.425∗∗∗ 7.499∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.307)






Likability rating 2.787∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.297)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses. Likability and competence ratings,
described above, are coded 1-5 from “Very dislikable” to “Very likable” and
“Very incompetent” to “Very competent.”
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The negative, significant coefficients estimated for these ratings indicate that these eval-
uation penalties do increase with treatment dosage. Rather than rallying around their can-
didate or party when exposed to many consecutive instances of intraparty policy conflict,
respondents cooled toward both politicians and parties with each additional treatment seen.
This cumulative effect amounts to between two and three points of decreased warmth for
both politicians and for parties among partisan supporters at the maximum tested dosage
of five treatments seen. This result affirms the importance of repetition in political mes-
saging attempting to erode affinity for politicians among their supporters during electoral
competition.
The analysis in Table 2 suggests the mechanism behind these lowered evaluation scores
is not, however, related to the policy positions relayed in the treatments. Table 2 presents
regression results testing whether treatment dosage alters evaluations of politicians and par-
ties not cued in treatments. The dataset that produces these estimates pools respondents’
thermometer ratings for all politicians not cued—for Trump supporters, for example, the
politicians included in this analysis are Mike Pence, Biden, Sanders, Warren, and Buttigieg.
For Biden respondents, these ratings include Trump, Pence, Sanders, Warren and Buttigieg
ratings. The “other party” ratings consist of the thermometer ratings for the Democratic
Party among Republican respondents and Republican Party thermometer ratings among
Democratic respondents. Treatment dosage reduced respondents’ feelings of warmth to-
wards politicians and parties not cued at all by a comparable amount as those included in
the treatment text. Seeing conflicting positions for favored politicians and parties seems
to reduce respondents’ feelings of warmth toward all politicians and parties, not just those
whose policy positions are shown. This suggests the conflict in the informational treatments,
not the specific policy positions relayed, are driving the negative evaluation penalties iden-
party strength and stronger liberal ideology for Democrats and stronger party strength and stronger conser-
vative ideology for Republicans. These recodings do not alter the direction or magnitude of the estimated
effects.
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Table 2: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Non-Cued Politician and Party
All Non-Cued Politician Non-Cued Party





Politician support 2.954∗∗∗ 0.112






Likability rating 2.888∗∗∗ 0.373
(0.237) (0.396)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses. Likability and competence ratings,
described above, are coded 1-5 from “Very dislikable” to “Very likable” and
“Very incompetent” to “Very competent.”
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tified in Table 1. Previous research and utility models identify conflicting policy pressures
reduces the public’s enthusiasm toward both politicians (Campbell et al., 1960; Mutz, 2002)
and parties (Snyder and Ting, 2002). The conflicting pressures contained in the treatments
in this experiment seem to lower respondents’ warmth toward all politicians and both parties,
not just those included in the treatment.
5 Not My Candidate! Effects among Non-Supporters
The April 2020 survey, as described in Chapter 1, created a randomly determined subject
pool of Sanders supporters receiving the Biden vs. the Democratic Party cues and of Biden
supporters receiving Sanders vs. the Democratic Party. It did so by randomly matching
subjects to either Sanders or Biden, rather than matching Democratic respondents to their
preferred candidate. This enables estimation of evaluation treatment effects among non-
supporters. For the Republicans and Donald Trump, I include an analysis of treatment
effects among Republicans who did not approve of the job Donald Trump was doing as
president.4
Tables 3 and 4 show evaluation treatment effects estimated among non-supporters of
Biden, Sanders, and Trump by treatment type and dosage. While the smaller sample size
prevents the estimate precision required to achieve conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance, these effects are notable for their similarity in direction and magnitude to the results
shown above among each politician’s supporters. Even among non-supporters, evaluation
penalties for opposing the political party were limited. This is especially notable for the
treatment effects for Biden cues among Sanders supporters, as Biden’s cued positions were
very unpopular among the examined sample of Sanders supporters. Even for this group,
informational treatments had only minimal effect on their evaluations of Biden, further sup-
4While not an apples-to-apples comparison, there is no comparable figure in the Republican Party to
provide a comparable analysis.
93
Table 3: Politician Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type among Non-Supporters
Politician Thermometer Rating
Biden ratings Sanders ratings Trump ratings
among among among
Sanders supporters Biden supporters disapprovers
(1) (2) (3)
Simple statement treatment −4.727 −1.948 −3.589
(3.762) (3.347) (2.683)
News treatment −2.799 −1.536 −1.874
(3.526) (3.513) (2.711)
Personal plea treatment −3.943 −2.054 −4.165
(3.934) (3.289) (2.731)
Democratic Party knowledge 0.239 4.200∗∗
(1.083) (1.629)
Republican Party knowledge 0.357
(0.822)
Ideology 1.921∗ −0.958 1.440∗
(1.054) (0.811) (0.778)
Party strength −1.986 −2.118 −3.404∗∗
(1.602) (1.339) (1.405)
White 6.965∗∗ −0.677 1.455
(3.207) (2.774) (2.283)
Age 0.073 −0.102 −0.007
(0.109) (0.073) (0.058)
Likability rating 9.366∗∗∗ 8.066∗∗∗ 10.227∗∗∗
(1.786) (1.557) (1.046)
Competence rating 5.945∗∗∗ 8.301∗∗∗ 6.957∗∗∗
(1.621) (1.854) (0.874)
Constant −5.003 13.255 4.277
(7.957) (8.440) (9.543)
N 209 247 470
R2 0.445 0.426 0.420
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
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porting the conclusion from the policy-by-policy results that politicians face few evaluation
penalties for adopting unpopular positions among co-partisan respondents, even when the
party positions are included in the treatment text and in this case, even among co-partisans
who prefer a different candidate. The lack of strong evaluation penalties for politicians’
heterodoxy, even among non-supporters, both challenges issue voting models and highlights
parties’ challenge in opposing popular politicians. Whether it is because of politicians’ advan-
tages in valence dimensions over the valence strengths parties have among their supporters
or some other feature, popular politicians appear to have little to fear in staking their ground
independently from their parties, even on issues that are unpopular in the electorate.
6 Politician Versus Politician, Partisan Competition
If the parties cannot effectively counter popular politicians, who can? Table 5 presents
evaluation treatment effects for the October recontact survey, pitting Biden against the
respondents’ initially preferred candidate, either Sanders or Warren, rather than the Demo-
cratic Party, on five new policies. For Sanders supporters, these policies were support for
the Brady Bill (Sanders initially opposed, Biden supported), construction of a border wall
(Sanders opposed, Biden supported), electoral college reform (Sanders supported, Biden op-
posed), federal abortion funding (Sanders supported, Biden opposed), and Social Security
expansion (Sanders supported, Biden opposed). For Warren supporters, the five issues were
canceling student debt (Warren supported, Biden opposed), creation of a wealth tax (War-
ren supported, Biden opposed), electoral college reform (Warren supported, Biden opposed),
federal abortion funding (Warren supported, Biden opposed), and Social Security expansion
(Warren supported, Biden opposed).
The treatments in this wave of the experiment were of the same format as those used
previously, but instead of the Democratic Party providing the counter-cue for Biden’s shown
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Table 4: Politician Evaluation Effects by Dosage among Non-Supporters
Politician Thermometer Rating
Biden ratings Sanders ratings Trump ratings
among among among
Sanders supporters Biden supporters disapprovers
(1) (2) (3)
Dosage −0.758 0.089 −0.852∗
(0.753) (0.675) (0.494)
Democratic Party knowledge 0.341 4.127∗∗
(1.084) (1.622)
Republican Party knowledge 0.410
(0.816)
Ideology 1.935∗ −0.980 1.460∗
(1.049) (0.804) (0.774)
Party strength −1.812 −2.126 −3.469∗∗
(1.577) (1.319) (1.401)
White 6.838∗∗ −0.894 1.267
(3.172) (2.783) (2.274)
Age 0.069 −0.100 −0.006
(0.107) (0.073) (0.058)
Likability rating 9.293∗∗∗ 8.043∗∗∗ 10.310∗∗∗
(1.773) (1.535) (1.046)
Competence rating 5.970∗∗∗ 8.182∗∗∗ 6.999∗∗∗
(1.614) (1.842) (0.869)
Constant −6.304 12.376 3.975
(7.769) (8.276) (9.391)
N 209 247 470
R2 0.443 0.425 0.421
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Biden Versus Original Candidate among Sanders and Warren Initial Supporters
Politician Politician
Thermometer Rating Vote Likelihood
(1) (2)
Simple statement treatment −0.296 −0.026
(3.079) (0.074)
News treatment −3.480 −0.070
(3.141) (0.074)
Personal plea treatment −10.721∗∗∗ −0.063
(3.396) (0.075)
Simple statement treatment × TrumpCue −3.123 0.029
(4.370) (0.104)
News treatment × TrumpCue 6.068 0.073
(4.409) (0.100)
Personal plea treatment × TrumpCue 9.973∗∗ 0.082
(4.533) (0.100)
Trump cue 1.398 −0.017
(3.415) (0.073)




Politician support 6.648∗∗∗ 0.053
(1.588) (0.037)






Likability rating 9.949∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(1.338) (0.029)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
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policy position, I used either Sanders or Warren, depending on respondents’ initial prefer-
ences as measured in the January survey, to counter Biden’s position. Simple statements
relayed the contrasting positions of Biden and Sanders or Warren in direct wording, without
any justification or explanation. The personal pleas relayed the same policy positions, but
added personal quotes or Tweets from both Biden and Sanders or Warren, reiterating the
two politicians’ contrasting positions. The news treatments used real news stories, generally
written during the Democratic primary election, that focused on the policy conflict between
Biden and either Sanders or Warren. These news stories were included in their original
versions, only edited to remove mentions of politicians other than the two intended to be
cued.
These treatments, matching Biden against another prominent Democratic candidate
rather than the Democratic Party among respondents who initially supported the non-Biden
politician, lowered respondents’ evaluations of Biden by a far greater magnitude than any of
the analyses above. Respondents who saw at least one personal plea treatment felt nearly
11 points less warmly towards Joe Biden than did control respondents. In vote likelihood,
the personal plea condition led respondents to report being more than six percentage points
less likely to vote for Joe Biden, just two weeks before Election Day, though the high degree
of variance surrounding this estimate prevents it from reaching statistical significance.5
Politicians therefore appear to have much more to fear from being opposed by other
co-partisan politicians than they do from the party itself. This result points to primary
elections as contexts in which partisans are more willing to update their opinions of co-
partisan politicians: primaries are the time in the election cycle when multiple prominent
politicians from the same party are typically able to achieve national followings, and people
appear more willing to substantially update their evaluations of politicians in response to
5Those who had already voted at the time the survey was administered were omitted from the vote
likelihood analysis.
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policy disagreements between politicians than they do in reaction to policy disagreements
between politicians and political parties.
In order to test whether respondents’ willingness to update their evaluations is indeed
specific to intraparty contexts, I experimentally manipulated the salience of interparty com-
petition by factorially randomizing a “Trump cue” administered after treatment, before
evaluation outcomes were measured. This cue simply stated that Donald Trump was Joe
Biden’s opponent in the upcoming election, and asked the respondent whether they approved
of Trump, how likable they found Trump, and how competent they found Trump. This cue
was a simple way of increasing the salience of interparty competition by highlighting Biden’s
opponent in the upcoming general election, rather than the salience of intraparty competi-
tion that was increased by highlighting Biden’s former opponent in the Democratic primary
election.
This cue, when interacted with the treatment, wiped out the treatment’s negative eval-
uation penalties, as shown in rows three through six of Table 5. While the personal plea
treatment condition pitting Biden against Sanders or Warren lowered respondents’ warmth
toward Biden by 10.7 points, seeing the Trump cue after these treatments increased warmth
toward Biden by 10.0 points, almost entirely erasing the evaluation penalties caused by the
Biden vs. Sanders or Biden vs. Warren treatments. While partisans appear more willing
to update their evaluations of politicians when they are opposed by other politicians than
when they are opposed by parties, in other words, this appears to be specific to intraparty
contexts.
7 Conclusion
The results in Chapter 1 of this dissertation show evidence of enduring persuasive effects
resulting from the treatments tested. In this chapter, I present evidence arguing that this
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policy position change is not accompanied, except in a few specific cases, by corresponding
changes in respondents’ evaluations of politician and party. On the whole, the evidence in
this chapter is more supportive of the position adoption model of elite influence on pub-
lic opinion than the elite persuasion model, similar to recent findings by Broockman and
Butler (2017) and Lenz (2012). Being shown to hold some positions, such as supporting
gun control (Trump), supporting abortion restrictions (Biden), or opposing decriminalizing
undocumented border crossing (the Democratic Party), did produce noticeable evaluation
penalties, in line with the “easy issues” argument in Carmines and Stimson (1980). Even for
these few issues which did move respondents’ evaluations, however, evaluation penalties were
small. On the whole, then, politicians and parties appear able to hold unpopular positions
while suffering minimal electoral backlash. Critically, unlike most previous studies that find
partisanship and partisan labels enable politicians to adopt unpopular positions without los-
ing support, such as Mummolo, Peterson and Westwood (2019), here the treatments each
included explicit partisan counters. Not only do politicians appear to be protected by their
parties, they also appear to be protected from their parties.
Outside of the few specific policy positions that proved electorally costly for politicians or
parties, many of the treatments produced negative evaluation penalties that were too small
to be statistically significant. Though evaluation penalties resulting from treatment stack
cumulatively, the increased evaluation penalties from higher treatment dosages seem driven
by policy conflict and the conflicting information streams themselves, not by the adoption of
unpopular policy positions. While higher treatment dosages do cause more strongly negative
evaluations of parties and politicians, this effect applies similarly to politicians and parties
not cued in the experiment at all. This finding suggests evaluation penalties estimated in
this chapter, outside of the few exceptional candidate × policy combinations that produced
significant effects, are the result of respondents’ aversion toward political conflict itself, rather
than evidence of widespread, low-intensity policy-based evaluation changes.
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While popular politicians seem to have little to fear from opposing their parties, even
on most issues for which their supporters agree with the party, they stand to suffer more
from opposing other popular, co-partisan politicians. These stronger evaluation penalties
are circumstance-dependent, however, conditional on the salience of interparty competition.
Taken together, these findings suggest models of electoral accountability that depend on issue
voting, such as Mayhew’s (1974) electoral connection, do not operate in most interparty
electoral competitions, but may accurately describe voters’ decision processes in primary
elections.
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Chapter 3: Policy Positions versus Pol-
icy Preferences? Conjoint Analysis of
Hypothetical Candidates
Abstract: The final chapter of this dissertation considers the real-world implications of
the persuasive effects identified in Chapter 1 and the relative lack of evaluation effects es-
timated in Chapter 2. In Chapter 1, partisan supporters of Donald Trump, Joe Biden,
Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg each sided with their favored can-
didate, against their political party, when policy conflict between politician and party was
highlighted. The strength of observed opinion change is substantial, with treatment increas-
ing support for politicians’ policy positions, reducing support for their party’s positions, by
more than 20 percentage points in some cases. This persuasion also exhibited surprising
endurance, with effects still detectable nine months after initial treatment, far beyond what
would be expected from mere framing or priming effects. In Chapter 2, I estimate relatively
minimal effects for these same treatments on respondents’ evaluations of both politicians
and parties, suggesting electoral accountability of the sort theorized by issue voting models
does not operate effectively in modern American politics. In this chapter, I take advantage
of the randomly induced, enduring opinion changes estimated in Chapter 1 to conduct a
more direct test of issue voting in the American electorate by assessing whether treatment
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alter subjects’ choices in a conjoint experiment that randomly varied hypothetical candi-
dates’ policy positions. I find treatment did not produce any noticeable effect on the policy
positions respondents prefer politicians hold. Randomly induced change in policy positions
did not show signs of corresponding changes in candidate preferences, contrary to issue vot-
ing models’ predictions. Respondents of both parties do use candidates’ issue positions to
choose among them, but not in the way spatial voting models predict. This result suggests
subjects may use candidates’ issue positions as signals of their “types,” rather than simply
choosing the candidate whose issue positions most closely align with their own.
1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I present evidence that when policy conflict between individ-
ual politicians and political parties is highlighted, partisan supporters of the cued politician
tend to side with the politician, not the party, and do so strongly. This trend appears
largely to cut across policy area and politician, and endured over nine months after exposure
to treatment. Combined with the low-magnitude evaluation penalties paid by politicians
for their heterodoxy presented in Chapter 2, this dynamic suggests popular politicians, even
those like Bernie Sanders who are ultimately unsuccessful in securing their party’s presiden-
tial nomination, may have a powerful influence on the electorate faced by future candidates
by fundamentally altering the types of policies their supporters prefer.
Relatedly, issue voting theories argue that members of the electorate seek to elect candi-
dates that most closely share their policy preferences. As their policy preferences change, so
then should the candidates they vote for, all else equal. The treatments presented in Chap-
ter 1 create randomly induced differences in policy positions among treatment and control
groups. This variation allows for a direct experimental test of issue voting theories: when
subjects’ policy positions change, do their candidate preferences change as well?
103
This chapter assesses whether popular politicians’ heterodox policy positions truly re-
shape the electorate, as well as provide a clear test of issue voting predictions, by comparing
treatment and control subjects’ selections in a conjoint experiment that randomly varied
hypothetical candidates’ policy positions. If subjects do determine support for politicians in
the manner spatial voting theories predict, treatment should affect the policy positions that
respondents prefer when selecting among hypothetical candidates as well, given the large
changes in policy positions treatment caused.
Contrary to issue voting theories, I find no evidence that treatment caused significant
changes in subjects’ candidate preferences. This holds true even for issues for which treat-
ment caused large changes in subjects’ own policy positions, including cases where treatment
changed majority preferences. As one example, while a strong majority of Biden supporters
not shown Biden’s support for building a border fence opposed border fence construction,
among those shown Biden’s position on this issue, a majority favored border fence construc-
tion. However, these two groups were almost identically likely to select candidates who
supported border fence construction, holding other policy positions equal. This is a direct
contradiction of the predictions issue voting models make regarding the relationship between
voters’ policy preferences and the types of candidates they support.
I offer several possible explanations for the lack of treatment effects on subjects’ con-
joint preferences. It is possible treatment subjects misrepresented their policy preferences
following treatment, a phenomenon known as partisan cheerleading. Alternatively, the lack
of differences in conjoint preferences could be driven by the nature of the estimation proce-
dure for average marginal component effects, which simultaneously measure issue preference
and preference intensity. If treatment led respondents to update their policy positions while
simultaneously downweighting the importance of issues on which they have new positions,
these two effects could cancel out in the AMCE procedure.
I argue neither of these explanations, however, are particularly likely. Partisan cheerlead-
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ing is often found in studies that use framing or priming cues to drive temporary opinion
changes. Given the endurance of the persuasive effects estimated in Chapter 1, still de-
tectable nine months after treatment, the opinion changes caused by exposure to treatment
seem to be evidence of true, lasting opinion change, not ephemeral effects driven by mere
wording effects. If the opinion changes were instead driven by partisans’ misrepresenting
their preferences out of a desire to give “their teams’ answer,” it seems unlikely they would
remember to again dissemble, in the same direction, more than nine months later. With re-
gard to the particularities of the AMCE estimation procedure, simpler analyses of respondent
preferences confirm the implications of the AMCE estimates—across all candidate × policy
combinations, treatment and control subjects reacted similarly to hypothetical candidate
positions, despite having markedly different average policy preferences in many cases.
The evidence presented in this chapter therefore challenges traditional issue voting theo-
ries. This dissertation does not, however, argue that issue positions do not matter. I present
evidence in Chapter 2 of subjects updating their evaluations of politicians and parties in
response to certain issues. In this chapter as well, it does not appear to be the case that
respondents simply did not care about issue positions when selecting candidates. Republican
respondents, on average, preferred candidates who oppose abortion funding, while Demo-
cratic respondents preferred candidates who support abortion funding, on average. I offer
an alternative explanation for the findings presented in this chapter: partisan voters do care
about issue positions, but use them as cues to infer candidates’ “types” and choose candi-
dates based on type, rather than selecting the candidate with whom they share the greatest
degree of ideological proximity.
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2 Issue Voting and Partisan Cheerleading
The extent to which voters cast ballots on the basis of specific policy preferences is one of
the most carefully examined issues in American politics. From seminal work by Lazarsfeld,
Berelson and Gaudet (1944) to that by Campbell et al. (1960) and Nie, Verba and Petrocik
(1979), how much issues matter in electoral contexts has been widely debated but enjoys little
scholarly consensus. Whether Americans know enough about policy to cast their ballot on the
basis of policy preference (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), whether political
parties and partisanship hinder issue voting (Achen et al., 2017; Lenz, 2012; Zaller, 1992)
or are the only vehicle through which issue voting is possible, by ordering multidimensional
policy debates (Schattschneider, 1960; Wright and Schaffner, 2002), and how voters do or
do not use heuristics to cast issue-based ballots (Lupia, 1994) are just a few of the most
salient debates surrounding issue voting. At its core, however, the idea of issue voting is a
simple one: voters have preferences on public policy and want to elect representatives that
share those preferences. In Downs’ (1957) simple spatial model of voting, voters want to
minimize the ideological distance between themselves and their elected representatives, and
will support whichever politicians most closely share their political views.
The experiment described in this dissertation has several advantages that enable it to
be a helpful addition to this deep literature: as shown in Chapter 1, the treatments admin-
istered to respondents generated random, substantial, and enduring variation in subjects’
policy preferences on highly salient issues. Issue voting models are clear in predicting that
this sort of policy preference change, in the absence of conflicting signals such as parti-
sanship(Rahn, 1993) or valence dimensions (Peterson, 2019; Kirkland and Coppock, 2018),
should be accompanied by a corresponding change in subjects’ choices among candidates
who are differentiated by their policy positions. The simplicity of the test conducted here
paired with the robustness of the null findings presented are the central advantages this
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study offers to such a thoughtfully developed field.
One potential explanation for this chapter’s null conjoint results is that the persuasive
effects shown in Chapter 1 are evidence of respondents’ misrepresenting their true policy
preferences, rather than evidence of real opinion change. Survey respondents’ desire to
provide “their team’s” response is a well documented phenomenon (Green, Palmquist and
Schickler, 2002). Bullock et al. (2015) argues certain types of surveys and survey experiment
responses are not reflective of respondents’ true opinions or evidence of true opinion change,
but instead are driven by utility derived from expressing partisan solidarity. When the
material stakes of people’s survey responses are raised, such as when respondents get paid for
accurate answers, much of the partisan bias disappears, as the utility from giving the a correct
answer outweighs respondents’ utility from giving their team’s answer. It is possible that the
survey responses examined and large persuasive effects estimated in Chapter 1 are driven
by respondents’ cheerleading impulses. However, the endurance of the estimated opinion
changes make this possibility appear unlikely. While partisans may dissemble in response
to treatments in survey responses collected immediately following treatment, the continuity
of treatment effects so long after treatment suggests a degree of preference stability in these
updated opinions, which has been argued to be indicative of true preferences in previous
studies of issue voting (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder Jr, 2008). I find it therefore
unlikely that the changes in policy preferences caused by treatment in this experiment are
driven by respondents misrepresenting their true preferences, and instead take respondents’
stated policy positions as indicative of their true beliefs.
3 Hypotheses
This experiment is designed to test one central hypothesis:
H1: When shown cues from politicians and their political party that push in opposite
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directions, treatment subjects will be more likely to prefer hypothetical candidates
who echo the cued politician’s positions. The AMCE for each seen politician position
among the treatment group will be more positive than among the control group.
This hypothesis is tested among each of the five policies for each of the five politicians
included in this experiment.
4 Research Design
4.1 Sample
This chapter estimates effects of the same treatments as analyzed in Chapter 1 and Chapter
2 on a third set of outcomes: respondents’ selections between two hypothetical candidates
whose policy positions were randomly assigned in a conjoint experiment. The sample is the
same as that described previously, consisting of a convenience sample recruited from the
Lucid Fulcrum Exchange of approximately 12,000 respondents, each of whom completed two
similar conjoint selection tasks.
The analyzed samples for each politician are the same as those analyzed in the previous
chapter, consisting of Republican and Republican-leaning supporters of Donald Trump (those
who approve of the job he is doing as president) and Democratic and Democratic-leaning
supporters of Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg (divided by
which candidate respondents indicated they would vote for) who completed all relevant parts
of the survey.
4.2 Treatment Types
This experiment includes three different types of informational treatment: simple statements,
personal pleas, and news articles. All treatment texts were pre-registered and are included
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in Appendix H, and are also available at https://osf.io/4u2g6. I briefly summarize the
treatments used here.
The first treatment type, simple statements, are symmetrical, factual statements which
reveal the opposing positions of politician and party on the cued policy, without any rhetoric
or justification for the positions shown. The personal plea treatments are structured similarly,
but add personalized content from both political party and cued politician in the form
of Tweets or direct quotes, paired with contradicting excerpts from recent official party
platforms. Quotes and party platform excerpts articulated the positions for politician or
party, with additional content that may have confounded treatment removed. I excluded
Tweets that had such potentially confounding information from consideration, using only
Tweets that exclusively covered the tested issue. The third treatment type, news articles,
consisted of real news stories covering the intraparty disagreement on the policy being tested.
These news articles contained the same policy position information as the previous treatment
types. These articles were edited only to remove the names of politicians other than the one
being tested and were otherwise unaltered from their original publication format.
For the results presented in the main text, I pool across these three treatment types
in order to increase the precision of effect estimates, separating respondents who saw no
informational prompt whatsoever from those who saw any one of the three treatment types
within each issue. Results separating each treatment type are shown in Appendix G, and
align with the overall results presented here in the main text, though with much more
variation due to the smaller samples for each separate treatment. As is the case with the
comparisons in the main text, AMCEs conditional on treatment for each treatment type




Prior to assignment, subjects were asked a variety of standard demographic and political af-
filiation questions. Republicans were asked whether they approved of the job Donald Trump
was doing as president; Republicans who approved of the job Trump was doing as president
were categorized as Trump supporters. Democrats were asked which of the Democratic pri-
mary candidates (Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg) they
most favored, and were categorized as supporters of the Democratic candidate they selected.
All respondents were asked questions to assess the strength of their support for the indicated
politician, and to score how likable and how competent they found their preferred politician.
Following covariate measurement, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the three
treatment types described above and received a random treatment dosage assignment, rang-
ing from zero to five. The treatment dosage was then randomly distributed across the five
policies. For each issue, respondents were asked whether they support, oppose, or neither
support nor oppose each policy on a seven-point scale, running from “Support strongly” to
“Oppose strongly.” In order to make the persuasive effects more readily interpretable, the
tables showing policy average positions for control and treatment groups below translate the
original seven-point outcome into a percentage support outcome measure. In calculating
these policy support percentages, respondents who stated that they strongly support, sup-
port, or somewhat support the policy were coded as 1. Respondents who strongly oppose,
oppose, or slightly oppose were coded as 0. Respondents who neither support nor oppose
the policy are coded as a 0.5. As mentioned in Chapter 1, treatment effects measured on
the original 1-7 policy preference scale align closely with these results, and are shown in
Appendix B.
Following the collection of subjects’ stated policy preferences, all subjects were asked a
series of politician evaluation questions, which are the subject of Chapter 2. After providing
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candidate and party evaluations, respondents were asked to complete a conjoint experiment
selection task, choosing between two hypothetical candidate profiles. Each candidate profile
listed seven policy positions held by the candidate. These policies consisted of the five tested
issues the respondents had just seen, plus two constant issues across all respondents, LGBT
employment protections and the death penalty. Profiles listed either support for or opposition
to each policy. As the broader goal of this dissertation is to study unorthodox policy positions
and policy position combinations, I did not constrain the possible combinations of policy
positions candidates could be shown to have. Candidates could therefore be shown to hold
ideologically opposing positions, such as support for gun control and opposition to abortion
funding. All policy positions therefore had equal probability of being shown, and all possible
combinations of policy positions were equally likely. Each respondent completed this task
twice, with policy positions and the order in which policies were presented re-randomized for
the second task. An example of two hypothetical profiles respondents might choose between
for Trump supporters is below.
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Foreign policy Opposes NATO Supports NATO
Crime Supports death penalty Supports death penalty




The issues tested in this experiment are the same as those analyzed in the previous two
chapters. For Donald Trump, the five issues identified were support for NATO, banning
all Muslims from entering the United States, political influence on the Federal Reserve,
federal funding for abortion providers, and increasing restrictions on firearm sales. For Joe
Biden, the five issues identified were support for charter schools, marijuana legalization,
federal funding for abortions, expanding Social Security, and building a border wall along
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the U.S.-Mexico border. The five tested issues for Bernie Sanders were trade tariffs, canceling
all student debt, Medicare-for-All, a national fracking ban, and decriminalizing the act of
crossing the U.S.-Mexico border without proper documentation. For Warren supporters, I
tested trade tariffs, Medicare-for-All, a national fracking ban, decriminalizing undocumented
border crossing, and creating a national registry of all firearms and firearm owners. The
issues tested for Pete Buttigieg were opposition to free trade agreements (specifically the
Trans-Pacific Partnership), a federal firearm licensing requirement, maintaining the current
level of federal defense spending (rather than reducing it), immediate withdrawal of troops
from Afghanistan, and opposition to the creation of publicly funded charter schools.
5 Results: Conjoint Results
For each candidate, I include tables with the policy support levels for control and treatment
groups. As these proportions pool all treatment types, the percentages shown here differ
slightly from those shown in Chapter 1, though they are very similar to the simple statement
proportions included in Chapter 1.1
I present the primary results of this experiment graphically in Figures 1 through 5. These
figures show the estimated AMCEs and CAMCEs for each issue and each candidate included
in the experiment. These figures, as shown in Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014),
convey the average effect holding certain policy positions had on candidates’ likelihood of be-
ing selected. In order to make the AMCEs more readily interpretable, all shown AMCEs are
reported as the change in likelihood of selecting a candidate with the same policy position as
the cued politician. An estimated AMCE of 0.10 for the “Supports federal abortion funding”
position, therefore, means that hypothetical candidates that were shown to support federal
1Pooling all treatment types generally produces similar policy support percentages as the simple state-
ments alone as the pooled proportions include the news treatments, which were generally less effective at
increasing support for politicians’ positions, and the personal plea treatments, which were generally more
effective at increasing support for politicians’ positions, compared to the simple statements.
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abortion funding were 10 percentage points more likely to be selected than hypothetical can-
didates that were shown to oppose federal abortion funding, holding all other policy positions
equal. Because each policy position has only two possible values, support or oppose, this
result would indicate that hypothetical candidates shown to support abortion funding were
selected 55% of the time, while hypothetical candidates shown to oppose abortion funding
were selected 45% of the time.
For each issue × candidate combination, I show three AMCEs and their 95% confidence
intervals: the overall AMCE, the AMCE conditional on the respondent being in the control
group for the issue in question (not shown the politician or party position for the given issue),
and the AMCE conditional on the respondent being in a treatment group for the issue in
question (therefore seeing both the politician and party positions for the issue). For this
analysis, all treatment types were pooled; conditional AMCEs split by treatment type can
be found in Appendix G. AMCEs and CAMCEs were estimated using the cjoint package in
R, which implements the Average Marginal Component-specific Effects estimator presented
in Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014).
True for all candidates and all issues, this chapter has one essential finding: treatment
and control groups showed no differences in their assessments of candidates’ policy positions,
despite significant differences in these groups’ own policy preferences. Control and treatment
subjects appear to have evaluated candidates nearly identically, preferring the same policy
positions for each of the five tested issues and preferring those positions with similar intensity.
There are no detectable differences in any of the AMCEs conditional on treatment condition
for any candidate × policy combinations beyond what might be expected through sampling
variance. Respondents who saw treatments on these issues preferred the same policies, at the
same magnitudes, as those who did not see informational treatments, despite the significant
differences in these two groups’ stated policy positions caused by treatment.
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5.1 Conjoint Results: Donald Trump Supporters
Table 1: Policy Support Percentages: Republican Trump Supporters
Control Any treatment










Support increasing gun control 46.7% 61.1%
Figure 1 displays conjoint AMCEs and AMCEs conditional on treatment status (CAMCEs)
for Trump supporters for each of the five policies tested: federal funding for abortions,
support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, increasing restrictions on firearm sales,
banning Muslims from entering the United States, and applying political pressure to the Fed-
eral Reserve. There are no differences in the directions of the conditional AMCEs estimated
among the control group from those estimated among the treatment group, and no significant
differences in the CAMCE magnitudes. Both groups were less likely to select a candidate
who shared Trump’s cued support for federal abortion funding, and slightly less likely to se-
lect candidates who shared Trump’s opposition to NATO. The latter estimated component
effect, however, is not significant, indicating support for NATO was not an important issue
for Trump supporters when determining which candidate to select. Hypothetical candidates
who shared Trump’s support for increasing gun control were also less likely to be selected
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Figure 1: Donald Trump Supporters: Conjoint AMCEs and Conditional
AMCEs
This figure displays the AMCEs for each policy shown to Trump supporters, as well as
AMCEs conditional on seeing informational treatments for these issues.
by both treatment and control Republican, Trump-supporting respondents. Candidates who
supported banning Muslim immigrants from entering the U.S. were more likely to be chosen
by both respondents who did and who did not see treatment on the issue, as were candi-
dates who supported allowing political pressure on the Federal Reserve. More striking than
the similarity in AMCE directions estimated among control and treatment groups, however,
is the similarity in estimated component effect magnitudes, despite significant differences in
respondents’ own stated policy positions on these policies between the control and treatment
groups.
This similarity between control and treatment AMCE is particularly notable in the area
of abortion funding support. Among the control group, only 33.9% of Republican, Trump-
supporting respondents favored federal funding for abortions (Table 1). Among Republican
Trump supporters who were shown one of the treatments stating that Trump supports
federal abortion funding while the Republican Party opposes it, however, 45.1% supported
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federal funds for abortions. In other words, for Republican Trump supporters, treatment
moved respondents from strong opposition to near-neutrality for federal abortion funding.
As can be seen in the leftmost facet of Figure 1, however, treatment and control Trump
supporters reacted similarly to hypothetical candidates who shared Trump’s position on
abortion: supporting abortion funding caused candidates to be between 11 and 15 percentage
points less likely to be selected for both groups. The difference between the AMCEs for
control and treatment groups is not significant, and the confidence intervals for each estimate
show substantial overlap. Candidates’ stances on NATO did not influence respondents’
choices in either the control or treatment groups, with estimates for both indistinguishable
from zero. Support for increasing gun control was an important issue for both those who
saw Trump and the GOP positions and those who did not. Among the control group,
candidates who supported gun control increases were 8.7 percentage points less likely to be
selected, while among the treatment group this estimate was a nearly identical 8.4 percentage
points. These two groups produce AMCEs of the same direction and magnitude, despite wide
differences in their own policy positions.
Among Republican, Trump-supporting respondents, there were no significant differences
in the average marginal component effect directions or magnitudes for any policy between
respondents in the treatment or control conditions, despite significant differences in aver-
age policy support between these groups for four of the five issues tested. While Republi-
can, Trump-supporting respondents updated their own policy positions to better align with
Trump’s positions, they do not appear to have updated their preferences for the positions
they prefer hypothetical candidates to have on the same issues, as issue voting theories would
predict. This evidence does not support the proposed hypothesis tested in this chapter.
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5.2 Conjoint Results: Joe Biden Supporters














Oppose charter schools 39.8% 43.1%
Figure 2 displays conjoint AMCEs for Biden supporters for each of the five policies tested:
support for adding border fencing, legalizing marijuana, preserving the Hyde Amendment,
expanding Social Security, and funding charter schools. The rates of policy support for
Biden’s positions on these issues are shown in Table 2. As was the case among Donald
Trump supporters, Biden supporters who were shown Biden’s and the Democratic Party’s
positions on these five issues evaluated those same positions similarly when choosing be-
tween hypothetical candidates. Candidates who shared Biden’s support for adding border
fencing were less likely to be chosen by Democratic Biden supporters in both the control
and treatment groups, as were those who shared Biden’s opposition to legalizing marijuana.
Opposing federal abortion funding was seen as a negative for both groups as well. This result
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Figure 2: Joe Biden Supporters: Conjoint AMCEs and Conditional
AMCEs
This figure displays the AMCEs for each policy shown to Biden supporters, as well as
AMCEs conditional on seeing informational treatments for these issues.
also illustrates the relationship between conjoint AMCEs and majority preferences. In the
control group, a slight majority of Biden supporters (50.8%) supported the Hyde Amend-
ment, which restricts federal funding for abortions. The CAMCE for this issue and group,
however, is strongly negative—candidates who were shown to support the Hyde Amendment
were 11.3 percentage points less likely to be selected, holding all other positions constant.
The direction of the AMCE for this issue, then, does not match the majority preference on
this issue. Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik (2019) show how this result can occur when
respondents with minority preferences on a given issue have more intense preferences on
that issue. In this case, if candidates’ position on abortion funding is a more important issue
when choosing among candidates for those who oppose the Hyde Amendment than it is for
those who support the Hyde amendment, the AMCE for this issue could be negative despite
majority preferences suggesting a likely positive AMCE. This dynamic could help explain
the lack of difference across control and treatment groups in this chapter, and is discussed
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in greater depth below.2
Candidates who were shown to oppose expanding Social Security benefits were also simi-
larly less likely to be chosen by both Biden supporters who were told Biden opposes such an
expansion and by supporters who were not told Biden’s position on the issue. Charter school
opposition does not appear to have been an influential policy position for either control or
treatment respondents. Among the control group, sharing Biden’s opposition to charter
schools caused candidates to be slightly less likely to be selected, and among the treatment
group this same policy position caused candidates to be selected slightly more often, but
AMCE estimates among both groups were very close to zero and were not statistically sig-
nificant. Once again, more striking than the shared direction of the CAMCEs estimated
among control and treatment groups is the lack of significant differences in the CAMCEs for
any of the policy positions tested, conditional on treatment condition.
This is most striking for the border fencing issue, presented in the leftmost facet of Fig-
ure 2. Only 31.5% of Democratic Biden supporters in the control group favored increasing
border fencing. However, told Biden supports adding border fencing and the Democratic
Party opposes it, over 50% of the treatment group favored border fencing. When choosing
among hypothetical candidates, though, supporting increased border fencing decreased the
likelihood of a hypothetical candidate being selected by 11.2 percentage points in the control
group and 9.3 percentage points in the treatment group. The confidence intervals surround-
ing these estimates overlap to a great degree. We cannot therefore differentiate the effect
each of these positions had on the likelihood a candidate was selected. A simple comparison
of selection rates among control and treatment groups for this issue shows the robustness of
this similarity: candidates that support border fencing were selected 44.5% (SE = 0.021) of
2Other analyses, however, suggest these similarities are not an artifact of the AMCE estimation procedure
and are in fact robust. For example, putting aside the AMCE estimations, subjects in the control group
and treatment group among Biden supporters selected candidates who shared Biden’s positions at the same
rates. Biden supporters felt similarly toward candidates who support border fence construction regardless
of treatment condition, despite having very different average policy positions on this issue.
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the time by control group Biden supporters and 45.4% (SE = 0.019) of the time by treatment
group respondents.
Opposition to expanding Social Security was also an issue Biden on which was an ef-
fective opinion leader among his supporters. When shown that Biden opposed expanding
Social Security but the Democratic Party supports it, opposition to Social Security expansion
doubled, from 9.9% in the control group to 19.8% in the treatment group. In the conjoint ex-
ercise, each of these groups preferred candidates who support expanding Social Security, and
by similar magnitudes. Among the control group, opposition to expanding Social Security
decreased the likelihood of selection by 13.3 percentage points; this figure was a statistically
indistinguishable 10.9 percentage point decrease among the treatment group, despite being
a position shared by double the proportion of respondents who saw treatments on this issue.
Overall, as was the case among Trump supporters, Biden supporters do not appear to have
updated the policies they prefer to see in hypothetical candidates, even for issues on which
they do appear willing to update their own positions. We are left with the result of treatment
clearly moving policy positions, but seemingly having no effect on policy preferences—the
opposite of the result predicted by issue voting theories.
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5.3 Conjoint Results: Bernie Sanders Supporters
Table 3: Policy Support Percentages: Democratic Sanders Supporters
Control Any treatment




Support Medicare-for-All 89.8% 91.8%




Figure 3: Bernie Sanders Supporters: Conjoint AMCEs and Conditional
AMCEs
This figure displays the AMCEs for each policy shown to Sanders supporters, as well
as AMCEs conditional on seeing informational treatments for these issues.
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Corresponding average policy support percentages among Sanders supporters and AM-
CEs and treatment-conditional AMCEs for this group are shown in Table 3 and Figure 3,
respectively. Sanders’ cued positions were much more popular among his supporters than
Biden’s cued positions were among his. Reflecting this popularity, the estimated AMCEs
for all five positions are positive. This result indicates that Democratic Sanders supporters
were all, on average, more likely to choose candidates who shared any one of Sanders’ cued
positions, both those who were shown Sanders’ and the Democratic Party’s positions and
those that were not on support for tariffs, canceling student debt, Medicare-for-All, banning
fracking, and decriminalizing undocumented border crossing.
While a majority of the control group favored each of the issues tested among Sanders
supporters, seeing treatments led to significant increases in policy support for tariffs, a ban
on fracking, and decriminalizing undocumented border crossing. Despite these differences in
average policy support between the control and treatment groups of Sanders supporters, there
are no significant differences in the marginal component effects sharing these positions had on
hypothetical candidates’ likelihood of being chosen when comparing control and treatment
groups. Treatment subjects were slightly likely to choose candidates who supported tariffs
or supported a fracking ban, despite having a markedly higher rate of support for those same
positions. The only position for which seeing Sanders’ and the Democratic Party positions
may have produced a notable increase in CAMCE magnitude for sharing Sanders position
is canceling student debt, the issue for which the control and treatment groups’ average
policy support is most similar among the five issues tested. The CAMCE difference for
each of these issues, however, falls far short of statistical significance, and cannot therefore
be separated from sampling variation. Bernie Sanders supporters, similar to Trump and
Biden supporters, do not show any signs of changing their preferences when selecting among
hypothetical candidates as a result of treatments, despite treatments causing significant
differences in average policy support.
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5.4 Conjoint Results: Elizabeth Warren Supporters
Table 4: Policy Support Percentages: Democratic Warren Supporters
Control Any treatment




Support Medicare-for-All 87.5% 82.4%




Figure 4: Elizabeth Warren Supporters: Conjoint AMCEs and
Conditional AMCEs
This figure displays the AMCEs for each policy shown to Warren supporters, as well
as AMCEs conditional on seeing informational treatments for these issues.
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Elizabeth Warren supporters were tested on a similar slate of issues to Bernie Sanders
supporters, and produced a similar pattern of AMCEs (Figure 4). As is the case for each
of the previously examined candidates and their supporters, treatment did not have any
noticeable effect on the policies Warren supporters preferred in hypothetical candidates.
This is most clearly illustrated when looking at support for tariffs. A minority (48.1%) of
Warren supporters not shown Warren and Democratic Party positions on this issue supported
tariffs (Table 4). Among the treatment group, however, 62.2% favored tariffs, an increase
in policy support of 14.1 percentage points as a result of treatment. Despite this change,
treatment Warren supporters reacted similarly to candidates’ support for tariffs, decreasing
the likelihood of selection among both groups, as the magnitudes of the CAMCEs for this
position are not statistically distinct between the control and treatment respondent groups.
Seeing the informational treatments also produced significant increases in policy support
among Warren supporters for supporting a fracking ban and supporting decriminalizing
undocumented border crossing. The conditional AMCEs for these positions, however, appear
unchanged by treatment. I find no significant differences in AMCEs for any issue position
tested among those who did and did not see the politician and party positions for the issue
in question.
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5.5 Conjoint Results: Pete Buttigieg Supporters














Oppose charter schools 55.5% 50.6%
Rates of policy support among those who did and did not see informational treatments
among Democratic Buttigieg supporters are shown in Table 5, with AMCEs and CAMCEs
for Buttigieg’s positions on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a national gun licensing require-
ment, defense spending, troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, and charter schools shown in
Figure 5. There was substantial variation in the degree of alignment with Buttigieg’s posi-
tions among his supporters who were not shown his positions and the Democratic Party’s
opposing positions. Opposition to free trade agreements was a position shared by only
18.0% of control group Buttigieg supporters and opposition to defense spending by only
32.6%. Buttigieg’s support for a national gun licensing requirement was much more popu-
lar, with 89.8% of control Buttigieg supporters favoring this policy. Support for immediate
Afghanistan withdrawal was also popular, favored by 64.5% of the control sample. Oppo-
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Figure 5: Pete Buttigieg Supporters: Conjoint AMCEs and Conditional
AMCEs
This figure displays the AMCEs for each policy shown to Buttigieg supporters, as well
as AMCEs conditional on seeing informational treatments for these issues.
sition to charter schools, as was the case among Biden supporters, was an issue Buttigieg
supporters were split on, with 55.5% of the control group opposing charters.
Four of these positions did not appear to have a strong influence on Buttigieg supporters’
selection among hypothetical candidates: opposition to free trade agreements, opposition to
defense spending, support for immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan, and opposition to
charter schools all produced AMCEs and CAMCEs that were not statistically significant.
This indicates that, on average, Buttigieg supporters were little-swayed by candidates’ posi-
tions on these issues when choosing which candidate to support. Support for a national gun
licensing requirement was the most influential position among Buttigieg supporters, with
politicians holding this position estimated to be between 13 and 18 percentage points more
likely to be chosen among both control and treatment Buttigieg supporters.
Similar to the previous four samples analyzed, I find no significant differences in CAMCE
directions or magnitudes for any of the five tested issues when comparing subjects who did
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and did not see Buttigieg and the Democratic Party positions on the issue, despite significant
differences in the average policy positions between these two groups.
6 Discussion
Across all 25 politician × issue combinations, there are no significant differences between
subjects who saw treatments conveying the politicians’ and their political party’s positions
on the issue. As shown in Chapter 1, however, there were large differences in subjects’
own policy positions when comparing those who did and did not see these informational
treatments. This evidence does not support the proposed hypothesis and contradicts the
predictions made by issue voting theories.
I discuss two possible explanations for the lack of effects in the outcomes analyzed in
this chapter in light of the large effects found in Chapter 1: 1) the persuasive effects esti-
mated in Chapter 1 could be the result of partisan cheerleading, driven by a desire to give
“their team’s” response, rather than reflecting true opinion change. 2) Subjects could be
simultaneously updating their policy positions on issues for which they see treatments and
the relative importance they place on those issue positions when evaluating hypothetical
candidates, leading estimated AMCEs to not reflect average policy preferences.
As discussed above, previous research has uncovered evidence of partisan cheerleading,
a phenomenon in which respondents may misrepresent their true beliefs due to the value
derived from expressing answers that more closely align with their team. As shown in
Chapter 1, for the sample analyzed here respondents’ teams appear to be more accurately
defined as certain politicians, rather than political parties, when the two do not align. If
the effects estimated in Chapter 1 are characterized by partisan cheerleading, the change
in survey-reported policy preferences may not be an accurate reflection of respondents’ true
policy preferences. In the conjoint task analyzed in this chapter, the connections between
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respondents’ selections and the desirable response, from a cheerleading perspective, may be
less direct and therefore less obvious. The lack of detectable treatment effects in the conjoint
results could therefore be a more accurate reflection of respondents’ true preferences, which
remain little-changed by treatment, than subjects’ policy preferences as directly reported.
However, the endurance of the treatment effects shown in Chapter 1 make this result seem
unlikely. The fact that respondents’ policy positions remained significantly altered more
than nine months after treatment suggests the estimated changes are largely real reflections
of updated opinions, not ephemeral framing or priming effects characterized by cheerleading.
The second possibility is that subjects could be updating both their own policy positions
and the relative weight they place on issues for which they have newly updated positions.
Average marginal component effects, as shown in Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik (2019),
capture a combination of preference and preference intensity. In cases where a minority of
respondents have more intense preferences on one conjoint characteristic than do the ma-
jority on that dimension, that dimension’s AMCE can fail to reflect the majority opinion,
as appears to be the case for abortion among Biden supporters and tariffs among Warren
supporters in the analysis above. In the context of the comparison between AMCEs esti-
mated among control and treatment groups in this chapter, if respondents put less emphasis
on policy positions on which they have just been persuaded to adopt a new policy position,
those who remain unpersuaded by treatment would have relative more intense preferences
on that issue. This simultaneous updating of both policy position and preference intensity
could produce the null effects estimated here for AMCE direction and magnitude. However,
as stated above, simpler analyses confirm the robustness of treatment’s null effect on respon-
dents’ evaluations of hypothetical candidates, indicating the particularities of the AMCE
estimation procedure are not behind the lack of effects observed here.
Ultimately, whatever the mechanism behind the pattern of effects estimated in Chapter
1 and in this chapter, the practical implications for politicians’ influence on the electorate
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for other candidates is the same: follow-the-leader persuasion does not appear to have a
detectable effect on how respondents evaluate hypothetical candidates. Popular politicians
appear to have powerful influence over their own supporters’ policy positions. However, their
effect on electorate preferences faced by other candidates appears to be far smaller.
7 Conclusion
While the treatments analyzed in this dissertation caused significant, enduring persuasive
effects, they do not appear to influence the policy positions respondents prefer when choosing
among hypothetical candidates. Among supporters for all tested politicians, AMCEs for each
policy among treatment and control groups were indistinguishable from one another, despite
large differences in the groups’ own stated policy preferences. It appears partisan supporters
do update their policy positions to match their favored politicians, but do not similarly up-
date their preferences when choosing among hypothetical candidates. This finding suggests
heterodox candidates do not fundamentally change the sorts of candidates their supporters
would prefer in future elections, and also contradicts the predictions of issue voting theories.
It is not the argument of this chapter, nor this dissertation more broadly, that policy issues
do not matter in Americans’ electoral decisions. The conjoint results presented here show
much evidence of respondents using policy positions to guide their choices—respondents did
not make their conjoint selections randomly or completely independently from candidates’
shown policy positions; Republican respondents preferred candidates with more conserva-
tive positions on abortion and Democratic candidates preferred candidates with more liberal
positions on immigration, as one would expect. More specifically, however, the evidence pre-
sented in this chapter suggests respondents do not necessarily use their own policy positions
to determine whom to support by choosing candidates that minimize the distance between
their own ideological positions and their representatives’.
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While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine what mechanisms underlie the
pattern wherein respondents updated their policy positions but did not update the policy
positions they prefer their candidates hold, I offer one possible explanation here. A strong
body of previous work identifies the processes through which members of the electorate use
politicians’ policy positions to form opinions about their “types”, typically their partisanship.
The treatments tested in this dissertation cue real politicians, to whom respondents have
real attachments and of whom respondents have already formed their impressions. They
already know and have determined they support these real-life politicians. In a conjoint
experiment, respondents only have the information given to them. More important than the
specific policy positions these hypothetical candidates hold could be the “type” of politician
they appear to be from their policy positions, a result supported by other similar conjoint
experiments (Mummolo, Peterson and Westwood, 2019). The hypothetical candidates in
conjoint experiments do not have personalities or other attributes that can signal “type”;
in the absence of these dimensions, respondents may revert to preferring party positions as
a more clear signal of type than just trying to identify the candidate with the most similar
policy preferences to their own. Put in the context of this experiment, Trump supporters
know Trump and like Trump. When told he holds a certain heterodox policy position, they
are willing to look past this and even update their own policy positions to match. But
when choosing between unknown candidates, of whom they have not decided whether or not
they approve, they would prefer, all else equal, to choose a candidate who holds Republican
Party positions because they know they tend to prefer that “type” of politician. Treatment
may cause respondents to update their policy positions without updating their associations
between policy positions and what those positions signal about a candidate.
Evaluating this possibility is a rich area for future research to explore. Yet the evidence
presented in this chapter is clear: random inducement of clear, enduring opinion change
did not generate a corresponding change in the policy positions subjects preferred hypo-
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thetical candidates hold. Among this sample at least, subjects do not appear to be simply
choosing the candidate that minimizes ideological distance between their own positions and
their representatives’, even in the absence of party labels or other potentially confounding
information, in contrast to the predictions of issue voting theories.
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Conclusion
The experiments examined in this dissertation randomly assign informational cues re-
vealing intraparty conflict to examine how partisan respondents react when politicians take
counter-party positions. Whom do members of the electorate side with, how do their opin-
ions change, and what does it mean for politicians, parties, and the electorate going forward?
Each chapter in this dissertation examines the effects of these treatments on a different out-
come measure.
Chapter 1 finds partisan supporters of Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Eliz-
abeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg each siding with their preferred politician, against their
party, in most cases, even for unpopular policy positions, with persuasive effects enduring
months after initial treatment. Chapter 2 examines how respondents altered their eval-
uations of politicians and parties as a result of treatment. While some issue/candidate
treatment combinations caused respondents to lower their evaluations of candidates, these
effects were generally small—respondents’ support for candidates they support appears ro-
bust, even against explicit party counter cues. While negative evaluation effects increased
with treatment dosage, it appears political conflict inherent in the treatments, not the spe-
cific policy positions, may be driving these negative effects. The third and final chapter
tests whether the opinion changes estimated in Chapter 1 produce corresponding changes in
the ways respondents’ select hypothetical candidates, finding treatment did not produce any
noticeable changes in the policy positions respondents preferred in a conjoint experiment.
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The experiments analyzed here do have limitations, as well as raise questions for future
research to address. First and foremost, while I find politicians to be far more persuasive
than parties, I cannot determine the mechanism underlying their increased persuasive power.
It is possible partisans simply trust politicians more than parties to represent their interests.
Alternatively, politicians’ charisma or rhetorical skills could give them valence-dimension
advantages over political parties when it comes to winning hearts and minds in the electorate.
Future research on this topic should strive to identify the specific mechanisms underlying
politicians’ persuasive advantages. Relatedly, the endurance of persuasive effects is somewhat
puzzling given the relatively ephemeral nature of most previous persuasion experiments’
effects. What about the treatments administered here caused them to stick in respondents’
minds? Replication and extension of this finding should be a central component of future
studies of policy persuasion.
Another limitation is the potential uncertainty of the real-world relevance of the exper-
imental effects estimated in an unrealistic information environment. While the robustness
of findings across treatment type, politician, and policy area to some extent assuage exter-
nal validity concerns about the findings presented here, future research should continue to
work toward experimental manipulation of information environments that are as realistic as
possible.
Finally, because of the order questions were asked, it is not possible to identify which
respondents are persuaded by treatment and which respondents held to their original policy
positions. As a result, one cannot to determine how these two groups of respondents updated
their evaluations of politicians, or their preferences in conjoint experiments, differently from
one another. Are evaluation effects driven by those who are unconvinced by treatment?
Or are respondents simultaneously revising their policy positions and politician evaluations?
These questions cannot be answered by this dissertation, but merit future investigation.
While the experiments I analyze have limitations, they significantly improve our under-
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standings of elite influence on public opinion, the relationship between individual politicians
and political parties, and partisan electorate preference formation. This dissertation argues
for far greater persuasive power for politicians than for political parties, and little electoral
risk for politicians adopting even unpopular, counter-party policy positions. Taken together,
these results highlight how difficult it is for parties to check popular politicians. I also, how-
ever, identify limits to this persuasive power. Rather than altering the positions respondents
prefer that politicians endorse, treatment and control respondents alike preferred party-line
positions when selecting among hypothetical candidates. Individual politicians may not have
as large an impact on the shape of the partisan electorate, therefore, as the results from the
first chapter suggest. Even highly effective individual opinion leaders may have some diffi-
culty influencing long-term party positions, and up-and-coming candidates may find it more
difficult than expected to ride the coattails of previous heterodox politicians’ campaigns.
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Appendix A: Sample Demographics
Table 1: Comparing sample demographics
Trump Biden Sanders Warren Buttigieg
supporters supporters supporters supporters supporters
Female (%) 56.36 (0.85) 61.74 (1.26) 58.01 (1.21) 68.15 (1.77) 65.97 (2.17)
Education (mean years) 14.44 (0.06) 14.44 (0.06) 14.25 (0.05) 14.83 (0.09) 14.81 (0.10)
Age (mean years) 50.69 (0.28) 49.09 (0.43) 36.43 (0.35) 45.00 (0.61) 52.84 (0.76)
Race
White (%) 86.57 (0.58) 54.59 (1.29) 54.23 (1.22) 66.00 (1.80) 80.04 (1.83)
Black (%) 2.07 (0.24) 28.48 (1.17) 20.52 (0.99) 14.92 (1.35) 6.72 (1.15)
Latino (%) 6.67 (0.43) 11.27 (0.82) 16.5 (0.91) 11.48 (1.21) 8.19 (1.26)
Asian (%) 2.71 (0.28) 3.78 (0.50) 5.64 (0.57) 5.31 (0.85) 3.36 (0.83)
Native American (%) 1.08 (0.18) 0.54 (0.19) 0.72 (0.21) 0.57 (0.29) 0.21 (0.21)
Other/multiracial (%) 0.90 (0.16) 1.35 (0.30) 2.4 (0.37) 1.72 (0.49) 1.47 (0.55)
Region of the United States
Northeast (%) 17.07 (0.64) 24.29 (1.11) 20.94 (1.00) 22.81 (1.59) 24.16 (1.96)
Midwest (%) 20.48 (0.69) 18.62 (1.01) 21.48 (1.01) 21.23 (1.55) 25.63 (2.00)
South (%) 44.48 (0.85) 40.76 (1.28) 36.29 (1.18) 35.87 (1.82) 31.72 (2.14)
West (%) 17.54 (0.65) 15.92 (0.95) 20.82 (0.99) 19.23 (1.49) 17.44 (1.74)
Party ID (1-7) 6.46 (0.01) 1.50 (0.02) 1.67 (0.02) 1.57 (0.03) 1.65 (0.03)
Ideology (1-7) 5.59 (0.02) 4.08 (0.05) 3.44 (0.04) 3.52 (0.07) 3.47 (0.08)
Political Attentiveness (1-5) 3.78 (0.02) 3.78 (0.03) 3.66 (0.03) 3.82 (0.04) 3.85 (0.05)
Political Knowledge (1-5) 1.71 (0.02) 2.21 (0.03) 0.85 (0.02) 1.45 (0.04) 2.05 (0.06)
N 3,433 1,482 1,667 697 476
Standard errors in parentheses where applicable.
0*9
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Appendix B: Policy Persuasion: All Treat-
ment Types
1 Persuasive Effects among Donald Trump Supporters
Figure 1: Donald Trump Policy Persuasion: Percentage
Support, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Trump supporters of
seeing each treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing
Trump’s position.
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Figure 2: Donald Trump Policy Persuasion: 1-7 Policy Support
Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Trump supporters of see-
ing each treatment type on policy support, measured as change on
original 1-7 policy support scale towards Trump’s position.
2 Persuasive Effects among Joe Biden Supporters
Figure 3: Joe Biden Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support, All
Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Biden’s position.
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Figure 4: Joe Biden Policy Persuasion: 1-7 Policy Support Scale, All
Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original 1-7 policy
support scale towards Biden’s position.
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3 Persuasive Effects among Bernie Sanders Supporters
Figure 5: Bernie Sanders Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support,
All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Sanders’ po-
sition.
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Figure 6: Bernie Sanders Policy Persuasion: 1-7 Policy Support
Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original 1-7
policy support scale towards Sanders’ position.
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4 Persuasive Effects among Elizabeth Warren Support-
ers
Figure 7: Elizabeth Warren Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support,
All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Warren supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Warren’s po-
sition.
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Figure 8: Elizabeth Warren Policy Persuasion: 1-7 Policy Support
Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Warren supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original 1-7
policy support scale towards Warren’s position.
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5 Persuasive Effects among Pete Buttigieg Supporters
Figure 9: Pete Buttigieg Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support, All
Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Buttigieg supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Buttigieg’s
position.
149
Figure 10: Pete Buttigieg Policy Persuasion: 1-7 Policy Support
Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Buttigieg supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original 1-7
policy support scale towards Buttigieg’s position.
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Appendix C: Wave 2 Persuasive Effects
Among Partisan Supporters
1 Wave 2 Persuasive Effects among Donald Trump Sup-
porters
Figure 1: Wave 2 Donald Trump Policy Persuasion: Percentage
Support, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Trump supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Trump’s po-
sition.
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Figure 2: Wave 2 Donald Trump Policy Persuasion: 1-7 Policy
Support Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Trump supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original 1-7
policy support scale towards Trump’s position.
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2 Wave 2 Persuasive Effects among Joe Biden Sup-
porters
Figure 3: Wave 2 Joe Biden Policy Persuasion: Percentage Support,
All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Biden’s position.
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Figure 4: Wave 2 Joe Biden Policy Persuasion: 1-7 Policy Support
Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original 1-7 policy
support scale towards Biden’s position.
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3 Wave 2 Persuasive Effects among Bernie Sanders
Supporters
Figure 5: Wave 2 Bernie Sanders Policy Persuasion: Percentage
Support, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Sanders’ po-
sition.
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Figure 6: Wave 2 Bernie Sanders Policy Persuasion: 1-7 Policy
Support Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing
each treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original 1-7
policy support scale towards Sanders’ position.
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Appendix D: Persuasive Effects Among
Partisan Non-Supporters by Policy
1 Wave 1 Persuasive Effects among Non-Supporters
Figure 1: Wave 1 Donald Trump Policy Persuasion among
Non-Supporters: Percentage Support, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Republican Trump non-
supporters of seeing each treatment type on policy support, as percentage
sharing Trump’s position.
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Figure 2: Wave 1 Donald Trump Policy Persuasion among
Non-Supporters: 1-7 Policy Support Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Republican Trump non-
supporters of seeing each treatment type on policy support, measured as
change on original 1-7 policy support scale towards Trump’s position.
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2 Wave 2 Persuasive Effects among Non-Supporters
Figure 3: Wave 2 Joe Biden Policy Persuasion among
Non-Supporters: Percentage Support, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing
each Biden treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Biden’s
position.
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Figure 4: Wave 2 Joe Biden Policy Persuasion among
Non-Supporters: 1-7 Policy Support Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing
each Biden treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original
1-7 policy support scale towards Biden’s position.
Figure 5: Wave 2 Bernie Sanders Policy Persuasion among
Non-Supporters: Percentage Support, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
Sanders treatment type on policy support, as percentage sharing Sanders’
position.
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Figure 6: Wave 2 Bernie Sanders Policy Persuasion among
Non-Supporters: 1-7 Policy Support Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
Sanders treatment type on policy support, measured as change on original
1-7 policy support scale towards Sanders’ position.
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3 Wave 3 Persuasive Effects: Joe Biden vs. Original
Candidate
Figure 7: Wave 3 Joe Biden Policy Persuasion among Sanders
Supporters: Percentage Support, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among original Sanders supporters of
seeing each Biden × Sanders treatment type on policy support, as percentage
sharing Biden’s position.
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Figure 8: Wave 3 Joe Biden Policy Persuasion among Sanders
Supporters: 1-7 Policy Support Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among original Sanders supporters of
seeing each Biden × Sanders treatment type on policy support, measured
as change on original 1-7 policy support scale towards Biden’s position.
Figure 9: Wave 3 Joe Biden Policy Persuasion among Warren
Supporters: Percentage Support, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among original Warren supporters of
seeing each Biden × Warren treatment type on policy support, as percentage
sharing Biden’s position.
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Figure 10: Wave 3 Joe Biden Policy Persuasion among Warren
Supporters: 1-7 Policy Support Scale, All Treatment Types
This figure displays treatment effects among original Warren supporters of
seeing each Biden × Warren treatment type on policy support, measured as
change on original 1-7 policy support scale towards Biden’s position.
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Appendix E: Evaluation Effects by Pol-
icy and Treatment Type
1 Evaluation effects among Donald Trump Supporters
Figure 1: Donald Trump Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Donald Trump Feeling Thermometer Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Trump supporters of seeing
each treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward Donald
Trump.
165
Figure 2: Donald Trump Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Donald Trump Vote Likelihood Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Trump supporters of seeing
each treatment type on likelihood of voting for Trump in the next election,
measured in percent likely to vote for Trump.
Figure 3: Republican Party Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Republican Party Feeling Thermometer Ratings among Donald
Trump Supporters
This figure displays treatment effects among Trump supporters of seeing
each treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward the Re-
publican Party.
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2 Evaluation effects among Joe Biden Supporters
Figure 4: Joe Biden Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type: Joe
Biden Feeling Thermometer Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward Joe Biden.
Figure 5: Joe Biden Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type: Joe
Biden Vote Likelihood Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
treatment type on likelihood of voting for Biden in the next election, mea-
sured in percent likely to vote for Biden.
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Figure 6: Democratic Party Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer Ratings among Joe Biden
Supporters
This figure displays treatment effects among Biden supporters of seeing each
treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward the Demo-
cratic Party.
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3 Evaluation effects among Bernie Sanders Supporters
Figure 7: Bernie Sanders Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Bernie Sanders Feeling Thermometer Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing
each treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward Bernie
Sanders.
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Figure 8: Bernie Sanders Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Bernie Sanders Vote Likelihood Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Bernie Sanders supporters of
seeing each treatment type on likelihood of voting for Sanders in the next
election, measured in percent likely to vote for Sanders.
Figure 9: Democratic Party Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer Ratings among Bernie
Sanders Supporters
This figure displays treatment effects among Sanders supporters of seeing
each treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward the
Democratic Party.
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4 Evaluation effects among Elizabeth Warren Support-
ers
Figure 10: Elizabeth Warren Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Elizabeth Warren Feeling Thermometer Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Warren supporters of seeing
each treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward Eliza-
beth Warren.
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Figure 11: Elizabeth Warren Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Elizabeth Warren Vote Likelihood Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Elizabeth Warren supporters
of seeing each treatment type on likelihood of voting for Warren in the next
election, measured in percent likely to vote for Warren.
Figure 12: Democratic Party Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer Ratings among Elizabeth
Warren Supporters
This figure displays treatment effects among Warren supporters of seeing
each treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward the
Democratic Party.
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5 Evaluation effects among Pete Buttigieg Supporters
Figure 13: Pete Buttigieg Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Pete Buttigieg Feeling Thermometer Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Warren supporters of seeing
each treatment type on feeling thermometer warmth ratings toward Pete
Buttigieg.
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Figure 14: Pete Buttigieg Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Pete Buttigieg Vote Likelihood Ratings
This figure displays treatment effects among Pete Buttigieg supporters of
seeing each treatment type on likelihood of voting for Buttigieg in the next
election, measured in percent likely to vote for Buttigieg.
Figure 15: Democratic Party Evaluation Effects by Treatment Type:
Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer Ratings among Pete
Buttigieg Supporters
This figure displays treatment effects among Buttigieg supporters of see-




Table 1: Politician Vote Likelihood Effects by Dosage
Politician Vote Likelihood
Trump Biden Sanders Warren Buttigieg
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dosage −0.003∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002 −0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Republican Party knowledge 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
Democratic Party knowledge −0.005 0.005 0.022∗∗∗ −0.0005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
Ideology −0.001 0.001 −0.005∗∗ −0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Party strength 0.010∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.008∗ 0.015 −0.021∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012)
Politician support 0.020∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.031∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016)
White 0.012∗ 0.013 −0.010 0.011 0.046∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.023)
Age 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.0005 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.001)
Likability rating 0.014∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.021)
Competence rating 0.040∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.019)
Constant 0.562 0.461 0.518 0.196 0.307
(0.025) (0.055) (0.040) (0.074) (0.097)
N 3,377 1,432 1,610 670 450
R2 0.121 0.108 0.146 0.195 0.183
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix F: Treatment Dosage Effects
by Candidate and Party
1 Vote Likelihood Evaluation Effects by Dosage
2 Candidate and Party Thermometer Evaluation Ef-
fects by Dosage: Donald Trump Supporters
Table 2: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Donald Trump and Republican Party
among Trump Supporters
Donald Trump Republican Party






Politician support 1.280∗∗∗ 5.658∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.443)






Likability rating 2.453∗∗∗ 1.802∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.348)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
177
Table 3: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Non-Cued Politicians and Democratic
Party among Trump Supporters
All Non-Cued Politician Democratic Party






Politician support 1.896∗∗∗ 0.361
(0.342) (0.605)






Likability rating 2.037∗∗∗ 2.473∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.450)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses.
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3 Candidate and Party Thermometer Evaluation Ef-
fects by Dosage: Joe Biden Supporters
Table 4: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Joe Biden and Democratic Party
among Biden Supporters
Joe Biden Democratic Party






Politician support −0.766 −6.465∗∗∗
(0.649) (0.693)






Likability rating 7.303∗∗∗ 3.432∗∗∗
(0.955) (1.018)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Non-Cued Politicians and Republican
Party among Biden Supporters
All Non-Cued Politician Republican Party






Politician support −2.400∗∗∗ 1.638
(0.523) (1.026)






Likability rating 1.658∗∗ −1.331
(0.714) (1.603)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses.
180
4 Candidate and Party Thermometer Evaluation Ef-
fects by Dosage: Bernie Sanders Supporters
Table 6: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Bernie Sanders and Democratic Party
among Sanders Supporters
Bernie Sanders Democratic Party






Politician support −0.534 −8.529∗∗∗
(0.427) (0.688)






Likability rating 5.895∗∗∗ 3.853∗∗∗
(0.690) (1.112)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Non-Cued Politicians and Republican
Party among Sanders Supporters
All Non-Cued Politician Republican Party






Politician support −3.615∗∗∗ 0.797
(0.387) (0.698)






Likability rating −0.437 −2.181∗
(0.611) (1.273)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses.
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5 Candidate and Party Thermometer Evaluation Ef-
fects by Dosage: Elizabeth Warren Supporters
Table 8: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Elizabeth Warren and Democratic
Party among Warren Supporters
Elizabeth Warren Democratic Party






Politician support −0.140 −8.333∗∗∗
(0.760) (0.923)






Likability rating 4.343∗∗∗ 4.552∗∗∗
(1.070) (1.301)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 9: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Non-Cued Politicians and Republican
Party among Warren Supporters
All Non-Cued Politician Republican Party






Politician support −2.982∗∗∗ 1.256
(0.650) (1.229)






Likability rating 0.953 −1.311
(0.898) (1.800)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses.
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6 Candidate and Party Thermometer Evaluation Ef-
fects by Dosage: Pete Buttigieg Supporters
Table 10: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Pete Buttigieg and Democratic Party
among Buttigieg Supporters
Pete Buttigieg Democratic Party






Politician support −2.493∗∗∗ −7.754∗∗∗
(0.841) (1.148)






Likability rating 5.363∗∗∗ 4.927∗∗
(1.414) (1.925)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Conventional OLS standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 11: Feeling Thermometer Effects by Dosage for Non-Cued Politicians and
Republican Party among Buttigieg Supporters
All Non-Cued Politician Republican Party






Politician support −3.286∗∗∗ 1.149
(0.831) (1.303)






Likability rating 0.228 −3.385
(1.345) (2.618)






∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
HC2 standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix G: Conjoint Experiment Re-
sults by Treatment Type
Figure 1: Donald Trump Supporter Conjoint Results by Policy: All
Treatment Types
This figure displays estimated AMCEs and CAMCEs, conditional on treat-
ment type, for each policy position among Trump supporters.
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Figure 2: Joe Biden Supporter Conjoint Results by Policy: All
Treatment Types
This figure displays estimated AMCEs and CAMCEs, conditional on treat-
ment type, for each policy position among Biden supporters.
Figure 3: Bernie Sanders Supporter Conjoint Results by Policy: All
Treatment Types
This figure displays estimated AMCEs and CAMCEs, conditional on treat-
ment type, for each policy position among Sanders supporters.
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Figure 4: Elizabeth Warren Supporter Conjoint Results by Policy:
All Treatment Types
This figure displays estimated AMCEs and CAMCEs, conditional on treat-
ment type, for each policy position among Warren supporters.
Figure 5: Pete Buttigieg Supporter Conjoint Results by Policy: All
Treatment Types
This figure displays estimated AMCEs and CAMCEs, conditional on treat-
ment type, for each policy position among Buttigieg supporters.
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Appendix H: Treatment Text
1 Wave 1 Treatments
1.1 Wave 1, Trump × Republican Party Treatments
Wave 1, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, NATO
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, or NATO?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.
The Republican Party traditionally supports NATO, as stated in a recent Republican Party
Platform:
“Ensuring the continued vitality of our political alliance with Europe through NATO will require
effort and understanding on both sides of the Atlantic.”
However, Donald Trump opposes NATO, a stance he recently reiterated in the following Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
or NATO?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.
The Republican Party traditionally supports NATO.
However, Donald Trump opposes NATO.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
or NATO?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.
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(Washington Post) – President Trump clearly dislikes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
During his 2016 campaign, Trump dismissed the organization as “obsolete” and regularly grouses
that allies are not “paying their bills.” Such comments have strained Trumps relationships with allied
leaders and weakened the ties of the alliance.
It marks the end of an era in which Republican presidents embraced flexible, multilateral alliances
that could adapt to changing conditions and safeguard American interests worldwide.
NATO has historically been as much, if not more, of a Republican project as a Democratic one. The
alliance’s Republican ties go back to Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served as the first supreme allied
commander of NATO before entering the White House.
In a rare move, Senate Republicans invited the NATO secretary general to speak before Congress
today reportedly without the White House’s consent. The decision highlights the distance between
NATO and the White House.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or
NATO?
Wave 1, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, Muslim Ban
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning all Muslims from entering
the United States?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
banning all Muslims from entering the United States.
The Republican Party opposes banning Muslims from entering the United States and
supports Muslims in the U.S., as stated in a recent official Republican Party Platform:
“The struggle in which we are engaged is ideological, not ethnic or religious. The extremists we
face are abusers of faith, not its champions. We appreciate the loyalty of all Americans whose family
roots lie in the Middle East, and we gratefully acknowledge the contributions of American Arabs and
Muslims.”
However, Donald Trump supports banning Muslims from entering the United States, say-
ing:
“Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses,
our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and
have no sense of reason or respect for human life.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning all Muslims from entering the United
States?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on banning all Muslims from entering the United States.
The Republican Party opposes banning Muslims from entering the United States and
supports Muslims in the U.S.
However, Donald Trump supports banning Muslims from entering the United States.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning all Muslims from entering the United
States?
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• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on banning all Muslims from entering the United States.
(BBC) – Over the past few weeks, word spread that Republican elders were increasingly anxious at
the damage Donald Trump was doing to their party.
With Trump’s latest pronouncement on closing the US borders to all Muslims, that anxiety has
become palpable panic. Virtually all those in Trump’s party, Republican officials past and present,
have joined in condemning him.
“As a conservative who truly cares about religious liberty, Donald Trump’s bad idea and rhetoric send
a shiver down my spine,” Tweeted the head of the Republican Party in South Carolina.
Donald Trump echoes the traditional conservative condemnations of the federal government in Wash-
ington, DC, as a bloated, wasteful institution populated by career politicians who are, intentionally
or not, bringing harm to the nation. But he takes those lines and uses them as a blunderbuss against
everyone in power, Republicans included.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning all Muslims from entering the United
States?
Wave 1, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, Influencing the
Federal Reserve
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing presidents to influence
decisions made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encouraging the Fed to lower interest
rates?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encourag-
ing the Fed to lower interest rates.
The Republican Party opposes allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the
Federal Reserve, especially the lowering of interest rates, as stated in the most recent official Re-
publican Party Platform:
“[We support an] annual audit of the Federal Reserve’s activities. Such an audit would need to
be carefully implemented so that the Federal Reserve remains insulated from political pressures and
its decisions are based on sound economic principles and sound money rather than political pressures
for easy money and loose credit.”
However, Donald Trump supports allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the
Federal Reserve, especially the lowering interest rates, a stance he reiterated in this recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing presidents to influence decisions
made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encouraging the Fed to lower interest rates?
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• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encour-
aging the Fed to lower interest rates.
The Republican Party opposes allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the
Federal Reserve, especially the lowering of interest rates.
However, Donald Trump supports allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the
Federal Reserve, especially the lowering interest rates.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing presidents to influence decisions
made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encouraging the Fed to lower interest rates?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encour-
aging the Fed to lower interest rates.
(Washington Post) – President Trump dramatically escalated his pressure on the Federal Reserve
to cut interest rates later this month, attacking for the first time the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York in his months-long criticism of the central bank.
Many economists, including those within his own party, dispute his views, warning that low interest
rates at this point in the business cycle could create dangerous bubbles that damage the economy
with little notice.
Few presidents in modern history have publicly jawboned the central bank as much as Trump, and it
has raised concerns among Republicans about politicization and the prospect that Trump has eroded
the central bank’s independence. But Trump and top aides have brushed the criticism aside and
continued their blistering attacks.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing presidents to influence decisions made
by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encouraging the Fed to lower interest rates?
Wave 1, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, Abortion Funding
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing government funds to go
to organizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
allowing government funds to go to organizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
The Republican Party traditionally opposes allowing government funds to go to orga-
nizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood, as stated in the most recent official
Republican Party Platform:
“We oppose the use of public funds to perform or promote abortion or to fund organizations, like
Planned Parenthood, so long as they provide or refer for elective abortions.”
However, Donald Trump supports allowing government funds to go to organizations that
provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood, saying:
“I would look at the good aspects of [Planned Parenthood], and I would also look because Im sure
they do some things properly and good for women. I would look at that, and I would look at other
aspects also, but we have to take care of women.”
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Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing government funds to go to orga-
nizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on allowing government funds to go to organizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
The Republican Party traditionally opposes allowing government funds to go to orga-
nizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
However, Donald Trump supports allowing government funds to go to organizations that
provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing government funds to go to orga-
nizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood?
• News treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position on al-
lowing government funds to go to organizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
(Politico) – Speaking on CNNs “New Day” Tuesday morning, Donald Trump said that before
defunding Planned Parenthood entirely, he would look at the positive aspects of the organization.
Under current law, no government funding is allowed to go to abortions, which Planned Parenthood
says make up 3 percent of its services.
Trump’s comments set him in a different category than most Republicans, who are advocating to shut
down the organization entirely and move all funds to community health centers that do not perform
abortions.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing government funds to go to organiza-
tions that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood?
Wave 1, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, Firearm Sales
Restrictions
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on individuals’
rights to purchase and own firearms?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own firearms.
The Republican Party opposes increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase
and own firearms, as stated in a recent official Republican Party Platform:
“We uphold the right of individuals to keep and bear arms, a natural inalienable right that predates
the Constitution and is secured by the Second Amendment...We oppose any effort to deprive individ-
uals of their right to keep and bear arms.”
However, Donald Trump supports increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to pur-
chase and own firearms, a stance he reiterated in a recent Tweet:
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Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own firearms.
The Republican Party opposes increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase
and own firearms.
However, Donald Trump supports increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to pur-
chase and own firearms.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own firearms.
(Politico) – Donald Trump thrust himself to the fore of the gun debate on Wednesday, announcing
that he’ll meet with the National Rifle Association to discuss banning people on the terror and no-fly
watch lists from purchasing firearms.
His unprompted announcement pressures the gun lobby to help reach a compromise on the contentious
proposal in the wake of the worst mass shooting in American history.
Though Trump’s proactive stance on the terror watch list issue is new, he has previously expressed
his support of such a ban. Following November’s terrorist attacks in Paris in which 130 people died,
Trump backed a Democratic-pushed measure to bar people on the watch list from purchasing guns.
Trump’s position appeared to signal a shift from the traditional Republican stance, which had dis-
missed such bans just one day ago as ineffective or unconstitutional, if not both.
If Donald Trump decides today that he supports ‘No Fly, No Buy,’ it will be just the latest disagree-
ment that House Republicans say they have with him.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms?
1.2 Wave 1, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments
Wave 1, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Charter Schools
• Control: Charter schools are schools that are publicly funded but are not managed by the local
school board. These schools are expected to meet promised objectives, but are exempt from many
state regulations.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the formation of charter schools?
• Personal plea treatment: Charter school are schools that are publicly funded but are not managed
by the local school board. These schools are expected to meet promised objectives, but are exempt
from many state regulations. Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
charter schools.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports charter schools, as stated in the most recent
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official Democratic Party Platform:
“We support democratically governed, great neighborhood public schools and high-quality public
charter schools...We believe that high-quality public charter schools should provide options for par-
ents.”
However, Joe Biden opposes charter schools, saying:
“I do not support any federal money...for charter schools—period. The bottom line is it siphons
off money from public schools, which are already in enough trouble.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the formation of charter schools?
• Simple statement treatment: Charter school are schools that are publicly funded but are not
managed by the local school board. These schools are expected to meet promised objectives, but
are exempt from many state regulations. Please read the following statements before deciding your
position on charter schools.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports charter schools.
However, Joe Biden opposes charter schools.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the formation of charter schools?
• News article treatment: Charter school are schools that are publicly funded but are not managed
by the local school board. These schools are expected to meet promised objectives, but are exempt
from many state regulations. Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on charter schools.
(Washington Post) – Democrats have long backed charter schools as a politically safe way to give
kids at low-performing schools more options. Many supported merit pay for the best teachers and
holding schools accountable for test scores.
When asked about charters privately run, publicly funded schools during a recent forum with the
American Federation of Teachers, Joe Biden sounded a negative note, saying that charter schools
siphon money from the public school system.
It’s an unsettling development for charter school advocates, and a sharp turn from where many
Democrats have been.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the formation of charter schools?
Wave 1, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Marijuana Legal-
ization
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational
use?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports legalizing marijuana for recreational use, as
stated in the most recent official Democratic Party Platform:
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“We encourage the federal government to remove marijuana from the list of “Schedule 1” federal
controlled substances and to appropriately regulate it, providing a reasoned pathway for future legal-
ization.”
However, Joe Biden opposes legalizing marijuana for recreational use, saying:
“The truth of the matter is, there’s not nearly been enough evidence that has been acquired as to
whether or not it is a gateway drug. It’s a debate, and I want a lot more before I legalize it nationally.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational use?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
However, Joe Biden opposes legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational use?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on banning all Muslims from entering the United States.
(USA Today) – Former Vice President Joe Biden said Saturday that more study is needed to de-
termine whether marijuana is “a gateway drug,” making him the only one of the leading Democratic
presidential primary candidates to oppose legalization on the federal level.
Though Biden opposes legalization on the federal level, he said anyone incarcerated for marijuana
should be released and criminal records should be expunged of any marijuana charges.
Biden’s stance contrasts with most other Democratic candidates who seek the nomination from voters
who heavily favor legalization. According to a poll from the Pew Research Center that was released
Thursday, 78% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say marijuana should be legal.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational use?
Wave 1, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Federal Funding
for Abortion
• Control: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to save the life of the
woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• Personal plea treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to
save the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following
statements before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes the Hyde Amendment, as stated in the most
recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We will continue to oppose—and seek to overturn—federal and state laws and policies that im-
pede a woman’s access to abortion, including by repealing the Hyde Amendment.”
However, Joe Biden supports the Hyde Amendment, saying:
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“I’m a bit of an odd man out in my party—I do not vote for funding for abortion...I won’t sup-
port public funding [for abortion].”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• Simple statement treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except
to save the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following
statements before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes the Hyde Amendment.
However, Joe Biden supports the Hyde Amendment.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• News article treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to save
the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following recent
news story before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
(USA Today) – Former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who has shunned Democratic Party
orthodoxy, again broke with his party’s base and many of his campaign rivals on Wednesday when
his campaign confirmed that he still backs the Hyde Amendment, a measure that prohibits the use
of federal funds for abortion with exceptions for cases involving rape, incest and when the life of the
mother is in danger.
The backlash to Mr. Biden came swiftly from Democrats who support abortion rights, with many
noting that the Hyde Amendment disproportionately affects economically disadvantaged women and
women of color.
Several of Mr. Biden’s primary opponents moved quickly Wednesday to highlight their own oppo-
sition to the Hyde Amendment, underscoring how sharply Mr. Biden’s position differs from most
Democrats. The measure, which dates to the 1970s, pertains to Medicaid funding of abortion, which
is why opponents say the restrictions affect poor women most directly.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
Wave 1, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Social Security
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
expanding Social Security benefits.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports expanding Social Security benefits, as stated
in the most recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We will fight every effort to cut, privatize, or weaken Social Security, including attempts to raise the
retirement age, diminish benefits by cutting cost-of-living adjustments, or reducing earned benefits.
Democrats will expand Social Security so that every American can retire with dignity and respect.”
However, while he was a US Senator, Joe Biden opposed expanding Social Security bene-
fits, saying:
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“When I argued that we should freeze federal spending, I meant Social Security as well...And I
not only tried it once, I tried it twice, I tried it a third time, and I tried it a fourth time.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on expanding Social Security benefits.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports expanding Social Security benefits.
However, while he was a US Senator, Joe Biden opposed expanding Social Security bene-
fits.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on expanding Social Security benefits.
(Politico) – For the past week, candidates running for the Democratic party presidential nomi-
nation have discussed former vice president Joe Biden’s long-standing record entertaining cuts to
Social Security, an opposing position from that of progressives and many mainstream Democrats.
Biden’s challengers said Tuesday will be time for Biden to answer hard questions about his past
onstage, saying that the difference between Biden and other Democrats “is a contrast Democratic
voters deserve to know.”
Biden’s advisers said the former vice president will be ready to take on and prevail against their
attacks onstage just as he did when opponents Kamala Harris, Kirsten Gillibrand, Julián Castro, and
Bill de Blasio went after him, only to see their critiques fall flat as they lost ground and exited the
race as Biden pressed ahead.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
Wave 1, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Border Wall
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the
southern border of the US?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes adding fencing along the southern border, as
stated in the most recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We are not a country that cowers behind walls...Democrats reject [the] proposal to build a wall
on our southern border and alienate Mexico, a valuable partner.”
However, while he was a US Senator, Joe Biden voted in favor of adding fencing along the
southern border of the US, saying:
“Folks, I voted for a fence, I voted, unlike most Democrats—and some of you won’t like it—I voted
for 700 miles of fence...let me tell you something folks, people are driving across that border with
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tons, tons, hear me, tons of everything from byproducts for methamphetamine to cocaine to heroin
and it’s all coming up through corrupt Mexico.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes adding fencing along the southern border.
However, while he was a US Senator, Joe Biden voted in favor of adding fencing along the
southern border of the US.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
(CNN) – Joe Biden once argued a fence was needed stop “tons” of drugs coming into the country
from “corrupt Mexico.”
Then-Senator Biden’s past comments, which he made in the run-up to and during the 2008 pres-
idential race, show an approach to the issue of immigration that could run afoul of his party as Biden
seeks the Democratic nomination to take on President Donald Trump in 2020. It also shows how
Biden’s long record in government can at times provide a contrast to the Democratic Party, which
opposes increasing border fencing.
Speaking to a South Carolina rotary club in November 2006, Biden touted his support for the Secure
Fence Act – a bill that authorized 700 miles of double-layered fence on the border through more than
a billion dollars in appropriations.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
1.3 Wave 1, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments
Wave 1, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Trade Tariffs
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose limiting free trade by raising tariffs
and barriers to imports from other countries?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to imports from other countries.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers
to imports from other countries, as stated in a recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We have also sought to promote free and fair trade. Because of the economic dynamism of the
Asia-Pacific region, which is already home to more than half the global economy, expanding trade
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with that region is critical to creating jobs and opportunities for the American people.
Building on the free trade agreement with South Korea...we are on track to finalize the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, a historic high-standard agreement that will address new and emerging trade issues,
lower barriers to the free flow of trade and investment, increase exports, and create more American
jobs. We will work to expand free and fair trade in the Americas as well.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to im-
ports from other countries, a stance he reiterated in this recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose limiting free trade by raising tariffs and
barriers to imports from other countries?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to imports from other countries.
The Democratic Party opposes limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to imports
from other countries.
However, Bernie Sanders supports limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to im-
ports from other countries.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose limiting free trade by raising tariffs and
barriers to imports from other countries?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to imports from other countries.
WASHINGTON, D.C. (Reuters) – At a meeting of the Democratic Party draft platform com-
mittee in Orlando, Florida, supporters of Bernie Sanders were unable to influence the committee to
adopt strong language opposing the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact, marking
a powerful blow to the efforts by the U.S. senator from Vermont to push the party away from free
trade agreements.
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“We did everything we could to win that vote,” said Sanders policy adviser Warren Gunnels. “It
was very disappointing.”
Instead of a condemnation specific to the TPP, the Democratic committee reached language say-
ing they would oppose “trade agreements that do not support good American jobs.”
Sanders has headed the effort to oppose the TPP and free trade deals like it, which he says are
unfair to American workers.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose limiting free trade by raising tariffs and
barriers to imports from other countries?
Wave 1, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Canceling Stu-
dent Debt
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student debt in the
country?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
canceling all student debt in the country.
The Democratic Party opposes canceling all student debt, as stated in the most recent official
Democratic Party Platform:
“Democrats will allow those who currently have student debt to refinance their loans at the low-
est rates possible. We will simplify and expand access to income-based repayment.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports canceling all student debt, a stance he reiterated in a
recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student debt?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on canceling all student debt in the country.
The Democratic Party opposes canceling all student debt.
However, Bernie Sanders supports canceling all student debt.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student debt?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on canceling all student debt in the country.
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(Washington Post) – As Bernie Sanders has risen in the polls, some Democrats have voiced
concerns about his candidacy. The senator from Vermont is running to enact sweeping changes.
House Democratic leaders emphasized sticking to noncontroversial “kitchen table” issues designed
to draw broad support. But Sanders and his allies are advancing a strikingly different strategy. By
taking unorthodox positions, such as eliminating all student-loan debt, they are discussing ideas rarely
broached by Democrats.
Some of the tensions between Sanders and Democratic leaders eased after his bruising campaign
against Clinton in 2016, but the friction is still apparent at his campaign events, where Sanders has
continued to rail against the party establishment.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student debt?
Wave 1, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Medicare-for-All
• Control: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the federal government
would be the sole insurer.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare for All?
• Personal plea treatment: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the
federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following statements before deciding
your position on Medicare-for-all.
The Democratic Party opposes Medicare-for-All, as stated in a recent official Democratic Party
Platform:
“Families and individuals should have the option of keeping the coverage they have or choosing from
a wide array of health insurance plans, including many private health insurance options and a public
plan.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports Medicare-for-All, a stance he reiterated in a recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare-for-All?
• Simple statement treatment: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which
the federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following statements before deciding
your position on Medicare-for-all.
The Democratic Party opposes Medicare-for-All.
However, Bernie Sanders supports Medicare-for-All.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare-for-All?
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• News article treatment: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the
federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following recent news story before
deciding your position on Medicare-for-All.
(Washington Post) – In the end, literally, the candidates returned to health care.
Just before their closing statements, the seven candidates who qualified for the last debate of 2019
talked about the practicality of sweeping health care reform specifically, “Medicare for All.”
In light of the Obama administration’s challenges passing the Affordable Care Act nearly a decade
ago, most Democrats don’t seem to think that replacing the nation’s existing health care with a
single-payer system is realistic. They note that Americans are already paying taxes for a relatively
small portion of the population to be covered by Medicare, and fear taxes would skyrocket under a
single-payer system.
Yes, Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont replied, taxes would go up under his Medicare for All plan.
But premiums, deductibles and out-of-pocket expenses would disappear, he said, and there would be
an annual cap on prescription drug costs.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare for All?
Wave 1, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Fracking Ban
• Control: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for extracting oil or natural
gas from deep underground.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
• Personal plea treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for ex-
tracting oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following news statements before
deciding your position on fracking.
The Democratic Party opposes banning fracking in the United States, as stated in a recent
official Democratic Party Platform:
“We can move towards a sustainable energy-independent future if we harness all of America’s great
natural resources. Harnessing our natural gas resources needs to be done...We will continue to advo-
cate for the use of this clean fossil fuel.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports banning fracking in the United States, a stance he re-
iterated in this recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
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• Simple statement treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for
extracting oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following statements before
deciding your position on fracking.
The Democratic Party opposes banning fracking in the United States.
However, Bernie Sanders supports banning fracking in the United States.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
• News article treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for extract-
ing oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following recent news story before
deciding your position on fracking.
(Washington Post) – The idea of banning fracking, a natural-gas extraction process the pre-
vious Democratic administration encouraged while pursuing other limits to fossil fuel exploration, is
one of many that has moved from the Democratic fringes to the 2020 primary. While Sanders ran
on a fracking ban in 2016, the Democratic National Committee voted narrowly not to endorse the
ban. In 2018, when Sanders campaigned in Colorado, he avoided talking about a ballot measure that
would have drastically limited the area where natural gas companies could explore; the statewide
Democratic ticket did not support it.
Since then, a total and immediate ban on fracking, short for hydraulic fracturing, has reappeared
in Sanders’s comprehensive climate plan.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
Wave 1, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Decriminalizing
Undocumented Border Crossing
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing
the border into the United States without proper documentation?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
The Democratic Party opposes decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the
United States without proper documentation, as stated in a recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“The American people are a welcoming and generous people, but those who enter our country’s
borders illegally, and those who employ them, disrespect the rule of the law. We need to secure our
borders, and support additional personnel, infrastructure, and technology on the border and at our
ports of entry.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into
the United States without proper documentation, saying:
“No human being is illegal. Unauthorized presence in the United States is a civil, not a criminal, of-
fense...[I will] return to the long-time standard of handling border crossings through civil proceedings.”
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Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
The Democratic Party opposes decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the
United States without proper documentation.
However, Bernie Sanders supports decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into
the United States without proper documentation.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
• News article treatment: Please read the following news item before deciding your position on
decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
(LA Times) – Bernie Sanders is adding his support to a call for decriminalizing illegal border
crossings, a proposal thats further exposing deep ideological divides in the Democratic party.
The issue illustrates another important fault line between traditional Democrats, who oppose de-
criminalizing the border, and those like Sanders who support it.
Sanders said he was taking back an issue that should be about humanitarianism and not be viewed
through the national security prism it often has been since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks nor used to
stoke racist fears for political gain.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
1.4 Wave 1, Warren × Democratic Party Treatments
Wave 1, Warren × Democratic Party Treatments, Trade Tariffs
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose limiting free trade by raising tariffs
and barriers to imports from other countries?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to imports from other countries.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers
to imports from other countries, as stated in a recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We have also sought to promote free and fair trade. Because of the economic dynamism of the
Asia-Pacific region, which is already home to more than half the global economy, expanding trade
with that region is critical to creating jobs and opportunities for the American people.
Building on the free trade agreement with South Korea...we are on track to finalize the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, a historic high-standard agreement that will address new and emerging trade issues,
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lower barriers to the free flow of trade and investment, increase exports, and create more American
jobs. We will work to expand free and fair trade in the Americas as well.”
However, Elizabeth Warren supports limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to im-
ports from other countries, a stance she reiterated in this recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose limiting free trade by raising tariffs and
barriers to imports from other countries?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to imports from other countries.
The Democratic Party opposes limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to imports
from other countries.
However, Elizabeth Warren supports limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to im-
ports from other countries.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose limiting free trade by raising tariffs and
barriers to imports from other countries?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on limiting free trade by raising tariffs and barriers to imports from other countries.
(POLITO) – The most important trade bill in a decade has pitted Elizabeth Warren against
virtually every Democrat who supports a landmark piece of legislation that would allow Democrats
to close what could be the biggest free-trade deal in history.
The open warring among Democrats over fast-track trade legislation, and the party’s broader existen-
tial crisis on free trade, grew more pronounced Thursday as senior Democratic lawmakers announced
a breakthrough on their trade bill. Some Democrats still feel the burn, 20 years later, of lost man-
ufacturing jobs from the North American Free Trade Agreement pushed through by a Democratic
administration.
What’s at stake substantively is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-country free-trade deal that
would dwarf NAFTA. But there’s also much more at stake politically for a Democratic Party whose
progressive wing is enjoying an upswing thanks to the aggressive populism of Elizabeth Warren, who
is unabashedly anti-free trade deal.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose limiting free trade by raising tariffs and
barriers to imports from other countries?
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Wave 1, Warren × Democratic Party Treatments, National Gun
Registry
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose federal law requiring every gun in
the country to be registered, regardless of states’ individual laws?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
federal law requiring every gun in the country to be registered.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes a federal law requiring every gun in the
country to be registered, preferring a state-by-state approach, as stated in a recent Democratic
Party Platform:
“We recognize that the right to bear arms is an important part of the American tradition, and
we will preserve Americans’ Second Amendment right to own and use firearms. We believe that the
right to own firearms ifs subject to reasonable regulation, but we know that what works in Chicago
may not work in Cheyanne.”
However, Elizabeth Warren supports a federal law requiring every gun in the country
to be registered, a stance she recently reiterated:
“Yes, we need to create a federal licensing system. States with strict licensing requirements ex-
perience lower rates of gun trafficking and violence. A license is required to drive a car, and Congress
should establish a similarly straightforward federal licensing system for the purchase of any type of
firearm or ammunition.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose federal law requiring every gun in the country
to be registered, regardless of states’ individual laws?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on federal law requiring every gun in the country to be registered.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes a federal law requiring every gun in the
country to be registered, preferring a state-by-state approach.
However, Elizabeth Warren supports a federal law requiring every gun in the country
to be registered.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose federal law requiring every gun in the country
to be registered, regardless of states’ individual laws?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on federal law requiring every gun in the country to be registered.
(New York Times) – Senator Elizabeth Warren expressed support for a federal gun registry, an
idea that many Democrats used to dismiss exasperatedly as gun-lobby scaremongering.
Democrats generally have tried to counter the idea of a federal registry: No, they said, background
checks wouldn’t lead to a registry. They didn’t want to “take away your guns.” They dismissed such
talk as gun-lobby alarmism. Warren, however, is proposing to create just such a registry.
Some Democrats have said that a registration requirement should apply only to assault weapon own-
ers who chose not to participate in a voluntary buyback program. But Ms. Warren was unequivocal
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in proposing more than that, saying that she believe all guns should be registered.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose federal law requiring every gun in the country
to be registered, regardless of states’ individual laws?
Wave 1, Warren × Democratic Party Treatments, Medicare-for-All
• Control: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the federal government
would be the sole insurer.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare for All?
• Personal plea treatment: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the
federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following statements before deciding
your position on Medicare-for-all.
The Democratic Party opposes Medicare-for-All, as stated in a recent official Democratic Party
Platform:
“Families and individuals should have the option of keeping the coverage they have or choosing from
a wide array of health insurance plans, including many private health insurance options and a public
plan.”
However, Elizabeth Warren supports Medicare-for-All, a stance she reiterated in a recent
Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare-for-All?
• Simple statement treatment: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which
the federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following statements before deciding
your position on Medicare-for-all.
The Democratic Party opposes Medicare-for-All.
However, Elizabeth Warren supports Medicare-for-All.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare-for-All?
• News article treatment: Medicare for All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the
federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following recent news story before
deciding your position on Medicare-for-all.
(The Hill) – Senate Democrats are distancing themselves from Senator Elizabeth Warren’s “Medi-
care for All” plan.
Warren rolled out her proposal for Medicare for All last week, instantly fanning the flames of a
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raging debate among the Democratic party over the idea. Democratic senators on Tuesday said flatly
that they would not vote for Warren’s plan if she were president in 2021.
The proposed elimination of private insurance and its trillions of dollars in tax hikes are prime reasons
Democrats cite for rejecting her approach. Many Democratic senators said they prefer an optional
government-run insurance plan, known as a public option.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare-for-All?
Wave 1, Warren × Democratic Party Treatments, Fracking Ban
• Control: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for extracting oil or natural
gas from deep underground.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
• Personal plea treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for ex-
tracting oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following news statements before
deciding your position on fracking.
The Democratic Party opposes banning fracking in the United States, as stated in a recent
official Democratic Party Platform:
“We can move towards a sustainable energy-independent future if we harness all of America’s great
natural resources. Harnessing our natural gas resources needs to be done...We will continue to advo-
cate for the use of this clean fossil fuel.”
However, Elizabeth Warren supports banning fracking in the United States, a stance she
reiterated in this recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
• Simple statement treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for
extracting oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following statements before
deciding your position on fracking.
The Democratic Party opposes banning fracking in the United States.
However, Elizabeth Warren supports banning fracking in the United States.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
• News article treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for extract-
ing oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following recent news story before
deciding your position on fracking.
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(LA Times) – The idea of banning fracking, a natural-gas extraction process the previous Demo-
cratic administration encouraged while pursuing other limits to fossil fuel exploration, is one that has
moved from the Democratic fringes to the 2020 primary.
In 2016, the Democratic National Committee voted narrowly not to endorse the ban. In 2018 in
Colorado, the statewide Democratic ticket did not support a ballot measure that would have drasti-
cally limited the area where natural gas companies could explore. Since then, Warren has stated that
she would sign an executive order banning fracking everywhere.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
Wave 1, Warren × Democratic Party Treatments, Decriminalizing
Undocumented Border Crossing
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing
the border into the United States without proper documentation?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
The Democratic Party opposes decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the
United States without proper documentation, as stated in a recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“The American people are a welcoming and generous people, but those who enter our country’s
borders illegally, and those who employ them, disrespect the rule of the law. We need to secure our
borders, and support additional personnel, infrastructure, and technology on the border and at our
ports of entry.”
However, Elizabeth Warren supports decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into
the United States without proper documentation, saying:
“As president, I will immediately issue guidance to end criminal prosecutions for simple adminis-
trative immigration violations...and refocus our limited resources on actual criminals and real threats
to the United States”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
The Democratic Party opposes decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the
United States without proper documentation.
However, Elizabeth Warren supports decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into
the United States without proper documentation.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
• News article treatment: Please read the following news items before deciding your position on
decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
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(LA Times) – Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren is adding her support to a call for de-
criminalizing illegal border crossings, a proposal that’s further exposing deep ideological divides in
the Democratic party. Warren called in July for repealing the criminal prohibition against crossing
the border illegally, promising in her own immigration plan to end criminal prosecutions for adminis-
trative immigration violations.
The issue illustrates another important fault line between traditional Democrats, who oppose the
measure, and those like Warren, who support it.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
1.5 Wave 1, Buttigieg × Democratic Party Treatments
Wave 1, Buttigieg × Democratic Party Treatments, Trade Tariffs
• Control: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement among 11 Pacific
Rim economies, including the United States.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the U.S. joining the TPP?
• Personal plea treatment: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement
among Pacific Rim economies, including the United States. Please read the following statements
before deciding your position on the U.S. joining the TPP.
The Democratic Party supports joining the TPP, as stated in a recent official Democratic
Party Platform:
“We have also sought to promote free and fair trade. Because of the economic dynamism of the
Asia-Pacific region, which is already home to more than half the global economy, expanding trade
with that region is critical to creating jobs and opportunities for the American people.
Building on the free trade agreement with South Korea...we are on track to finalize the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, a historic high-standard agreement that will address new and emerging trade issues,
lower barriers to the free flow of trade and investment, increase exports, and create more American
jobs.”
However, Pete Buttigieg opposes joining the TPP, saying:
“I would not support the US joining the current TPP. It lacks critical trade provisions on labor,
environment, and the digital economy, and does not align closely enough with the needs and interests
of American workers.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the U.S. joining the TPP?
• Simple statement treatment: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agree-
ment among Pacific Rim economies, including the United States. Please read the following statements
before deciding your position on the U.S. joining the TPP.
The Democratic Party supports joining the TPP.
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However, Pete Buttigieg opposes joining the TPP.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the U.S. joining the TPP?
• News article treatment: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement
among Pacific Rim economies, including the United States. Please read the following recent news
story before deciding your position on the U.S. joining the TPP.
(Vox) – “I think we’re at a tipping point, says Thea Lee, who leads the lefty Economic Policy
Institute, which is skeptical of free trade agreements. “You could see Democrats retreat to their usual
pro-trade stance. My hope is we can convince people that’s not an option. We’re not going to go
back to the status quo ante. What we need to do is have a forward-looking vision.”
Previous Democratic presidents put the party on the path of free trade, pursuing trade liberaliza-
tion through proposals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership in service of embracing global competition.
Trade is one issue where the president has a lot of freedom to set his or her own agenda once in office,
even if a president ultimately needs Congress to ratify new trade deals.
Pete Buttigieg is proposing a reorientation for the Democratic trade agenda, opposing free trade
deals like NAFTA and the TPP, while others are staking out a more traditional position in favor of
free trade agreements.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the U.S. joining the TPP?
Wave 1, Buttigieg × Democratic Party Treatments, Gun Licensing
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose federal law requiring a license for
every gun owner, regardless of states’ individual laws?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
federal law requiring a license for every gun owner, regardless of states’ individual laws.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes a federal law requiring a license for every
gun owner, preferring a state-by-state approach, as stated in a recent Democratic Party Platform:
“We recognize that the right to bear arms is an important part of the American tradition, and
we will preserve Americans’ Second Amendment right to own and use firearms. We believe that the
right to own firearms ifs subject to reasonable regulation, but we know that what works in Chicago
may not work in Cheyanne.”
However, Pete Buttigieg supports a federal law requiring requiring a license for every
gun owner, a stance he reiterated in this recent Tweet:
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Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose federal law requiring a license for every
gun owner, regardless of states’ individual laws?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on federal law requiring a license for every gun owner, regardless of states’ individual laws.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes a federal law requiring a license for ev-
ery gun owner, preferring a state-by-state approach.
However, Pete Buttigieg supports a federal law requiring requiring a license for every
gun owner.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose federal law requiring a license for every
gun owner, regardless of states’ individual laws?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on federal law requiring a license for every gun owner, regardless of states’ individual laws.
(Vox) – On Tuesday, South Bend, Indiana Mayor Pete Buttigieg released a detailed, multi-point
plan for curbing gun violence.
Buttigieg’s plan goes further than Democrats have traditionally. Instead of advocating for better
background checks and an assault weapons ban, as Democrats have for decades, Buttigieg is propos-
ing a federal system that would require everyone to obtain a license to own and buy a gun, regardless
of states’ individual laws.
Other Democrats have been skeptical of a federal licensing system, arguing that a gun licensing
system will not change whether or not people buy weapons, what kinds of weapons they can buy,
where they can use them, how they can store them.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose federal law requiring a license for every
gun owner, regardless of states’ individual laws?
Wave 1, Buttigieg × Democratic Party Treatments, Defense Spend-
ing
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose lowering the amount the United
States spends on defense?
• Personal plea treatment:Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
lowering the amount the United States spends on defense.
The Democratic Party supports lowering defense spending, as stated in a recent official
Democratic Party Platform:
“In our current fiscal environment, we must also make tough budgetary decisions across the board
and that includes within the defense budget. The Budget Control Act enacted with the support
of...Democrats, mandates reductions in federal spending, including defense spending.”
However, Pete Buttigieg opposes lowering defense spending, saying:
“America’s security challenges demand a military budget that provides both the overall capacity
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and specific capabilities to deter conflict across the globe and fight and win if necessary. I’ve been
clear that we need to maintain absolute military superiority.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose lowering the amount the United States spends
on defense?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on lowering the amount the United States spends on defense.
The Democratic Party supports lowering defense spending.
However, Pete Buttigieg opposes lowering defense spending.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose lowering the amount the United States spends
on defense?
• News article treatment: Please read the following news items before deciding your position on
lowering the amount the United States spends on defense.
(The Atlantic)– Many Democrats have been crystal clear in what they see wrong with America’s
foreign policy in recent years. Democrats believe former presidents tolerated a rigged global economy,
did not pay enough attention to oligarchic authoritarianism, and set the defense budget far too high.
Buttigieg, however, struck a different note than Democrats typically sound on the defense budget. He
a different question does America have the right type of military? rather than calling for unilateral
cuts. He made a powerful case for modernization to deal with future threats.
Buttigieg still has a lot of work to do to unpack what this means, but was bold in staking out
an alternative to the typical Democratic position.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose lowering the amount the United States spends
on defense?
Wave 1, Buttigieg × Democratic Party Treatments, Troop With-
drawal from Afghanistan
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose an immediate withdrawal of all
U.S. military troops from Afghanistan?
• Personal plea treatment:Please read the following statements before deciding your position on an
immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military troops from Afghanistan.
The Democratic Party opposes an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military troops from
Afghanistan, as stated in the most recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“In Afghanistan, we will work with the NATO-led coalition of partners to bolster the democratically-
elected government. Democrats will continue to push for an Afghan-led peace process and press both
Afghanistan and Pakistan to deny terrorists sanctuary on either side of the border. We support [the]
decision to maintain a limited troop presence in Afghanistan and ensure that Afghanistan never again
serves as a haven for terrorists to plan and launch attacks on our homeland.”
However, Pete Buttigieg supports an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military troops
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from Afghanistan, a stance he reiterated in this recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. mili-
tary troops from Afghanistan?
• Simple statement treatment:Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military troops from Afghanistan.
The Democratic Party opposes an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military troops from
Afghanistan.
However, Pete Buttigieg supports an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military troops
from Afghanistan.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. mili-
tary troops from Afghanistan?
• News article treatment:Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military troops from Afghanistan.
(New York Times) – For 18 years and four presidential elections, Democrats running for president
have felt compelled to lay out comprehensive plans for the future of Afghanistan, vowing to never
again let the country become a breeding ground for terrorists who could strike the United States as
they did on Sept. 11, 2001.
Even while deeply opposing President George W. Bush’s war in Iraq, Democrats saw Afghanistan
as the good war, prompted by a direct attack on the United States.
Now, candidates like Pete Buttigieg, who has pledged to withdraw the troops within a year of taking
office, are committing to quickly ending the long-running conflict, a stance that is different from the
one Democrats have usually adopted.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. mili-
tary troops from Afghanistan?
Wave 1, Buttigieg × Democratic Party Treatments, Charter Schools
• Control: Charter schools are schools that are publicly funded but are not managed by the local
school board. These schools are expected to meet promised objectives, but are exempt from many
state regulations.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the formation of charter schools?
• Personal plea treatment: Charter school are schools that are publicly funded but are not managed
by the local school board. These schools are expected to meet promised objectives, but are exempt
from many state regulations. Please read the following news items before deciding your position on
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charter schools.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports charter schools, as stated in the most recent
official Democratic Party Platform:
“We support democratically governed, great neighborhood public schools and high-quality public
charter schoolsWe believe that high-quality public charter schools should provide options for parents.”
However, Pete Buttigieg opposes charter schools, saying:
“I’m skeptical that we’re going to gain a lot through expansion of charter schools when we still
have such severely underfunded traditional public education...I believe that we need to move away
from charter schools altogether.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the formation of charter schools?
• Simple statement treatment: Charter school are schools that are publicly funded but are not
managed by the local school board. These schools are expected to meet promised objectives, but
are exempt from many state regulations. Please read the following news items before deciding your
position on charter schools.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports charter schools.
However, Pete Buttigieg opposes charter schools.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the formation of charter schools?
• News article treatment: Charter school are schools that are publicly funded but are not managed
by the local school board. These schools are expected to meet promised objectives, but are exempt
from many state regulations. Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on charter schools.
(The New York Times) – Charter schools, which educate over three million students, are publicly
funded and privately managed and often are not unionized. Nationally, the schools perform about
the same as traditional neighborhood schools.
Since the 1990s, the charter school movement has had Democratic backing. It was central to President
Barack Obama’s education legacy. But this year, some like Pete Buttigieg are backing away from
charter schools, and siding with the teachers’ unions that oppose their expansion.
Mayor Pete Buttigieg of South Bend, Ind., has raised questions about the role of charters and makes
no mention of the schools in his education platforms. Buttigieg has also said that he wants to curb
the role of for-profit charter schools.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the formation of charter schools?
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2 Wave 2 Treatments
2.1 Wave 2, Trump × Republican Party Treatments
Wave 2, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, NATO
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation, or NATO?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.
The Republican Party traditionally supports NATO, as stated in a recent Republican Party
Platform:
“Ensuring the continued vitality of our political alliance with Europe through NATO will require
effort and understanding on both sides of the Atlantic.”
However, Donald Trump opposes NATO, a stance he recently reiterated in the following Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
or NATO?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.
The Republican Party traditionally supports NATO.
However, Donald Trump opposes NATO.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
or NATO?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.
(Washington Post) – President Trump clearly dislikes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
During his 2016 campaign, Trump dismissed the organization as “obsolete” and regularly grouses
that allies are not “paying their bills.” Such comments have strained Trumps relationships with allied
leaders and weakened the ties of the alliance.
It marks the end of an era in which Republican presidents embraced flexible, multilateral alliances
that could adapt to changing conditions and safeguard American interests worldwide.
NATO has historically been as much, if not more, of a Republican project as a Democratic one. The
alliance’s Republican ties go back to Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served as the first supreme allied
commander of NATO before entering the White House.
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In a rare move, Senate Republicans invited the NATO secretary general to speak before Congress
today reportedly without the White House’s consent. The decision highlights the distance between
NATO and the White House.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or
NATO?
Wave 2, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, Muslim Ban
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning all Muslims from entering
the United States?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
banning all Muslims from entering the United States.
The Republican Party opposes banning Muslims from entering the United States and
supports Muslims in the U.S., as stated in a recent official Republican Party Platform:
“The struggle in which we are engaged is ideological, not ethnic or religious. The extremists we
face are abusers of faith, not its champions. We appreciate the loyalty of all Americans whose family
roots lie in the Middle East, and we gratefully acknowledge the contributions of American Arabs and
Muslims.”
However, Donald Trump supports banning Muslims from entering the United States, say-
ing:
“Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses,
our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and
have no sense of reason or respect for human life.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning all Muslims from entering the United
States?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on banning all Muslims from entering the United States.
The Republican Party opposes banning Muslims from entering the United States and
supports Muslims in the U.S.
However, Donald Trump supports banning Muslims from entering the United States.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning all Muslims from entering the United
States?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on banning all Muslims from entering the United States.
(BBC) – Over the past few weeks, word spread that Republican elders were increasingly anxious at
the damage Donald Trump was doing to their party.
With Trump’s latest pronouncement on closing the US borders to all Muslims, that anxiety has
become palpable panic. Virtually all those in Trump’s party, Republican officials past and present,
have joined in condemning him.
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“As a conservative who truly cares about religious liberty, Donald Trump’s bad idea and rhetoric send
a shiver down my spine,” Tweeted the head of the Republican Party in South Carolina.
Donald Trump echoes the traditional conservative condemnations of the federal government in Wash-
ington, DC, as a bloated, wasteful institution populated by career politicians who are, intentionally
or not, bringing harm to the nation. But he takes those lines and uses them as a blunderbuss against
everyone in power, Republicans included.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning all Muslims from entering the United
States?
Wave 2, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, Influencing the
Federal Reserve
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing presidents to influence
decisions made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encouraging the Fed to lower interest
rates?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encourag-
ing the Fed to lower interest rates.
The Republican Party opposes allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the
Federal Reserve, especially the lowering of interest rates, as stated in the most recent official Re-
publican Party Platform:
“[We support an] annual audit of the Federal Reserve’s activities. Such an audit would need to
be carefully implemented so that the Federal Reserve remains insulated from political pressures and
its decisions are based on sound economic principles and sound money rather than political pressures
for easy money and loose credit.”
However, Donald Trump supports allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the
Federal Reserve, especially the lowering interest rates, a stance he reiterated in this recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing presidents to influence decisions
made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encouraging the Fed to lower interest rates?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encour-
aging the Fed to lower interest rates.
The Republican Party opposes allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the
Federal Reserve, especially the lowering of interest rates.
However, Donald Trump supports allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the
Federal Reserve, especially the lowering interest rates.
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Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing presidents to influence decisions
made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encouraging the Fed to lower interest rates?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on allowing presidents to influence decisions made by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encour-
aging the Fed to lower interest rates.
(Washington Post) – President Trump dramatically escalated his pressure on the Federal Reserve
to cut interest rates later this month, attacking for the first time the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York in his months-long criticism of the central bank.
Many economists, including those within his own party, dispute his views, warning that low interest
rates at this point in the business cycle could create dangerous bubbles that damage the economy
with little notice.
Few presidents in modern history have publicly jawboned the central bank as much as Trump, and it
has raised concerns among Republicans about politicization and the prospect that Trump has eroded
the central bank’s independence. But Trump and top aides have brushed the criticism aside and
continued their blistering attacks.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing presidents to influence decisions made
by the Federal Reserve, or the Fed, such as encouraging the Fed to lower interest rates?
Wave 2, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, Abortion Funding
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing government funds to go
to organizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
allowing government funds to go to organizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
The Republican Party traditionally opposes allowing government funds to go to orga-
nizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood, as stated in the most recent official
Republican Party Platform:
“We oppose the use of public funds to perform or promote abortion or to fund organizations, like
Planned Parenthood, so long as they provide or refer for elective abortions.”
However, Donald Trump supports allowing government funds to go to organizations that
provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood, saying:
“I would look at the good aspects of [Planned Parenthood], and I would also look because Im sure
they do some things properly and good for women. I would look at that, and I would look at other
aspects also, but we have to take care of women.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing government funds to go to orga-
nizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on allowing government funds to go to organizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
The Republican Party traditionally opposes allowing government funds to go to orga-
nizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
However, Donald Trump supports allowing government funds to go to organizations that
provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
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Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing government funds to go to orga-
nizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood?
• News treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position on al-
lowing government funds to go to organizations that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood.
(Politico) – Speaking on CNNs “New Day” Tuesday morning, Donald Trump said that before
defunding Planned Parenthood entirely, he would look at the positive aspects of the organization.
Under current law, no government funding is allowed to go to abortions, which Planned Parenthood
says make up 3 percent of its services.
Trump’s comments set him in a different category than most Republicans, who are advocating to shut
down the organization entirely and move all funds to community health centers that do not perform
abortions.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose allowing government funds to go to organiza-
tions that provide abortions, like Planned Parenthood?
Wave 2, Trump × Republican Party Treatments, Firearm Sales
Restrictions
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on individuals’
rights to purchase and own firearms?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own firearms.
The Republican Party opposes increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase
and own firearms, as stated in a recent official Republican Party Platform:
“We uphold the right of individuals to keep and bear arms, a natural inalienable right that predates
the Constitution and is secured by the Second Amendment...We oppose any effort to deprive individ-
uals of their right to keep and bear arms.”
However, Donald Trump supports increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to pur-
chase and own firearms, a stance he reiterated in a recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own firearms.
The Republican Party opposes increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase
and own firearms.
However, Donald Trump supports increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to pur-
chase and own firearms.
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Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights to purchase and own firearms.
(Politico) – Donald Trump thrust himself to the fore of the gun debate on Wednesday, announcing
that he’ll meet with the National Rifle Association to discuss banning people on the terror and no-fly
watch lists from purchasing firearms.
His unprompted announcement pressures the gun lobby to help reach a compromise on the contentious
proposal in the wake of the worst mass shooting in American history.
Though Trump’s proactive stance on the terror watch list issue is new, he has previously expressed
his support of such a ban. Following November’s terrorist attacks in Paris in which 130 people died,
Trump backed a Democratic-pushed measure to bar people on the watch list from purchasing guns.
Trump’s position appeared to signal a shift from the traditional Republican stance, which had dis-
missed such bans just one day ago as ineffective or unconstitutional, if not both.
If Donald Trump decides today that he supports ‘No Fly, No Buy,’ it will be just the latest disagree-
ment that House Republicans say they have with him.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose increasing restrictions on individuals’ rights
to purchase and own firearms?
2.2 Wave 2, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments
Wave 2, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Market-Based Car-
bon Limits
• Control: In environmental policy, market-based solutions use taxes and other economic variables
to provide incentives for polluters to reduce or eliminate negative environmental effects, rather than
setting firm caps on pollution.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the use of market-based solutions for re-
ducing carbon emissions?
• Personal plea treatment: In environmental policy, market-based solutions use taxes and other
economic variables to provide incentives for polluters to reduce or eliminate negative environmental
effects, rather than setting firm caps on pollution.
Please read the following statements before deciding your position on market-based solutions for
reducing carbon emissions.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports market-based approaches to reducing car-
bon emissions, as stated in the most recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“Democrats believe that carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases should be priced to
reflect their negative externalities, and to accelerate the transition to a clean energy economy.”
However, Joe Biden opposes market-based approaches, preferring to set firm caps on pol-
lution, a stance he reiterated in the following Tweet:
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Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the use of market-based solutions for re-
ducing carbon emissions?
• Simple statement treatment: In environmental policy, market-based solutions use taxes and other
economic variables to provide incentives for polluters to reduce or eliminate negative environmental
effects, rather than setting firm caps on pollution.
Please read the following statements before deciding your position on market-based solutions for
reducing carbon emissions.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports market-based approaches to reducing car-
bon emissions.
However, Joe Biden opposes market-based approaches, preferring to set firm caps on pol-
lution.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the use of market-based solutions for re-
ducing carbon emissions?
• News article treatment: In environmental policy, market-based solutions use taxes and other
economic variables to provide incentives for polluters to reduce or eliminate negative environmental
effects, rather than setting firm caps on pollution.
Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position on market-based solutions
to reduce emissions.
(The Wall Street Journal) Joe Biden’s emergence as the 2020 Democratic presidential front-
runner is widely cast as a victory for moderates over progressives. On climate change, however, Mr.
Biden proposes a significantly bigger government role than Democrats traditionally have during White
House campaigns.
On climate change, Mr. Biden has called for eliminating carbon emissions by 2050, compared with
the 80% reduction that was the party consensus four years ago. Biden has not emphasized a carbon
tax, a popular idea among Democrats, and one that still draws support from economists in both par-
ties. “Biden has moved against a carbon price,” now preferring “industrial policy over market-based
approaches,” said Leah Stokes, a political scientist at the University of California, Santa Barbara,
who studies environmental politics.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the use of market-based solutions for re-
ducing carbon emissions?
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Wave 2, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Marijuana Legal-
ization
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational
use?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports legalizing marijuana for recreational use, as
stated in the most recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We encourage the federal government to remove marijuana from the list of “Schedule 1” federal
controlled substances and to appropriately regulate it, providing a reasoned pathway for future legal-
ization.”
However, Joe Biden opposes legalizing marijuana for recreational use, saying:
“The truth of the matter is, there’s not nearly been enough evidence that has been acquired as to
whether or not it is a gateway drug. It’s a debate, and I want a lot more before I legalize it nationally.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational use?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
However, Joe Biden opposes legalizing marijuana for recreational use.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational use?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on banning all Muslims from entering the United States.
(USA Today) – Former Vice President Joe Biden said Saturday that more study is needed to de-
termine whether marijuana is “a gateway drug,” making him the only one of the leading Democratic
presidential primary candidates to oppose legalization on the federal level.
Though Biden opposes legalization on the federal level, he said anyone incarcerated for marijuana
should be released and criminal records should be expunged of any marijuana charges.
Biden’s stance contrasts with most other Democratic candidates who seek the nomination from voters
who heavily favor legalization. According to a poll from the Pew Research Center that was released
Thursday, 78% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say marijuana should be legal.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose legalizing marijuana for recreational use?
Wave 2, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Federal Funding
for Abortion
• Control: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to save the life of the
woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
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• Personal plea treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to
save the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following
statements before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes the Hyde Amendment, as stated in the most
recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We will continue to oppose—and seek to overturn—federal and state laws and policies that im-
pede a woman’s access to abortion, including by repealing the Hyde Amendment.”
However, Joe Biden supports the Hyde Amendment, saying:
“I’m a bit of an odd man out in my party—I do not vote for funding for abortion...I won’t sup-
port public funding [for abortion].”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• Simple statement treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except
to save the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following
statements before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes the Hyde Amendment.
However, Joe Biden supports the Hyde Amendment.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• News article treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to save
the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following recent
news story before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
(USA Today) – Former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who has shunned Democratic Party
orthodoxy, again broke with his party’s base and many of his campaign rivals on Wednesday when
his campaign confirmed that he still backs the Hyde Amendment, a measure that prohibits the use
of federal funds for abortion with exceptions for cases involving rape, incest and when the life of the
mother is in danger.
The backlash to Mr. Biden came swiftly from Democrats who support abortion rights, with many
noting that the Hyde Amendment disproportionately affects economically disadvantaged women and
women of color.
Several of Mr. Biden’s primary opponents moved quickly Wednesday to highlight their own oppo-
sition to the Hyde Amendment, underscoring how sharply Mr. Biden’s position differs from most
Democrats. The measure, which dates to the 1970s, pertains to Medicaid funding of abortion, which
is why opponents say the restrictions affect poor women most directly.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
Wave 2, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Social Security
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
expanding Social Security benefits.
226
The Democratic Party traditionally supports expanding Social Security benefits, as stated
in the most recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We will fight every effort to cut, privatize, or weaken Social Security, including attempts to raise the
retirement age, diminish benefits by cutting cost-of-living adjustments, or reducing earned benefits.
Democrats will expand Social Security so that every American can retire with dignity and respect.”
However, while he was a US Senator, Joe Biden opposed expanding Social Security bene-
fits, saying:
“When I argued that we should freeze federal spending, I meant Social Security as well...And I
not only tried it once, I tried it twice, I tried it a third time, and I tried it a fourth time.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on expanding Social Security benefits.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports expanding Social Security benefits.
However, while he was a US Senator, Joe Biden opposed expanding Social Security bene-
fits.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on expanding Social Security benefits.
(Politico) – For the past week, candidates running for the Democratic party presidential nomi-
nation have discussed former vice president Joe Biden’s long-standing record entertaining cuts to
Social Security, an opposing position from that of progressives and many mainstream Democrats.
Biden’s challengers said Tuesday will be time for Biden to answer hard questions about his past
onstage, saying that the difference between Biden and other Democrats “is a contrast Democratic
voters deserve to know.”
Biden’s advisers said the former vice president will be ready to take on and prevail against their
attacks onstage just as he did when opponents Kamala Harris, Kirsten Gillibrand, Julián Castro, and
Bill de Blasio went after him, only to see their critiques fall flat as they lost ground and exited the
race as Biden pressed ahead.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
Wave 2, Biden × Democratic Party Treatments, Border Wall
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the
southern border of the US?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
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The Democratic Party traditionally opposes adding fencing along the southern border, as
stated in the most recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“We are not a country that cowers behind walls...Democrats reject [the] proposal to build a wall
on our southern border and alienate Mexico, a valuable partner.”
However, while he was a US Senator, Joe Biden voted in favor of adding fencing along the
southern border of the US, saying:
“Folks, I voted for a fence, I voted, unlike most Democrats—and some of you won’t like it—I voted
for 700 miles of fence...let me tell you something folks, people are driving across that border with
tons, tons, hear me, tons of everything from byproducts for methamphetamine to cocaine to heroin
and it’s all coming up through corrupt Mexico.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
The Democratic Party traditionally opposes adding fencing along the southern border.
However, while he was a US Senator, Joe Biden voted in favor of adding fencing along the
southern border of the US.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
(CNN) – Joe Biden once argued a fence was needed stop “tons” of drugs coming into the country
from “corrupt Mexico.”
Then-Senator Biden’s past comments, which he made in the run-up to and during the 2008 pres-
idential race, show an approach to the issue of immigration that could run afoul of his party as Biden
seeks the Democratic nomination to take on President Donald Trump in 2020. It also shows how
Biden’s long record in government can at times provide a contrast to the Democratic Party, which
opposes increasing border fencing.
Speaking to a South Carolina rotary club in November 2006, Biden touted his support for the Secure
Fence Act – a bill that authorized 700 miles of double-layered fence on the border through more than
a billion dollars in appropriations.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
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2.3 Wave 2, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments Supporters
Wave 2, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments Supporters, Brady
Bill
• Control: The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a waiting period in order
to purchase a firearm.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Brady Bill?
• Personal plea treatment: The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a wait-
ing period in order to purchase a firearm.
Please read the following statements before deciding your position on the Brady Bill.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports the Brady Bill, as stated in a recent official
Democratic Party Platform:
“To build on the success of the lifesaving Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, we will expand
and strengthen background checks and close dangerous loopholes in our current laws.”
However, Bernie Sanders voted against the Brady Bill, saying:
“There is not a “one size fits all” policy that would be appropriate for the entire nation. There-
fore, I opposed the “Brady Bill” [and] the seven day waiting period.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Brady Bill?
• Simple statement treatment:The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a
waiting period in order to purchase a firearm.
Please read the following statements before deciding your position on the Brady Bill.
The Democratic Party traditionally supports the Brady Bill.
However, Bernie Sanders voted against the Brady Bill.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Brady Bill?
• News article treatment: The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a waiting
period in order to purchase a firearm.
Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position on the Brady Bill.
(The Atlantic) – Bernie Sanders’ hallmark has been his consistency as an unbending progres-
sive over four decades in elected office. Yet if Sanders has embodied left-wing purity more than any of
the other potential Democratic nominees, gun policy is one area where his record has been far from
pristine in the eyes of Democrats.
The debate on gun control has shifted rapidly in the Democratic Party as mass shootings continue
to devastate communities across the country. For the second straight election, Sanders’s rivals are
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homing in on his past votes against tighter gun restrictions in a bid to halt his momentum. In debates
and interviews, opponents accused Sanders of siding “with the gun lobby” by opposing early versions
of the 1993 Brady bill and later by voting to shield gun manufacturers from liability if the weapons
they sold were used in violent crimes.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Brady Bill?
Wave 2, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Canceling Stu-
dent Debt
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student debt in the
country?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
canceling all student debt in the country.
The Democratic Party opposes canceling all student debt, as stated in the most recent official
Democratic Party Platform:
“Democrats will allow those who currently have student debt to refinance their loans at the low-
est rates possible. We will simplify and expand access to income-based repayment.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports canceling all student debt, a stance he reiterated in a
recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student debt?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on canceling all student debt in the country.
The Democratic Party opposes canceling all student debt.
However, Bernie Sanders supports canceling all student debt.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student debt?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on canceling all student debt in the country.
(Washington Post) – As Bernie Sanders has risen in the polls, some Democrats have voiced
concerns about his candidacy. The senator from Vermont is running to enact sweeping changes.
House Democratic leaders emphasized sticking to noncontroversial “kitchen table” issues designed
to draw broad support. But Sanders and his allies are advancing a strikingly different strategy. By
taking unorthodox positions, such as eliminating all student-loan debt, they are discussing ideas rarely
230
broached by Democrats.
Some of the tensions between Sanders and Democratic leaders eased after his bruising campaign
against Clinton in 2016, but the friction is still apparent at his campaign events, where Sanders has
continued to rail against the party establishment.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student debt?
Wave 2, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Medicare-for-All
• Control: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the federal government
would be the sole insurer.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare for All?
• Personal plea treatment: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the
federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following statements before deciding
your position on Medicare-for-all.
The Democratic Party opposes Medicare-for-All, as stated in a recent official Democratic Party
Platform:
“Families and individuals should have the option of keeping the coverage they have or choosing from
a wide array of health insurance plans, including many private health insurance options and a public
plan.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports Medicare-for-All, a stance he reiterated in a recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare-for-All?
• Simple statement treatment: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which
the federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following statements before deciding
your position on Medicare-for-all.
The Democratic Party opposes Medicare-for-All.
However, Bernie Sanders supports Medicare-for-All.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare-for-All?
• News article treatment: Medicare-for-All is a plan to create a healthcare system in which the
federal government would be the sole insurer. Please read the following recent news story before
deciding your position on Medicare-for-All.
(Washington Post) – In the end, literally, the candidates returned to health care.
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Just before their closing statements, the seven candidates who qualified for the last debate of 2019
talked about the practicality of sweeping health care reform specifically, “Medicare for All.”
In light of the Obama administration’s challenges passing the Affordable Care Act nearly a decade
ago, most Democrats don’t seem to think that replacing the nation’s existing health care with a
single-payer system is realistic. They note that Americans are already paying taxes for a relatively
small portion of the population to be covered by Medicare, and fear taxes would skyrocket under a
single-payer system.
Yes, Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont replied, taxes would go up under his Medicare for All plan.
But premiums, deductibles and out-of-pocket expenses would disappear, he said, and there would be
an annual cap on prescription drug costs.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose Medicare for All?
Wave 2, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Fracking Ban
• Control: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for extracting oil or natural
gas from deep underground.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
• Personal plea treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for ex-
tracting oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following news statements before
deciding your position on fracking.
The Democratic Party opposes banning fracking in the United States, as stated in a recent
official Democratic Party Platform:
“We can move towards a sustainable energy-independent future if we harness all of America’s great
natural resources. Harnessing our natural gas resources needs to be done...We will continue to advo-
cate for the use of this clean fossil fuel.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports banning fracking in the United States, a stance he re-
iterated in this recent Tweet:
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
• Simple statement treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for
extracting oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following statements before
deciding your position on fracking.
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The Democratic Party opposes banning fracking in the United States.
However, Bernie Sanders supports banning fracking in the United States.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
• News article treatment: Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a drilling technique used for extract-
ing oil or natural gas from deep underground. Please read the following recent news story before
deciding your position on fracking.
(Washington Post) – The idea of banning fracking, a natural-gas extraction process the pre-
vious Democratic administration encouraged while pursuing other limits to fossil fuel exploration, is
one of many that has moved from the Democratic fringes to the 2020 primary. While Sanders ran
on a fracking ban in 2016, the Democratic National Committee voted narrowly not to endorse the
ban. In 2018, when Sanders campaigned in Colorado, he avoided talking about a ballot measure that
would have drastically limited the area where natural gas companies could explore; the statewide
Democratic ticket did not support it.
Since then, a total and immediate ban on fracking, short for hydraulic fracturing, has reappeared
in Sanders’s comprehensive climate plan.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose banning fracking in the United States?
Wave 2, Sanders × Democratic Party Treatments, Decriminalizing
Undocumented Border Crossing
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing
the border into the United States without proper documentation?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
The Democratic Party opposes decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the
United States without proper documentation, as stated in a recent official Democratic Party Platform:
“The American people are a welcoming and generous people, but those who enter our country’s
borders illegally, and those who employ them, disrespect the rule of the law. We need to secure our
borders, and support additional personnel, infrastructure, and technology on the border and at our
ports of entry.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into
the United States without proper documentation, saying:
“No human being is illegal. Unauthorized presence in the United States is a civil, not a criminal, of-
fense...[I will] return to the long-time standard of handling border crossings through civil proceedings.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
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The Democratic Party opposes decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the
United States without proper documentation.
However, Bernie Sanders supports decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into
the United States without proper documentation.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
• News article treatment: Please read the following news item before deciding your position on
decriminalizing the act of crossing the border into the United States without proper documentation.
(LA Times) – Bernie Sanders is adding his support to a call for decriminalizing illegal border
crossings, a proposal thats further exposing deep ideological divides in the Democratic party.
The issue illustrates another important fault line between traditional Democrats, who oppose de-
criminalizing the border, and those like Sanders who support it.
Sanders said he was taking back an issue that should be about humanitarianism and not be viewed
through the national security prism it often has been since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks nor used to
stoke racist fears for political gain.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose decriminalizing the act of crossing the border
into the United States without proper documentation?
3 Wave 3 Treatments
3.1 Wave 3, Biden × Sanders Treatments
Wave 3, Biden × Sanders Treatments, Brady Bill
• Control: The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a waiting period in order
to purchase a firearm.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Brady Bill?
• Personal plea treatment: The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a wait-
ing period in order to purchase a firearm.
Please read the following statements before deciding your position on the Brady Bill.
Joe Biden supported the Brady Bill, saying:
“I’m the only person that has beaten the NRA nationally. I’m the guy that got the Brady Bill
passed, the background checks.”
However, Bernie Sanders voted against the Brady Bill, saying:
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“There is not a “one size fits all” policy that would be appropriate for the entire nation. There-
fore, I opposed the “Brady Bill” [and] the seven day waiting period.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Brady Bill?
• Simple statement treatment:The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a
waiting period in order to purchase a firearm.
Please read the following statements before deciding your position on the Brady Bill.
Joe Biden supported the Brady Bill.
However, Bernie Sanders voted against the Brady Bill.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Brady Bill?
• News article treatment: The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a waiting
period in order to purchase a firearm.
Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position on the Brady Bill.
(The Atlantic) – The Brady Bill is a law requiring federal background checks and a waiting
period in order to purchase a firearm. Please read the following recent news story before deciding
your position on the Brady Bill.
(The Atlantic) – Bernie Sanders’ hallmark has been his consistency as an unbending progressive over
four decades in elected office. Yet if Sanders has embodied left-wing purity more than any of the other
potential Democratic nominees, gun policy is one area where his record has been far from pristine in
the eyes of Democrats.
The debate on gun control has shifted rapidly in the Democratic Party as mass shootings continue to
devastate communities across the country. For the second straight election, Sanders’ rivals, like Joe
Biden, are homing in on his past votes against tighter gun restrictions in a bid to halt his momentum.
In debates and interviews, Biden accused Sanders of siding “with the gun lobby” by opposing early
versions of the 1993 Brady bill, which Biden supported.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Brady Bill?
Wave 3, Biden × Sanders Treatments, Border Wall
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the
southern border of the US?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
While he was a US Senator, Joe Biden voted in favor of adding fencing along the southern
border of the US, saying:
“Folks, I voted for a fence, I voted, unlike most Democrats—and some of you won’t like it—I voted
for 700 miles of fence...let me tell you something folks, people are driving across that border with
tons, tons, hear me, tons of everything from byproducts for methamphetamine to cocaine to heroin
and it’s all coming up through corrupt Mexico.”
However, Bernie Sanders opposes adding fencing along the southern border of the US, saying:
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“We don’t need a wall and we don’t need barbwire. I think the wall is an absurd idea. I think
it’s a waste of money...No, I am not going to support a wall.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
While he was a US Senator, Joe Biden voted in favor of adding fencing along the southern
border of the US.
However, Bernie Sanders opposes adding fencing along the southern border.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on adding barriers along the southern border of the US.
(The Boston Globe) – In 2006, the Secure Fence Act authorized a barrier along the southern
border, showing how concerns over border security occupied Washington well before the current ad-
ministration. The bill was passed into law with the support of Democratic party leaders like Joe Biden.
The plan was not nearly as expansive as a wall along the entire border. It allowed for about 700
miles of fencing along certain stretches. Congress put aside $1.4 billion for the fence, but the whole
cost, including maintenance, was pegged at $50 billion over 25 years, according to analyses at the time.
Only one current Democratic leader voted against the bill: That’s Bernie Sanders, who was in the
House of Representatives at the time.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose adding a physical barrier along the southern
border of the US?
Wave 3, Biden × Sanders Treatments, Electoral College Reform
• Control: The Electoral College is a unique method for indirectly electing the president of the United
States. In the Electoral College system, each state gets a certain number of electors based on its total
number of representatives in Congress. The candidate that gets more than half the total number of
electoral votes wins the election.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose getting rid of the electoral college and switching
to a national popular vote for presidential elections?
• Personal plea treatment: The Electoral College is a unique method for indirectly electing the
president of the United States. In the Electoral College system, each state gets a certain number of
electors based on its total number of representatives in Congress. The candidate that gets more than
half the total number of electoral votes wins the election. Please read the following statements before
deciding your position on the electoral college.
Joe Biden opposes getting rid of the Electoral College, saying
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“[T]hat structural change requires constitutional amendments. It raises problems that are more dam-
aging than the problem that exists.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports getting rid of the Electoral College, saying:
“It is hard to defend a system in which we have a president who lost the popular vote by 3 mil-
lion votes, so the answer is yes.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose getting rid of the Electoral College and
switching to a national popular vote for presidential elections?
• Simple statement treatment: The Electoral College is a unique method for indirectly electing the
president of the United States. In the Electoral College system, each state gets a certain number of
electors based on its total number of representatives in Congress. The candidate that gets more than
half the total number of electoral votes wins the election. Please read the following statements before
deciding your position on the electoral college.
Joe Biden opposes getting rid of the Electoral College.
However, Bernie Sanders supports getting rid of the Electoral College.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose getting rid of the Electoral College and
switching to a national popular vote for presidential elections?
• News article treatment: The Electoral College is a unique method for indirectly electing the presi-
dent of the United States. In the Electoral College system, each state gets a certain number of electors
based on its total number of representatives in Congress. The candidate that gets more than half the
total number of electoral votes wins the election. Please read the following recent news story before
deciding your position on the electoral college.
NBC News – Hardened by years of fruitless struggles to move nominees and legislation, several
Democratic candidates have argued for changes to make it harder for the minority party to stymie
legislation.
Bernie Sanders called for ending the Electoral College and moving to a national vote for president, an
idea with new momentum among Democrats after Trump lost the popular vote by 2.8 million votes
just 16 years after President George W. Bush won the White House despite trailing Al Gore by over
500,000 votes nationwide.
But others worry about upending longstanding institutions, especially candidates who have spent
significant time working in them, and have raised concerns that the other side would retaliate with
similar changes. Biden is opposed moving to a national popular vote for presidential elections.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose getting rid of the electoral college and switching
to a national popular vote for presidential elections?
Wave 3, Biden × Sanders Treatments, Federal Funding for Abortion
• Control: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to save the life of the
woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
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• Personal plea treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to
save the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following
statements before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
Joe Biden supports the Hyde Amendment, saying:
“I’m a bit of an odd man out in my party—I do not vote for funding for abortion...I won’t sup-
port public funding [for abortion].”
However, Bernie Sanders opposes the Hyde Amendment, saying:
“I voted against the Hyde Amendment, which denies low-income women the right to get an abortion.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• Simple statement treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except
to save the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following
statements before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
Joe Biden supports the Hyde Amendment.
However, Bernie Sanders opposes the Hyde Amendment.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• News article treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to save
the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following recent
news story before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
(The New York Times) – Former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who has shunned Democratic
Party orthodoxy, again broke with many of his campaign rivals on Wednesday when his campaign
confirmed that he still backs the Hyde Amendment, a measure that prohibits the use of federal funds
for abortion with exceptions for cases involving rape, incest and when the life of the mother is in
danger.
The backlash to Mr. Biden came swiftly from Democrats like Bernie Sanders, who support abor-
tion rights, with many noting that the Hyde Amendment disproportionately affects economically
disadvantaged women and women of color. Mr. Sanders moved quickly Wednesday to highlight his
own opposition to the Hyde Amendment.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
Wave 3, Biden × Sanders Treatments, Social Security
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
expanding Social Security benefits.
While he was a US Senator, Joe Biden opposed expanding Social Security benefits, say-
ing:
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“When I argued that we should freeze federal spending, I meant Social Security as well...And I
not only tried it once, I tried it twice, I tried it a third time, and I tried it a fourth time.”
However, Bernie Sanders supports expanding Social Security benefits, saying:
“We’re not going to cut Social Security benefits. We’re going to expand them.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on expanding Social Security benefits.
While he was a US Senator, Joe Biden opposed expanding Social Security benefits.
However, Bernie Sanders supports expanding Social Security benefits.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on expanding Social Security benefits.
(Politico) – For the past week, candidates running for the Democratic party presidential nom-
ination have discussed former vice president Joe Biden’s long-standing record entertaining cuts to
Social Security, an opposing position from that of progressives like Bernie Sanders.
The Sanders campaign said Tuesday will be time for Biden to answer hard questions about his past
onstage, saying that the difference between Biden and Sanders “is a contrast Democratic voters de-
serve to know.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
3.2 Wave 3, Biden × Warren Treatments
Wave 3, Biden × Warren Treatments, Student Debt
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student loan debt in
the country?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
canceling all student loan debt in the country.
Elizabeth Warren supports canceling all student loan debt, a stance she reiterated in a
recent Tweet:
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However, Joe Biden opposes canceling all student loan debt, saying:
“I don’t think you should be paying for my son [Hunter] going to Yale Law School. I don’t think you
should be paying for my daughter [Ashley] to go to the University of Pennsylvania.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student loan debt?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on canceling all student loan debt in the country.
Elizabeth Warren supports canceling all student loan debt.
However, Joe Biden opposes canceling all student loan debt.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student loan debt?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on canceling all student loan debt in the country.
Forbes – Former Vice President Joe Biden and Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren are early
front runners for the Democratic presidential nomination.
These two have different visions of how to tackle the student debt crisis, as do the other Demo-
cratic candidates. Still, the candidates fall roughly into two camps.
Progressives like Warren want to eliminate some or all current student debt and provide free col-
lege for all Americans. More moderate Democrats, such as Biden, want to help student loan holders
handle their debt and make college more affordable, but not necessarily free for all.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose canceling all student loan debt?
Wave 3, Biden × Warren Treatments, Wealth Tax
• Control: A “wealth tax” is an annual tax on the net wealth a person holds, instead of the income
they bring in each year.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose establishing a wealth tax?
• Personal plea treatment: A “wealth tax” is an annual tax on the net wealth a person holds,
instead of the income they bring in each year. Please read the following statements before deciding
your position on establishing a wealth tax.
Joe Biden opposes establishing a wealth tax, saying he prefers other methods:
“These include closing the stepped-up basis loophole, raising the capital gains tax rate on millionaires,
and reverting to the 2009 real estate tax rates and exemption levels.”
However, Elizabeth Warren supports establishing a wealth tax, saying:
“It’s time for a wealth tax in America. It’s time to say the top one-tenth of 1%...to pitch in two
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cents of your wealth.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose establishing a wealth tax?
• Simple statement treatment: A “wealth tax” is an annual tax on the net wealth a person holds,
instead of the income they bring in each year. Please read the following statements before deciding
your position on establishing a wealth tax.
Joe Biden opposes establishing a wealth tax.
However, Elizabeth Warren supports establishing a wealth tax.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose establishing a wealth tax?
• News article treatment: A “wealth tax” is an annual tax on the net wealth a person holds, instead
of the income they bring in each year. Please read the following recent news story before deciding
your position on establishing a wealth tax.
Washington Post – The Democratic presidential candidates split Tuesday night over proposals
to impose hefty wealth taxes on the richest Americans, exposing an economic policy divide in the
party over the need to close the gap between the super-rich and everyone else.
Sen. Elizabeth Warren defended her proposal to heavily tax the assets held by the wealthiest Amer-
icans to create a number of new government programs, as their more centrist opponents, like Joe
Biden, either dodged the question or pushed back against the idea.
Biden has proposed raising capital gains taxes on millionaires and eliminating a loophole that al-
lows heirs to receive capital gains tax-free, according to his campaign, but has not embraced measures
that would raise as much money as the wealth tax pitched by Warren.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose establishing a wealth tax?
Wave 3, Biden × Warren Treatments, Electoral College Reform
• Control: The Electoral College is a unique method for indirectly electing the president of the United
States. In the Electoral College system, each state gets a certain number of electors based on its total
number of representatives in Congress. The candidate that gets more than half the total number of
electoral votes wins the election.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose getting rid of the electoral college and switching
to a national popular vote for presidential elections?
• Personal plea treatment: The Electoral College is a unique method for indirectly electing the
president of the United States. In the Electoral College system, each state gets a certain number of
electors based on its total number of representatives in Congress. The candidate that gets more than
half the total number of electoral votes wins the election. Please read the following statements before
deciding your position on the electoral college.
Joe Biden opposes getting rid of the Electoral College, saying
“[T]hat structural change requires constitutional amendments. It raises problems that are more dam-
aging than the problem that exists.”
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However, Elizabeth Warren supports getting rid of the Electoral College, saying:
“My view is that every vote matters. And the way we can make that happen is that we can have
national voting and that means get rid of the Electoral College and every vote counts.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose getting rid of the Electoral College and
switching to a national popular vote for presidential elections?
• Simple statement treatment: The Electoral College is a unique method for indirectly electing the
president of the United States. In the Electoral College system, each state gets a certain number of
electors based on its total number of representatives in Congress. The candidate that gets more than
half the total number of electoral votes wins the election. Please read the following statements before
deciding your position on the electoral college.
Joe Biden opposes getting rid of the Electoral College.
However, Elizabeth Warren supports getting rid of the Electoral College.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose getting rid of the Electoral College and
switching to a national popular vote for presidential elections?
• News article treatment: The Electoral College is a unique method for indirectly electing the presi-
dent of the United States. In the Electoral College system, each state gets a certain number of electors
based on its total number of representatives in Congress. The candidate that gets more than half the
total number of electoral votes wins the election. Please read the following recent news story before
deciding your position on the electoral college.
NBC News – Hardened by years of fruitless struggles to move nominees and legislation, several
Democratic candidates have argued for changes to make it harder for the minority party to stymie
legislation.
Elizabeth Warren called for ending the Electoral College and moving to a national vote for pres-
ident, an idea with new momentum among Democrats after Trump lost the popular vote by 2.8
million votes just 16 years after President George W. Bush won the White House despite trailing Al
Gore by over 500,000 votes nationwide.
But others worry about upending longstanding institutions, especially candidates who have spent
significant time working in them, and have raised concerns that the other side would retaliate with
similar changes. Biden is opposed moving to a national popular vote for presidential elections.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose getting rid of the electoral college and switching
to a national popular vote for presidential elections?
Wave 3, Biden × Warren Treatments, Federal Funding for Abortion
• Control: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to save the life of the
woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• Personal plea treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to
save the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following
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statements before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
Joe Biden supports the Hyde Amendment, saying:
“I’m a bit of an odd man out in my party—I do not vote for funding for abortion...I won’t sup-
port public funding [for abortion].”
However, Elizabeth Warren opposes the Hyde Amendment, saying:
“Yes, we must repeal the Hyde Amendment...Everyone no matter where they live, where they’re
from, how much money they make, or the color of their skin is entitled to the high-quality, evidence-
based reproductive health care.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• Simple statement treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except
to save the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following
statements before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
Joe Biden supports the Hyde Amendment.
However, Elizabeth Warren opposes the Hyde Amendment.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
• News article treatment: The Hyde Amendment blocks federal funding for abortions except to save
the life of the woman, or if the pregnancy arises from incest or rape. Please read the following recent
news story before deciding your position on the Hyde Amendment.
(The New York Times) – Former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who has shunned Democratic
Party orthodoxy, again broke with many of his campaign rivals on Wednesday when his campaign
confirmed that he still backs the Hyde Amendment, a measure that prohibits the use of federal funds
for abortion with exceptions for cases involving rape, incest and when the life of the mother is in
danger.
The backlash to Mr. Biden came swiftly from Democrats like Elizabeth Warren, who support abortion
rights, with many noting that the Hyde Amendment disproportionately affects economically disad-
vantaged women and women of color. Ms. Warren moved quickly Wednesday to highlight her own
opposition to the Hyde Amendment.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Hyde Amendment?
Wave 3, Biden × Warren Treatments, Social Security
• Control: Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• Personal plea treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position on
expanding Social Security benefits.
While he was a US Senator, Joe Biden opposed expanding Social Security benefits, say-
ing:
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“When I argued that we should freeze federal spending, I meant Social Security as well...And I
not only tried it once, I tried it twice, I tried it a third time, and I tried it a fourth time.”
However, Elizabeth Warren supports expanding Social Security benefits, saying:
“It’s time Washington stopped trying to slash Social Security benefits for people who’ve earned them.
It’s time to expand Social Security.”
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• Simple statement treatment: Please read the following statements before deciding your position
on expanding Social Security benefits.
While he was a US Senator, Joe Biden opposed expanding Social Security benefits.
However, Elizabeth Warren supports expanding Social Security benefits.
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
• News article treatment: Please read the following recent news story before deciding your position
on expanding Social Security benefits.
(Vox) – For the vast majority of his career, Biden has been a deficit hawk who’s willing to sacrifice
Social Security benefits for the sake of achieving smaller budget gaps. He’s even bragged about it to
establish a rhetorical contrast with Republican fiscal irresponsibility. And unlike some Biden-related
controversies, this isn’t ancient history. It’s a position Biden maintained as vice president and that
Elizabeth Warren fought against.
More profoundly, the argument reveals a question about governance, one that frames the actual
choices available differently than the typical “revolution versus pragmatism” argument that’s domi-
nated the Democratic campaign so far: What kinds of concessions should or would the next president
make in order to advance other priorities?
Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose expanding Social Security benefits?
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